Ubs AG 6-K, filed Oct 1, 2025
Ubs AG (AMUB)
6-K
2025-10-01
For: 2025-09-30
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Added on
April 06, 2026
About this 6-K
Ubs AG filed this 6-K on October 1, 2025.
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
_________________
FORM 6-K
REPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER
PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-16 OR 15d-16 UNDER
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Date: October 1, 2025
UBS Group AG
(Registrant's Name)
Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland
(Address of principal executive office)
Commission File Number: 1-36764
UBS AG
(Registrant's Name)
Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland
Aeschenvorstadt 1, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
(Address of principal executive offices)
Commission File Number: 1-15060
Indicate by check mark whether the registrants file or will file annual reports under cover of Form
20-F or Form 40-
F.
Form 20-F
☒
☐
This Form 6-K consists of the speech and Q&A transcripts of the presentation that took place on
September 30, 2025, that immediately follow this page.
1
UBS’s response to 6 June 2025
Capital Adequacy Ordinance
(CAO) consultation
30 September 2025
Speeches by
Sergio P. Ermotti
, Group Chief Executive Officer, and
Todd Tuckner
,
Group Chief Financial Officer
Including analyst Q&A session
Transcript.
Presentation and webcast replay is available at www.ubs.com/presentations
Sergio P. Ermotti
Slide 2 – Key messages
Thank you, Sarah and good morning, everyone.
Today we would like to briefly highlight key points from our submission to the Capital Adequacy Ordinance
consultation.
We want to contribute to an informed discussion based on facts and I remain hopeful for the adoption of a
reasonable solution – one that ultimately benefits all of the stakeholders, including Switzerland.
We believe our submission is comprehensive, so we will keep our remarks short as the purpose of this call is to take
questions or provide clarifications on our position.
With respect to the proposal to fully deduct investments in foreign subsidiaries from CET1 capital, we will comment
in more detail at the end of the consultation period which began last week.
To re-iterate what we have said several times since the acquisition of Credit Suisse over two years ago, in principle,
we fully support the further strengthening of regulation based on lessons learned from the events leading up to
March 2023, provided the amendments are targeted, proportionate and internationally aligned, and duly consider
the actual root causes of Credit Suisse’s collapse, including the significant regulatory concessions.
Unfortunately, the proposals on capital requirements, both at the ordinance and law level, do not meet these
standards.
These proposals would unduly penalize UBS, which has operated without regulatory concessions and was in a
position to credibly step in and rescue Credit Suisse, contributing to the stability of the Swiss and global financial
systems in March of 2023.
2
One critical shortcoming of the proposals is that they don’t differentiate between going-concern capital and loss-
absorbing capacity in recovery and resolution. This disregards the availability of other loss-absorbing instruments,
which in our case amount to 20 billion in AT1 and 100 billion in loss absorbing debt.
Slide 3 – UBS supports in principle enhancing regulation
As you can see, we support or broadly support all the initiatives in principle, except for those related to capital.
Our sustainable and diversified business model, and strong capital and liquidity positions, contribute to the resilience
of the Swiss financial center, and are complemented by a credible recovery and resolution plan that we have
developed over many years.
We continue to support efforts to further enhance our resolvability, although some important clarifications are
needed.
Slide 4 – Sum of the proposed capital measures is by far the strictest regime among peers
This chart illustrates why we believe the proposed capital measures go well beyond the global norms, despite
intentions to align with international standards.
It also shows that while some regimes are more demanding than others on certain elements, they compensate for
that in other areas, resulting in a more balanced capital regime.
That is why it is critical to look at the full regulatory picture and not just isolated components.
Slide 5 – Proposed capital measures are extreme and would make UBS a pronounced outlier, while also understating
its CET1 ratio
This chart illustrates how the proposed changes would significantly undermine our competitive position when
comparing minimum requirements.
The Swiss regime, particularly after the full implementation of Basel 3, is one of the strictest globally. Due to this,
our current regulatory requirements are already much higher than peers on a like-for-like basis.
So our current true minimum on a comparative basis is therefore actually closer to 16%, which is well above peers,
many of which have a much higher risk profile.
No matter how CET1 capital ratios are presented, the legislative proposals still result in an increase of around 24
billion in CET1 capital.
And equity is the most expensive form of financing.
Considering that UBS’s cost of equity, as determined by the market, has remained stable at around 10% over the
last ten years, this level of capital overshooting is not something we can accept.
With that, I hand over to Todd who will take you through our position in more detail.
3
Todd Tuckner
Slide 6 – CAO proposals would unduly eliminate ~11bn of CET1 capital at Group level
Thanks Sergio. Let me dive a bit deeper into the ordinance proposals and how we framed our response.
