Dear all, thank you for dialing into Frontline's quarterly earnings call. Frontline is reporting its best quarter ever. Our long-term strategy of growing voyage days and wheel to sea exposure during the slim years post-covid has come to fruition and our shareholders are now reaping the benefits. There are lots of moving parts in this market and no playbook. The key takeaway though is that the prevailing situation will have long-term implications. The current environment puts our lean organization to the test and we are extremely thankful for the hard work the Frontline Global team is putting in in keeping the propellers turning in this ocean of profits. Before I give the word to Inger, I'll run through our TCE numbers on slide 3 in the deck. In the second quarter of 2026, Frontline achieved $152,700 per day on our VLCC fleet, $111,400 per day on our SUSMAX fleet, and $92,400 per day on our LR2-AFROMAX fleet. So far in the second quarter of 2026, 86% of our VOCC days are booked at $156,900 per day, 79% of our SUSMAX days are booked at $117,400 per day, and the LR2s are catching up, having booked 70% of the days at $81,000 per day. Again all numbers in this table are on a low to discharge basis with the implications of ballast days at the end of the quarter this has. I'll now let Inger take you through the financial highlights.
Thanks Lars and good morning and good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. Then let's turn to slide four and look at the profit statement. We report profit of 659.2 million or two dollars and 96 cents per share, an adjusted profit of 580.2 million or two dollars and 61 cents per share in the second quarter of 2026. As Lars mentioned, this is the best quarterly profit and adjusted profit ever recorded by the company. The adjusted profit in the second quarter increased by 235.3 million compared with the previous quarter, primarily due to an increase in our TCE earnings. Ship operating expenses decreased by 4.3 million from previous quarter, and that was mainly due to sales of eight wheel to seas in the first quarter and two sous-max tankers in the second quarter and an increase in supply rebates which is partially offset by an increase in general running costs administrative expenses decreased by 2.4 million from previous quarter this excludes the synthetic optional evaluation gain of 5.3 million in the second quarter and then synthetic option revelation loss of 5.8 million in the first quarter adjusted interest expense decreased by 4.8 million from previous quarter due to lower depth and increase decrease in interest rates lastly depreciation decreased by 4.7 million from previous quarter due to sales of vessels let's then look at the balance sheet on slide five frontline has a solid balance sheet and a very strong liquidity of 1.2 billion in cash and cash equivalents, including undrawn amounts of revolver capacity of 901 million. Marketable securities and minimum cash requirements bank as per June the 30th. We have no meaningful death maturities until 2030. Remaining new building commitments as per end June was 601.1 million and relates to the acquisition of the nine new buildings from affiliates of Yemen. The company has secured new building financing of up to 737 million assets out in the press release. Then let's turn to slide six. In the second and third quarter of 2026 we reduced our financing costs through a combination of margin reductions on existing facilities for the remaining tenors and a full refinancing of selected facilities reducing the weighted average interest rate margin by approximately 52 basis points from 178 basis points at the end of the first quarter of 2026 to 126 basis points upon completion of the process in the third quarter of 2026. the reduction was driven by amendments but with 24 basis points refinancings with 21 basis points and new building financing and asset sales with seven basis points We have no deft maturities until 2028 and no meaningful maturities until 2030 supported by increased tenure across the portfolio as shown in the maturity chart. Then we can look at slide 7. Fleet composition, cash break even rates and OPEX. Upon delivery of the remaining WLTC new buildings and sale of two WLTCs, our fleet consists of 40 WLTCs, 19 Suisse Max tankers and 18 Afra Max slash LR2 tankers, has an average age of 6.6 years and consists of 100% eco-vessels where 69% are scrubber fitted. We estimate that average cash break-even rates for the next 12 months of approximately twenty three thousand eight hundred dollars per day for these disease twenty five seven hundred dollars per day for the Zeus max tankers and twenty two two hundred dollars per day for LR2 tankers with a fleet average estimate of about twenty three thousand nine hundred dollars per day this includes stridor cost for seven these disease seven Zeus max tankers and 8 LR2 tankers. It's about $22,300 per day or $1,600 per day less. We recorded OPEX including dry dock in the second quarter of $9,200 per day for VLCC, $9,000 per day for Susmax tankers and $13,300 per day for LR2 tankers. This includes dry dock of one VLC and three LR2 tankers. and the Q2 26 fleet average OPEX excluding JADOK was $8,700 per day. Then lastly, let us look at slide 8 and the cash generation. Frontline has a substantial cash generation potential with about 27,800 burning days annually. And as you can see from this slide, the cash generation potential basis current fleet TC rates and average spot market rates as of August 28 is 2.3 billion dollars over approximately 10 dollars and 35 cents per share providing a cash flow yield of 24 percent basis current share price. A 30 percent increase of these rates will increase the cash generation potential to 3.1 billion dollars or thirty dollars and ninety one cents per share and a 30 percent decrease of these rates will decrease the cash generation potential to 1.5 billion dollars or six dollars and eighty eighty cents per share with this I leave the word to Lars again Central stage, we see increasing risk in and around the Gulf area, both in the Gulf of Oman, in the Red Sea, we also see increased risk in the Black Sea, and the Hotis have
