
Elia Group Financial Report 2021 139
Other incentives
The tariff predefined by the regulator includes, besides the fair remuneration, all the incentives listed below. If Elia does not perform in
line with the targets for these incentives, as set by the regulator, the amount of the incentive allocated to Elia will decrease. The impact
is reflected in the deferred revenues which will generate future tariff decreases, see the description of the settlement mechanism below
(all amounts are pre-tax).
• Market integration: This incentive consists of three elements in the previous regulatory framework: (i) increase of import
capacity, (ii) increase in market welfare due to market coupling and (iii) financial participations. Only the incentive on financial
participations remains. The incentive on market welfare is no longer offered, whereas the one on import capacity has been
replaced by an incentive with a similar objective (increase of cross-border commercial exchange capacity) but with a fairly
different measurement method. Additionally, a new incentive has been created concerning the timely commissioning of
investment projects contributing to market integration. These incentives can contribute positively to the Elia’s profit (from €0 to
€16 million for cross-border capacity, from €0 to €7 million for timely commissioning). The profit (dividends and capital gains)
resulting from financial participations in other companies which CREG has accepted as being part of the RAB, is allocated as
follows: 40% is allocated to future tariff reductions and 60% is allocated to Elia’s profit ).
• Investment programme: This incentive is broadened and is defined as follows: (i) if the average interruption time (AIT) reaches a
target predefined by CREG, Elia’s net profit (pre-tax) could be impacted positively with a maximum of €4.8 million, (ii) should the
availability of the MOG align with the level set by CREG, the incentive can contribute to the Elia’s profit from €0 to €2.53 million
and (iii) Elia could benefit from €0 to €2 million if the predefined portfolio of maintained and redeployed investments is realised in
time and on budget.
• Innovation and grants: The content and the remuneration of this incentive has changed and covers (i) the realisation of
innovative projects which could contribute to the Elia’s remuneration for €0 to €3.7 million (pre-tax) and (ii) the subsidies granted
on innovative projects which could impact the Elia’s profit with a maximum of €0 to €1 million.
• Quality of customer related services: This incentive is broadened and is related to three incentives: (i) the level of client
satisfaction related to the establishment of new grid connections which can generate a profit for Elia of €0 to €1.35 million, (ii)
the level of client satisfaction for the full client base which would contribute €0 to €2.53 million to Elia’s profit and (iii) the quality
of the data that Elia publishes on a regular basis, which can generate remuneration for Elia of €0 to €5 million.
• Enhancement of balance system: This incentive is similar to the discretionary incentive in the previous regulatory framework,
through which Elia is rewarded for implementing certain projects related to system balancing as defined by CREG. This
incentive can generate remuneration between €0 and €2.5 million (pre-tax).
Regulatory framework for the Modular Offshore Grid
The CREG has amended the 2016-2019 tariff methodology to create specific rules applicable to investment in the MOG. A formal
consultation took place in the first weeks of 2018 between CREG and the issuer, and CREG took a decision on 6 December 2018 about
the new parameters to be introduced in the tariff methodology. The main features of said parameters are (i) a specific risk premium to
be applied to this investment (resulting in an additional net return of 1.4%); (ii) a special depreciation rate applicable to MOG assets; (iii)
certain costs specific to the MOG to bear another qualification compared to the costs for onshore activities; (iv) the cost level defined
based on the characteristics of the MOG assets; and (v) dedicated incentives linked to the availability of the offshore assets. For the
tariff period 2020-2023, the regulatory framework for the MOG has been included in the tariff methodology, based on the features
described above, except for the risk premium, which has been applied since 1 January 2020 on a target equity/debt ratio of 40/60.
Regulatory deferral account: deviations from budgeted values
Over the course of a year, the actual volumes of electricity transmitted may differ from the forecast volumes. If the transmitted volumes
are higher (or lower) than those forecast, the deviation is booked to an accrual account during the year in which it occurs. These
deviations from budgeted values (a regulatory debt or a regulatory receivable) are accumulated and will be taken into account when the
tariffs are set for the subsequent tariff period. Regardless of deviations between the forecast parameters for tariff-setting (fair
remuneration, non-controllable elements, controllable elements, influenceable costs, incentive components, cost and revenue allocation
between regulated and non-regulated activities) and the actual incurred costs or revenues related to these parameters, the CREG takes
the final decision each year as to whether the incurred costs/revenue can reasonably be borne by the tariffs. This decision may result in
the rejection of incurred elements. In the event that any incurred elements are rejected, the relevant amount will not be taken into
account when the tariffs are set for the next period. Although Elia can ask for a judicial review of any such decision, if this judicial review
were to be unsuccessful, a rejection may well have an overall negative impact on Elia’s financials.
Cost and revenue allocation between regulated and non-regulated activities
The tariff methodology for 2020-2023 features a mechanism enabling Elia to develop activities outside the Belgian regulated perimeter
and whose costs are not covered by grid tariffs in Belgium. This methodology establishes a mechanism to ensure that Elia's financial
participation in other companies not considered part of the RAB by the CREG (e.g. stakes in regulated or non-regulated activities
outside Belgium) has a neutral impact on Belgian grid users.
Public service obligations
In its role as a TSO, Elia is subject to various public service obligations imposed by the government and/or by regulation mechanisms.
Public authorities/regulation mechanisms identify public service obligations in various fields (such as the promotion of renewable
energy, green certificates, strategic reserves, social support, fees for the use of the public domain, offshore liability) for fulfilment by
TSOs. The costs incurred by the TSO with respect to these obligations are fully covered by the tariff ‘levies’ as approved by the
regulator. The amounts outstanding are reported as levies (see Note 6.9 for other receivables and Note 6.17 for other payables).