It is important to re-iterate that, in addition to being excessive and misaligned with international standards, the
proposals fail to address the key lessons learned at Credit Suisse’s parent bank, which was the stated intention of
the Swiss Federal Council’s proposals from the beginning.
If adopted as proposed, the ordinance changes, which I’ll cover momentarily, would eliminate around 11 billion, or
12%, of Group equity as eligible capital. By contrast, at the parent company level, the ordinance proposals would
erode 3 billion , or 3%, of UBS AG’s standalone equity as eligible capital.
Slide 7 – Full deduction of capitalized software lacks regulatory and economic justification
Turning to slide 7 and starting with capitalized software.
The use and development of software is fundamental to how banks operate and compete. Software supports the
running of daily operations, augments a bank’s risk control environment, enhances the client experience and
enables strategic transformation.
Generally speaking, software, whether purchased or internally developed, is commonly capitalized on a bank’s
balance sheet to reflect future economic benefits and is amortized over its expected life.
The proposals would entirely remove capitalized software from regulatory capital, thereby ignoring the importance
of software as a strategic competitive differentiator for a financial institution like UBS.
Even during periods of severe stress, software assets maintain their utility and remain essential for serving clients
and preserving the value of the franchise.
In this light, Credit Suisse’s capitalized software assets retained their economic and accounting value throughout
its crisis. It was only upon the acquisition by UBS and our decision to migrate retained Credit Suisse businesses onto
UBS’s existing systems that partial write-downs were required.
Additionally, a full deduction of capitalized software from regulatory capital would be misaligned with international
standards, ultimately impeding on UBS’s competitiveness.
Only a handful of jurisdictions apply such an extreme approach, mainly because capitalized software in those
jurisdictions is generally treated as an intangible asset for financial reporting purposes. On the other hand,
capitalized software is afforded full regulatory capital credit in the US to align with its accounting treatment. And
in the EU, capitalized software counts as regulatory capital and is required to be amortized over a three-year period
regardless of the applicable financial reporting treatment.
Slide 8 – Deduction of temporary difference DTAs (TD DTAs) would be misaligned with all other major jurisdictions
and would not reflect realizable asset value
Turning to DTAs on slide 8. The proposal – to fully deduct from regulatory capital – deferred tax assets arising from
temporary differences is without precedent. No peer jurisdiction – whether the EU, UK, or US – applies such extreme
treatment.
Temporary difference DTAs are very common across banks and apply to a wide variety of situations whereby the
expense for financial reporting purposes precedes the timing of the deduction for tax purposes. Common examples
include charges for credit losses, deferred compensation and litigation where the tax benefit comes later in time,
thereby informing an asset on the balance sheet.
4
To mitigate risks in ultimately realizing their value, international standards already limit the recognition of these
assets to 10% of regulatory capital and apply risk-weights of 250%.
The argument that the current regulatory capital treatment of temporary difference DTAs is pro-cyclical is not
supported by the facts. The DTA write-downs at Credit Suisse were not caused by flaws in the regulatory
framework, but rather were a result of management decisions to substantially restructure Credit Suisse’s investment
bank.
The majority of UBS’s temporary difference deferred tax assets are linked to our core wealth management business
in the US. And these have proven to be resilient, even in times of financial stress. Moreover, our fundamentally
different business model in contrast to Credit Suisse makes similar write-downs of our DTAs highly unlikely.
Slide 9 – PVA measures should not be based on business combination accounting
Finally, turning to slide 9 on PVAs. Prudential valuation adjustments reflect an uncertainty overlay in a bank’s capital
relating to difficult-to-value securities and derivatives.
The Federal Council justifies stricter treatment of PVAs by referencing the extensive security position write-downs
on Credit Suisse’s balance sheet at the close of the acquisition. We believe this argumentation is incorrect. The
write downs reflected purchase price allocation adjustments that UBS considered appropriate as part of standard
acquisition accounting.
PVAs are designed to account for valuation uncertainty in ongoing business operations and should therefore be
viewed in the context of our Level 3 asset profile. Today, our holdings amount to only one-tenth of what Credit
Suisse and UBS reported on a pro-forma basis in 2007. Since 2Q23, through the run-down of our Non-core and
Legacy portfolio we have further reduced Level 3 assets by around 60% to 16 billion, which is less than 1% of our
total balance sheet. The proposed PVA measures do not reflect the progress UBS has made in substantially reducing
the valuation uncertainty on its balance sheet.