become active again. Tanker rates remain high, and inefficiencies carry the weight of the shipping market. And we also see high-risk premiums on certain trades, in particular inner AG, which is somewhat illiquid, but at least showing on the bottom left-hand chart, you can see how the now somewhat theoretical TD3C index is printing levels nearing $600,000 per day. We tend to look at the TD15, and it's being dwarfed in this connection, but if you look closely on the left-hand scale, it's actually showing very close to $200,000 per day. Oil balances are kept in check by aggressive inventory draws. We are extremely surprised that the oil price manages to keep in this band between, say, $178 and somewhat north of $90. US, China and the rest of the OECD are the key sources of these inventory draws. The question is of course for how long can we draw? The tanker order book paused over the summer. Lead times from ordering to delivery is now moving into three and a half years. So we're talking about 2030 deliveries and we see this has kind of created a bit of a vacuum in the ordering market after a quite frantic activity in the first half of the year. The long-term implications as fleets continue to age will be around the inventory refill story, energy security policies and in the case of some sort of relief or some sort of solution between the US and Iran, sanctions relief could also pay play a part. We are in the midst of a storm I would say, but you know the long-term implications are at least easier to read. If we move to slide 10 and try and kind of analyze a little bit what's behind us, it's actually easier to analyze the market after the fact. We've had an 82% reduction in crude oil exports from inside the Strait of Hormuz. I know this is kind of a big question mark as certain agencies report higher exports than what's recorded out of the Middle East. Others are lower in respect of kind of transits by ocean through the Strait of Hormuz. Frontline are amongst the school of thought that believe we're somewhere between four and a half to five and a half million barrels per day. China crude imports have created a cushion to the oil price we believe and it's actually reduced by 35 percent in the same period. What's happened is that we've seen huge growth in inefficiencies in the market to the tune of 23 percent increase in idling days reveals the sea. But I do note that this is not waiting time or time that where owners like ourselves are fiddling around trying to figure out what to do. This is basically due to the trade itself where inefficiencies are creeping into every aspect of the voyage and under contract and being paid you're actually waiting. We've also seen a great increase in the trade between particularly Latin America, to the east of Suez. This basically results in the effective fleet supply tightening despite a decline in volumes. The increased SDS transfers of Fujaira and around Singapore and Malaysia also add to this. If you can imagine, the cargo flow that formerly used to be from inner Middle East Gulf to, say, Japan, is now like a three times trip. You go firstly from inner range E to Fujaira in some sort of shuttling traffic, then you by way of SDS put the oil into another ship that takes it to Malaysia where you again do an SDS operation before Japanese controlled ships take it in to Japan. So basically moving the same barrels in an increasingly inefficient manner. We do see though that there are large gaps in the tracking data and this also confuses us and most market analysts as a lot of vessels are sailing dark leaving a big blind spot. The headline figures may no longer be representative of the market but what is representative of the market is the rates that we are actually collecting. If you move to the next slide, the flows from Atlantic Basin has grown both outright by way of volume, but more importantly by the way of distances it's actually sailing. In a normal market you will have almost equal volume going from, say, US Gulf into Europe as into Asia. Now a larger part of the volume being exported out of the Dante Basin is actually taking the long route. With the Houthi action we're also seeing some very specific inefficiencies for the Yambo export that formerly used to sail through the Red Sea, where it's now to a greater degree going northbound. Basically, by way of you fill up a VLCC three quarters full, take it through the Suez Canal, and then load up the remaining barrels in Siddiqir, which is the end of the Suez Med pipeline. The supply shortage on the Middle East is further compensated by indubitory draws. virtually any or every corner of the world, with US and China being the largest contributors. Asia x China has increased the sourcing, again adding or creating the same ton of. Despite the volume shortfall as previously mentioned, the