9.2. Regulatory framework in Germany
9.2.1. Relevant legislation
The German legal framework is laid down in various pieces of legislation. The key law is the German Energy Act
(Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG), which defines the overall legal framework for the gas and electricity supply industry in
Germany. The EnWG is complemented by a number of laws, ordinances and regulatory decisions, which provide detailed rules
on the current system of incentive regulation, accounting methods and grid access arrangements, including:
• the Ordinance on Electricity Network Tariffs (Verordnung über die Entgelte für den Zugang zu
Elektrizitätsversorgungsnetzen (Stromnetzentgeltverordnung, StromNEV)), which establishes, among other things,
the principles and methods for the grid-tariff calculations and other obligations applying to system operators;
• the Ordinance on Electricity Network Access (Verordnung über den Zugang zu Elektrizitätsversorgungsnetzen
(Stromnetzzugangsverordnung, StromNZV), which, among other things, sets out further details of how to grant access
to the transmission systems (and other types of networks) by way of establishing the balancing groups, the scheduling
of electricity deliveries, control energy and other general obligations, e.g. congestion management
(Engpassmanagement), publication obligations, metering, minimum requirements for various types of contracts and
the duty of certain system operators to manage the balancing amount system for renewable energy;
• the Ordinance on Incentive Regulation (Verordnung über die Anreizregulierung der Energieversorgungsnetze
(Anreizregulierungsverordnung, ARegV)), which sets out the basic rules for incentive regulation for TSOs and other
system operators (as outlined in more detail below). It also describes in general terms how to benchmark efficiency,
which costs are included in the efficiency benchmarking, how to determine inefficiency and how this translates into
yearly targets for efficiency growth.
9.2.2. Regulatory agencies in Germany
The regulatory agencies for the energy sector in Germany are the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA, or Federal Network Agency) in
Bonn for grids to which over 100,000 grid users are directly or indirectly connected and the specific regulatory authorities in the
various federal states for grids to which fewer than 100,000 grid users are directly or indirectly connected. The regulatory
agencies are, among other things, in charge of ensuring non-discriminatory third-party access to grids and monitoring the grid-
use tariffs levied by the TSOs. 50Hertz Transmission and 50Hertz Offshore are subject to the authority of the Federal Network
Agency.
9.2.3. Tariff setting in Germany
The current regulation mechanism is established in Germany by the ARegV. Under the ARegV, grid tariffs are defined to
generate a pre-defined 'revenue cap' as determined by the Federal Network Agency for each TSO and for each regulatory
period. The revenue cap is essentially based on the costs of a base year, and is fixed for the entire regulatory period, except
when it is adjusted to account for specific cases provided for in the ARegV. System operators are not allowed to retain revenue
in excess of their individually determined revenue cap. Each regulatory period lasts five years, with the third regulatory period
starting on 1
st
January 2019 and ending on 31 December 2023. Tariffs are public and cannot be the subject of negotiations with
customers. Only certain customers (under certain set circumstances laid down in the relevant legislation) are allowed to agree to
individual tariffs under Article 19 of the StromNEV (for example, in the case of sole use of a grid asset). The Federal Network
Agency has to approve such individual tariffs.
For the purposes of the revenue cap, the costs incurred by a system operator fall into two categories as follows:
• Permanently non-influenceable costs (PNIC): These costs are fully integrated into the 'revenue cap' and are fully
recovered through the grid tariffs, albeit some of them with a two-year time lag.
o One cost position amongst the PNIC refers to investment measures, meaning costs resulting from new
investments in onshore grid infrastructure. They include return on equity, imputed trade tax, cost of debt,
depreciation and operational costs (currently at a fixed rate of 0.8% of the capitalised investment costs of the
respective onshore investments or 0.2 % for assets under construction within projects approved as of 2019). The
cost of debt related to investment measures is reflected in the interest rate based on acquired debt for the TSO
activity. Since 2012, the costs associated with these investment measures have been based on forecast values.
The differences between the forecast values and the actual values are reflected in the settlement mechanism
deferral account.
o In addition, PNIC include costs relating to ancillary services, grid losses and redispatch costs, as well as European
initiatives and costs from congestion management. These costs and income are included in the revenue cap based
on a procedural regulation mechanism set by the Federal Network Agency in accordance with Article 11(2) of the
ARegV. The regulation process for costs relating to ancillary services, congestion management and grid losses
gives the system operator an incentive to outperform the planned costs through bonus/malus mechanisms.
Moreover, costs resulting from European projects of common interest (PCI) to which Germany is contributing can
be included as PNIC, albeit with a two-year time lag.
• Temporarily non-influenceable costs (TNIC) and influenceable costs (IC): These costs include return on equity,
depreciation, cost of debt, imputed trade tax and other operational expenses and are subject to an incentive mechanism
set by the Federal Network Agency, which features an efficiency factor (only applicable to IC), a productivity improvement
factor and an inflation factor (applicable to both TNIC and IC) over a five-year period. In addition, the current incentive
mechanism provides for the use of a quality factor, but the criteria and implementation mechanism for this factor for TSOs
are yet to be defined by the Federal Network Agency. The various defined factors give the TSOs the medium-term
objective of eliminating what are deemed to be inefficient costs. As regards the cost of debt, the permitted cost of debt
related to influenceable costs needs to be shown to be marketable.