Finally, a brief word on AT1. AT1 instruments play an essential role in a crisis. The fact that UBS was able to restart
AT1 issuances with strong demand soon after the rescue of Credit Suisse is evidence of investor confidence in these
instruments, including importantly under the current Swiss regime and notwithstanding Credit Suisse events.
We support steps to further strengthen AT1 instruments as an effective recovery tool, provided reforms remain
consistent with established international practice. Our principal concern with the current proposal is the automatic
suspension of AT1 coupon payments after four consecutive quarters of cumulative losses, regardless of capital
strength. We believe a more appropriate and transparent approach is to link any restriction on interest payments
to the breach of a clearly pre-defined capital ratio trigger.
Slide 10 – TBTF regulatory process
As you can see from the timeline on slide 10, the regulatory process remains ongoing with the Federal Council’s
publication of final ordinance changes expected by mid-next year at the latest. The consultation on proposed law
changes relating to foreign participations is just underway and is set to conclude early next year, with parliamentary
deliberations expected to extend into 2027.
Given the wide range of potential outcomes, it is premature to discuss mitigating actions at this stage. We will
share details of our plans once there is sufficient clarity – ideally on the basis of a balanced and reasonable solution
when compared to that contained in the current series of proposals.
With that let’s open-up for Q&A.
5
Analyst Q&A (CEO and CFO)
Giulia Aurora Miotto, Morgan Stanley
Yes, hi, good morning. Thank you for the presentation and the document. It's very clear. I have two questions.
The first one, so you make a very strong point as to why this is not internationally aligned, but if Switzerland
doesn't change anything, would you consider moving headquarters? There have been several articles in the press
on this topic. Thank you.
And the second question is about what would be an acceptable solution for you, especially on the foreign
subsidiary point? Thank you.
Sergio P. Ermotti
Well, thank you, Giulia. I'm sorry to disappoint you, but I'm not really in a position to answer this question. First
of all, you know, as I mentioned, and we mentioned many times, our ultimate goal is to have a reasonable
solution out of this political process so that we can continue to compete as a global bank out of Switzerland with
our current business model. So, we're not going to enter into any speculations or commenting even on media
articles or representations about our intentions to take any steps in that sense.
And also, in respect of, let me point out once again that this is not a negotiation and I'm hearing all the time
that we should compromise or we should be willing to compromise. Well, as you can hear and see that our tone
and approach to these topics are constructive. We do recognize that there are lessons to be learned out of the
Credit Suisse crisis, but they need to be comprehensive and they need to be balanced and they need to be
internationally aligned. So, in my point of view, if they fulfill those requirements in a balanced way, then it is
what it is and we would see that as a balanced outcome. But a compromise is usually something that happens
between two people negotiating, and which we are not a party on any negotiation.
Giulia Aurora Miotto, Morgan Stanley
Thank you.
Chris Hallam, Goldman Sachs
Yes. Good morning, everybody, two questions. First, when do you expect to get confirmation on the transition
period for the initial deductions on software, DTAs, PVAs? Do you expect to have that by the time of fourth
quarter results in order to be able to guide for 2026 capital planning and capital distribution because I suppose
that’s really a, you know reflects your Jan 1
st
And then second, I guess slightly differently on the AT1's I suppose one peculiarity of the proposal is that a well-
capitalized but a less profitable bank would be disincentivized to undertake the required restructuring to fix their
business because of that four quarter look-back proposal, you know, that clearly has echoes, I guess, of the CS
failure. That feels fairly illogical intuitively. So, what's your sense on the probability that that is the end state that
we get to on Swiss AT1’s?
6
Sergio P. Ermotti
Let me take the first one and Todd can take on the second. On the timing, I think this is, you know, it's not likely
that we're going to get clarity by the beginning of the year when we will announce our capital return policy for
2026 because the submissions, as you know, ended yesterday. So, I think that the SIF will have to go through
the analysis of all submissions and, I mean, we are not in control of the timing but it looks a little bit optimistic
to expect an outcome in such a short period of time so. And then it remains a decision of the government how
they want to eventually announce and implement what they are proposing. And the only thing we know that
it’s unlikely to be before January 1
st
going to have more visibility on that. But you know, again, it's not a question that we can answer directly.
Todd Tuckner
Chris, on the AT1 point, I agree with your general comment that it would seem, the current proposal would seem
to be a disincentive to restructure because at the end of the day, it's always facts and circumstances based for a
given institution, you know how deep would the restructuring be and would it actually be appropriate in any
event to suspend payments on the AT1 given the depth of restructuring, but I generally agree that you can get
into situations or envision situations where this proposal would create a real issue when there isn't a real issue.