inefficiency and the growing distances yields the high tank demand we're currently experiencing. The big question though and this is the question as we near winter is how long can and will we draw on inventories as we approach the the colder season in the northern hemisphere. If you look at the top right chart this is always the onshore crew inventories. We have drawn materially the total, including kind of other inventories as well, is actually nearing a half a billion barrels. There is still a lot of barrels to draw, but there's certainly a limit to how far down the various nations are willing to go in this very insecure situation we're in. If we move to slide 12 and look at the order books, these order books continue to grow or continued, I would like to say, going into Q3. Currently looking at kind of the headline number of VLCCs, the order book is around 33.5% of the existing fleet. I do however think that one should look at the efficient fleet and as we note here around 166 or 167 vessels are not a part of kind of the commercially traded fleet, meaning that the VLCC order book currently is in fact very close to 40%. If you do the same kind of analysis across the asset classes that Frontline is exposed to, you'll get to that the current kind of order book to fleet ratio is in the mid 30%. We're actually closing in on what we saw in 2008-2009, and this is of course a concern looking forward. However, if you look after the aging of the fleet, which we actually didn't have to this extent back in the late 2010, the situation looks far more balanced. So if you move to slide 13, you can see that the total order book of the asset classes we're involved in currently stands around 777 ships. As they deliver over the next five years, will see 578 vessels moving towards the 20-year threshold, which means that we'll have the total population of 1,293 vessels coming to age, assuming no scrapping. This is of course dwarfing the current order book. If we have a look at the summary then from this presentation, the current market dwarfs the previous cycles i'd like to draw your attention to the orange column on the right hand side looking at what we what we thought was the strongest market we've ever seen in 2004 we're now you know twice that almost um the index is lying a little bit because a certain part of it is of course uh being weighed by both TC1 and TD3, which are inner AG loadings. But still, including that, we're way beyond what we've seen in previous years. And as I mentioned earlier in the presentation, constricted global oil supply yields inefficiencies and we see new trades and much longer trade lanes. Growing concern is starting to come forward for the supply cushion provided by primarily US and China. We have the Russia-Ukraine situation adding fuel to the fire with increased risk in the Black Sea. We also see reduced Russian product exports going forward. Although this is in many cases sanctioned barrels, it still adds to the products pool and it particularly affects the diesel supply going forward. The growth in the tanker order book is slowing as the lead times are extending. We also see that yard expansions are stretched. There's been a little bit of a period now since we've heard of new births being launched, particularly in China. Energy security and inventory situation is likely to dominate the narrative if the current situation persists into the winter. Again, And Frontline is center stage with our VLCC heavy, efficient business model. And we do see that the long-term period market is actually starting to price in these disruptions to last for much longer. With that, I would like to open for question and answers.
Operator
Thank you. To ask a question, you will need to press star 1 and 1 on your telephone and wait for your name to be announced. To withdraw your question, please press star 1 and 1 again. We are going to take our first question. One moment. And this question comes from John Chappell from Evercore ISI. Please go ahead.
Thank you. Good afternoon. Lars, last quarter you spoke to, I think it was 5% of the fleet that you were estimated with sitting outside of the strait and that was part of the inefficiencies um didn't mention that today obviously you had a lot of other data but do you have an update on that and as it relates to that is that just right outside of the strait or is there a much greater geographical area that we're talking to where a lot of ships are idling and you know basically adding to the inefficiencies um you know surprisingly um you know we we're actually observing that there that's kind of number of ships that are idling outside of uh of oman you could say or the the gulf of oman
stretching basically all down the indian coast has actually increased but this is increased with the growing kind of volume coming out of the Middle East by way of STS. So firstly, you have the pipeline coming into Fajira and the kind of the Omani Coast outside. But secondly, now you have kind of an increased or have had at least an increased traffic investors coming out for STS business. The timing of this is somewhat difficult to nail down. So it means that if you are a charterer and you book the ship, you're not exactly going to know the dates that STS ship is going to be ready for you. So this is creating a lot of delays. So this is why we see actually the population sitting in that region in particular is actually growing. Completely illogical, to be quite honest, in the current market situation. Okay. Yeah.