So, it's making an issue out of one that isn't where, for example, a bank may be going through financial stress
or some other aspects that are less significant, less serious. And as a result, automatically suspending the coupons
because of four consecutive cumulative losses – quarters of cumulative losses – would seem to me to be pro-
cyclical. So, the question though on restructuring, I guess, is a question of that hypothetical bank and the situation
it's in and the depth of the restructuring it has to go through in order to recover.
Sergio P. Ermotti
Yes. Let me add on to what Todd mentioned. I think that he's touching on an idiosyncratic situation in such a
scenario. But let me play out another scenario in which you have a more economic downturn in which for some
reason the entire banking system is going through a low level of profitability or small losses, but still having the
resilience to be there and serve clients and prepare for better days. Now, in such a scenario, if you are the only
bank that has to do that kind of write-down, although every other bank is having similar profitability issues, then
it's a stigma that you create on a single institution rather than being something that is aligned. So, it's very
difficult to see – I mean, I understand the reasoning because of what happened at Credit Suisse. Those were
substantial losses that were also creating an even bigger hole in their parent bank capital, but that's not a good
reason to then fix it in this way.
Chris Hallam, Goldman Sachs
Thank you. Very clear.
7
Kian Abouhossein, JPMorgan
Yes, thanks for taking my questions. The first question is on the ordinance measures. Can you still bundle those
into the legislative package or is that not possible anymore, and what would have to happen if it is possible to
basically get there? What are the key hurdle dates or events that we would have to watch out for?
And then the second question is just taking a step back, who are you actually now talking to considering that
this seems to be a very political process? Looking at the impact of the documents that are coming out, it seems
to be a very domestic focused audience, I mean, the documents are not even in English, most of them, but rather
than do they have a good understanding of how it sets you apart from international competitors? And do they
really care? That's the impression I get; they don't really care. So, can you just talk about your feedback from
your negotiations and talks with the other parties, I guess with the government at this point, or where we are?
Sergio P. Ermotti
First, on the first question, I think that, yes in theory, things can somehow come together if, but this is a decision
of the Federal Council to how to then either implement immediately after they consider all the submissions on
the consultation or to wait until they find and they analyze the submissions related to the consultation that just
opened. So, it's in their prerogative to thinking what they want to do. So, I have no indication that they're going
to take one direction or the other. So, as we stand right now, it looks like the ordinance will be implemented
before. But, you know, this is a political process and one in which, depending on the input from various parties,
including banks and a broader economy, and, you know, it may lead into a different outcome. So, in a nutshell,
the answer to your question is yes, it's still possible to bring them together, not formally, but de-facto because
they would be then implemented and addressed at the same time.
Then, well, look, we are talking, well, first of all, now we are talking reactively by, you know, in the consultation,
by answering formally to many points that we raised in the past and making it even clearer. Our position, we're
complementing it with more data points and more in-depth analysis. I think that it's fair to say that as we went
deeper in analyzing not only more international standards and how other jurisdictions are operating, that has
given us even more conviction that the proposals we see right now on capital are not balanced and not really in
line with addressing the true lessons learned from the Credit Suisse crisis.
Now, in respect of who we are talking to, we are responding to solicitations, also formal solicitations from the
Economic Commissions that will want to hear our views, both the upper and the lower Economic chambers, for
example. We are responding to requests for comments and clarification by political parties and the broader
society and economic associations. But that's the level of interaction.
Now, in response to your topic, yes, I'm sorry if our machine-translated with human touch English version didn't
work out well, but it's our first best attempt, to address this issue. Of course, you know, being a political
submission, it has to be done in one of the official languages in Switzerland, which in that case is – we took the
most popular or the biggest one is the German version. Let me tell you that many more people than we are made
to understand, they care about what's going on right now. I think it's fair to say that all the noises around what's
going on in Switzerland are quite unnecessary in my point of view. And of course, we are lucky that we have
been able to manage this in a fairly benign market situation. Our integration is progressing well. I think that the
last things we need is this kind of noise around Switzerland, which in my point of view did a fantastic job during
the three days of the crisis. But of course, right now it's time to really reconsider how we communicate and how
we approach these kinds of issues. But, again it's not in my control, it’s not in our control, and we do our best
to contribute to a healthy and fact-based discussion.
8
Kian Abouhossein, JPMorgan
Thank you.
Amit Goel, Mediobanca
Hi, thank you. Yes, two questions from me. One, just in terms of the phasing of the ordinance, so I think
previously you stated that you would expect a kind of a 4-year plus phase-in period. I just wanted to just check
whether that expectation has changed or not based on the commentary and the response?