Second one, more strategic, obviously a generational market right now, as you laid out in the last slide. And I think Frontline's track record and business model has been clear for the last 30 years. But you're doing some things that you haven't really done before with the time charters and like the two of the three year time charter, special dividend. Could this be an opportunity to really change the capital structure? I know Inger's done a lot with taking the cost of that down and pushing all the maturities out, but could you use some of this generational upside to take the leverage down, or is that just something that's not part of the DNA?
No, I would say it's not really a part of our DNA. As I think I've said many times, you know, we have kind of an informal strategy of trying to cover kind of one third of our revenues as well as covering one third of our key costs, you know, being fuel or interest rates. Currently, the market conditions have kind of prompted us to secure some of the revenues on VLCCs. And we're actually a little bit above 30% right now as we wait for the last new buildings to deliver. But I don't think it's really changed kind of the way we look at the capital allocation you know kind of our our proposition to investors is continues to be that we pay everything out and then we leave to the investor to decide whether if he wants to reinvest that will only kind of and it's never really going to disturb our dividends but i think the special dividends which you pointed to which which came from selling two ships um you know why we decided to just pay it out was basically uh due to the fact that we didn't really see uh much of uh kind of upside in reinvesting it in the market in the current kind of price environment we're in so uh so i think kind of frontline will just continue as we've always done we we pay the money to to to our shareholders um the leverage that we have now is comfortable considering the current market and where we are on asset values and so forth. So I think one should keep that in mind going forward.
All right. Very helpful. Thank you, Lars.
Operator
Thank you. We are now going to take our next question. And this one comes from Greg Lewis from BTIG. Please go ahead.
Yeah, I thank you, and good afternoon, everybody, and thanks for taking my questions. I did want to just, if you could follow up, Lars, more on thoughts around, to John's question around, you know, the decision to do the longer-term time charters. Really, I'm kind of curious. You know, these were obviously opportunistic. You know, historically, we've seen a lot of one-year, it seems like, you know, hey, the price is the price at the time, but one-year time charters in the B market, you know, are available. You know, I'm kind of curious how, and you alluded to it, how is the actual depth of the two, three, and potentially longer time charter market in four VLCCs as we kind of sit here looking at the back half of the year? Or is there really customer demand for these that we could actually see, maybe not frontline, but a real increase of these types of these term deals going forward? Or was this kind of more of like a one-off?
No, it's a very good question. You know, at the time when kind of these two-time charters, the two-year and the three-year were concluded, I would say the depth was somewhat limited. But as we kind of got over the summer and currently, it's quite deep. And this is what we alluded to in our presentation a little bit as well. It seems like kind of, you know, what is deemed intelligent money is now increasingly interested in getting kind of longer term contracts on. So we're talking about oil majors and the big kind of operators. so so um you know we could easily today uh do you know three four uh three-year time charters now kind of if we were willing to to accept the current levels which is well it's still south of eighty thousand dollars per day but closing in and it could actually be north of eighty thousand dollars depending on the position you can deliver the ship in so i would say this is uh you know we don't have a crystal ball in this market, right? So this is why, of course, you tend to end up fixing a little bit too early in retrospect. But I must say that the liquidity wasn't really there either. So you basically just had to make a decision. But now I think the game has changed a little bit. And we see, you know, I think a good indicator is looking at the FFA market. You know, right now, you know, exclusive of the Middle East, so exclusive of TD3C, the TD22, which is US Gulf to Asia kind of marker, that paper is trading kind of close to $100,000 per day for 2028 when there is 115 VLCC is being delivered. So I think the market is starting to potentially price in some of the tailwinds that we've been discussing. That, you know, in the event, well, first of all, the expectation is the situation to prevail for a while, which is just going to add further draws to the inventory, which is further going to strengthen the tailwinds coming out of this ordeal at some point. So I'm actually happy to say that right now that market is pretty deep. I'd like to add one comment, though, which I probably should have mentioned. We did the two time charters, but we also sold two ships. This is actually our way of being able to capture the inner AG profits because the actor that was willing to pay that kind of money for an almost 10-year-old ship, he had a reason for that, basically because it would enable him to get full control of the logistical chain of transporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz, because owners are actually starting, even the more adventurous owners are starting to be a little bit reluctant to sail through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that if you are an inner Middle East or inner AG exporter, you're much better off basically just paying $135 million for a 10-year-old ship and controlling the entire logistical chain yourself. But for us, since we don't trade into the AG, at least not currently, that was a way for us to capture that premium. And hence why we also just paid the proceeds out to shareholders.
Okay, super helpful. And then I did have a question on, I just was looking for some clarity on slide 12 where you kind of laid out your view of the VLCC fleet, the 900 ships. You know, just as we think about those, and I think you mentioned that there's maybe 170 ships that aren't really part of the active fleet. You know, maybe they're doing infrastructure or other types of issues. Is that the sanctioned fleet or is that other vessels because the sanctioned fleet in them, I would think, is trading? Like, how do we think about, you know, where the – and then I'm also curious as we think about that sanctioned fleet, you know, is a good way to think about it of those 170-ish sanctions ships? Those are all 15-plus-year-old vessels, or is it kind of more broad across the, I guess, the fleet age profile?
No, I think, no, it's more, you know, it's more, so, you know, so that every vessel over 20 years is almost, almost all of them are sanctioned. Because in the commercial kind of, you know, markets where we operate, very few actors accept vessels that are north of, or older than 20 years. There are some trading, but they're trading them kind of internally for big oil measures or refiners where they kind of control the technical management and the vetting of the ship themselves. So I would almost put like an equal sign between 20 plus and sanction. Speaking of the sanction fleet, we're not really seeing kind of utilization increase on that fleet. But what we are seeing is that although extremely slowly, more and more are getting kind of sold for recycling. So it's a very, very kind of slow trend because you do face kind of the sanctions as you, you know, the recyclers face it when they need to or want to purchase the steel. But there are kind of starting to, we're starting to see movements there where some of these ships are getting removed.
Okay, super helpful. Thank you very much and have a great weekend.
Operator
Thank you. As a reminder, to ask a question, you will need to press star 1 and 1 on your telephone. We are now going to take our next question. And this one is from Devin Sangoy from Teji Investments. Please go ahead.
Congratulations, Lars, on a good set of numbers. I have a few questions. one on when do you see the china uh you know as the winters will approach china will come back in the market and in that situation how do you see the market and second one is on the suez you have a drought and obviously the limited amount of ships are going to go through suez now how does impact the flows of the smaller ships?
Yeah, now first of all on China, I think kind of the question you're raising there is basically the big question the biggest question of them all in shipping because China has effectively reduced their imports at certain periods they basically halved it and from what we understand from industry sources is that, you know, Chinese kind of domestic demand is not materially reduced. And so, and since imports are down to the tune of three and a half to five million barrels per day, you know, for sure they need to be drawing on inventories. They have a huge pile of oil. They've actually been building inventories in the last, you know, years leading up to this situation in 2026. So they have a huge cushion. But at a certain point, you know, when, you know, somebody in Beijing will start to think that maybe we should kind of be a bit careful on continuing here. I don't know whether we're there yet. I don't know if we'll be there in a year's time. It's very difficult to say, but, you know, this is one of the kind of the big important questions. But I think it's more important in respect of oil price rather than shipping at this point. Of course, it could propel shipping even further if they start to aggressively chase barrels. But I think this is more an oil price kind of thing than a shipping thing. When it comes to Suez, I think, you know, respectfully, you might be confusing Suez for the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal is where the drought is being experienced. And that's where kind of we're seeing reduced volumes, but not really we, because the Panama Canal, you know, it's prioritized for containers and, you know, natural gas and LPG vessels. and, you know, kind of the rates and the way that kind of transits are organized. Very few tankers are using kind of the canal as it is. For the Suez, this has not yet been an issue that's been addressed.
And one more question on the scrapping. What are your views? We have seen no scrapping because the market's been very good. but what's your view going forward on the next 12 to 24 months?
As I mentioned a little bit previously, we are seeing some small positive developments on recycling or scrapping, as you say. The challenge has been that the recycling industry is a dollar-nominated industry too. So it means that they have difficulty in actually paying cash for a vessel that is sanctioned. What we have seen is that the US authorities have been willing to give exemptions for vessels that are not owned by owners that are sanctioned themselves. So it means that, you know, certain kind of quite well-renowned recyclers have been able to go to U.S. authorities. This is the vessel. This is the history of the vessel. These are the owners. Can we kind of buy this and get an exemption or a license to buy this vessel for recycling, and they've gotten yes. But the number of vessels there, we're talking kind of in the teens, so it's not material looking at the vast fleet of sanctioned vessels currently, but at least it's a start. So how that will evolve going forward, it's very difficult to say, but it's a positive movement at least.
Thank you, Lars. have a great weekend thank you you too thank you we are now going to take our next question and this one comes from audrey zhong from china securities please go ahead hi good afternoon last and anger this is audrey zhong from china securities um last thank you again for joining our webinar with Chinese institutional investors in March and my first question is on the recent VLCC sell we know that you sell so two VLCCs are about 270 million dollars I think this is a very your decision to sell the VLCC because given the current strong rate environment How did you compare the sale price with the present value of the future cash flows from continuing to operate the two tankers? Thank you. This is my first question.
Yeah. Hi, Audrey. No, it's, you know, it's again, excellent question. There were two kind of key analysis that we applied to the considerations. One was kind of, you know, what is the implied value of the assets that Frontline own? And as we're priced by the market at the, you know, multiple of almost, well, at the time it was north of 1.3 times NAV, you know, the implied value of the vessel was actually higher than what we achieved. But the second one is, and this is where it gets a little bit kind of not mathematical to put it that way, it goes a little bit on experience in this market. We are operating in one of the most volatile markets in the world, if not the most. That volatility tells you that nobody actually knows what's going to happen around the next turn. We looked at the assets and, you know, for us to decline selling at that level, we had to believe that we were going to make almost $70,000 per day every day until that vessel was 20 years old or those vessels were 20 years old. If you look at how our market has been moving historically, we thought that was a bold ask. Of course, it was the highest price achieved for that generation of ships at the time, and that was basically the analysis. So basically, what we do is we look at, you know, what do we need to get the 15 return on equity, which is, you know, where Frontline wants it to be kind of in order to make an investment case. And that resulted in this kind of rate requirement. And how likely was it that that rate requirement was going to be, you know, going to be real? And we thought potentially not. Maybe for the next couple of years, but not for 11 and a half years or 11 years, whatever it was at the time. So that was basically the analysis. But you have a very good point. It was not an easy decision to make when you're standing in the middle of a market, which at the time was earning for a VLCC around $100,000 per day. You know, it's, of course, something that needs deep consideration.
Great. Great. Thank you a lot. That's very clear and very helpful. And my second question is on cash break you were raised. I noticed that despite the reduction in financing margins, I think you did a very great job in decreasing your financing cost. But actually, the Swiss Max cash break-even point increased to 25% in the VLCC break-even for the first time since 2021, based on our quarterly tracking. So does the $25,700 already reflect the benefit of the lower financing margin? If so, what other factors drove the increase? and how should we expect the Swiss Max cash break-even to trend in the second half of 2026? Thank you.
Sorry, I wasn't hearing everything you asked about, but I think you were referring to the Swiss Max break-even rate. Is that correct? Inger, please allow me to repeat my question. actually is why the Swiss max cash break even higher than even the LCC cash breaking even rates in Q2 yeah the reason for that is that the dry dock components and the cash break even rates for Q2 cash break even rates are much higher than it was for the Q1 cash break even rates and then and in addition to that in Q1 we had the undrawn depth or an RCF which was undrawn on one of the vessels which is assumed to be drawn in in the Q2 break-even rate okay great
and so can we expect that the Swissmax cash break-even in Q3 and Q4 also have the trend like in Q2 because I think it's increasing the Swiss max cash break even I'm not so sure I understood what you said now what what was the question again yeah actually it's three and Q4 what the Swiss max cash break even would be like things I think the Swiss max cash break even is increasing now sorry after these cash break even rates are for 12 months forward so it is from for 12 months forward from the second yes from
the end of June 2026 you add them four quarters to the end of June 2027 so these cash begin rate of 27 and that's over 25,700 pursuits max vessels are for 12 months period going forward including then the q3 q4 q1 and q2 of 2027. it's an average so yeah and it is explained by what i just said that you have dry dock of seven vessels in that period which she did not have in the previous cashback even rate which we showed you for the end of the
first quarter okay okay great I understand that thank you Inga thank you thank you that was the last question for today I will now hand the call back to Lars for closing remarks thank you very much and all of you thank you for listening in it's truly an exceptional market we are experiencing and also well into Q3. So looking forward to our call next quarter. Thank you very much.