And then secondly, I guess within the responses, commentary about there's not a – and it's very hard then to do
a holistic or at least for the government to do a holistic and kind of impact study or QIS? I was just kind of curious
whether then, whether you would basically effectively do that and could present that as part of the kind of
helping the politicians understand potential consequences and impact of the measures if they were impacted,
implemented holistically? Thank you.
Sergio P. Ermotti
So, the issue on the phase-in is that – what we have reiterated in our submissions is that, I mean – it's still clear
that it's common in this kind of situation to have a phase-in. You saw that in the law part of the proposal it’s
clearly stated at seven years. We have been made to understand that it's also going to be the case for the
ordinance. And this is going to start from 2027, but the fact that it was not clearly stated in the proposal of the
ordinance made us, just for good order we pointed out that this is still missing. And I think that, I believe it’s
quite common and clear that we will have a phase-in. I think that the four years, I don’t remember us saying four
years, but probably was like, if we mention it is the minimum common reasonable timing for phasing in
something like that, but it is just for good order that we are pointing it out. We haven’t really changed our
understanding and conviction that it’s going to be a phase-in also for the ordinance when it comes.
In terms of, yes, we will analyze this issue. To be honest, I think that we will need to seriously think about if it’s
better for us to do it, I mean a UBS one would be always taken with a little bit of, you know, I don’t know how
to formulate it diplomatically, but probably in a way that is a suspicious way. So, we rather have independent
people having such studies and at being able to outline in a balanced way what it is, but in case we don’t see
any of them happening, we may consider having our view on the matter so that at least we are on the record.
But hopefully it's not going to be necessary.
Amit Goel, Mediobanca
Thank you. And just to clarify what you’re saying, you anticipate or you would expect a seven year phase-in or
sorry –
9
Sergio P. Ermotti
No, we don’t know. It’s not because the current proposal on subsidiaries is seven years that the same will be
applied to the ordinance. We would say that, most likely a minimum of four, it’s likely to happen for the
ordinance, while on the law one, it’s already clear it is seven.
Amit Goel, Mediobanca
Got it. Thank you.
Stefan Stalmann, Autonomous Research
Good morning. Thank you very much for the presentation. Very useful. I wanted to ask please on the original
document on page 21. It says that full reduction from CET1 capital will correspond to an increase in capital
coverage of foreign subsidiaries from 60% to a 130%, and I was wondering what the math is behind the 130%,
please?
And the second question, I appreciate that you don’t want to talk about mitigation yet, but I’m wondering in
particular about your DTAs on timing differences. You have quite a substantial amount there that relates to the
treatment of US real estate, and I’m not quite sure what that actually is and it seems a bit different to what I see
at other banks. Could you maybe explain what’s driving this relatively large DTA item related to US real estate
and whether that could actually be changed? Thank you.
Todd Tuckner
Hi, Stefan. So, on the first question, the math on the more than 100 to 130 is just factoring in AT1. So, it’s the
whole Tier 1 stack that is the math behind.
On the DTA question, in terms of the real estate, so that’s part of the stack of temp difference DTAs in the US,
as you point out, we have effectively generated these temp difference DTAs because we have deferred the tax
deduction on a lot of the real estate and leaseholds that we have in the branch network in the US. We have
deferred the deductions in relation to leaseholds that create temp difference DTAs and historically have also
accounted for at least up to 10% regulatory capital. But in addition to that, we also have the more standard
temporary differences that I have called out including deferred compensation as one example, expected credit
losses as another. So, it’s an array of that, but the real estate position that you point out does in fact relate to
the branch network and in the US business, and historically has been a substantial component of our DTA stack
in the US.
Stefan Stalmann, Autonomous Research
Are you effectively depreciating your leaseholds faster than the IRS recognized for your taxable purposes?
10
Todd Tuckner
Yes, we effectively have, we’ve pushed out the tax deduction beyond the book expense, correct. So, we
amortized the leaseholds under the accounting standard and we take the tax benefit over a longer period of time
under US tax principles.
Stefan Stalmann, Autonomous Research
Thank you. Very helpful. Thank you very much.
Sergio P. Ermotti
It was the last question. Thanks for calling in. I hope you found the document useful and my colleagues in the IR
team are at your disposal, if you have any further clarification. Thank you and have a nice day.
11
Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements |
including but not limited to management’s outlook for UBS’s financial performance, statements relating to the anticipated effect of transactions and strategic
initiatives on UBS’s business and future development and goals or intentions to achieve climate, sustainability and other social objectives. While these forward-
looking statements represent UBS’s judgments, expectations and objectives concerning the matters described, a number of risks, uncertainties and other
important factors could cause actual developments and results to differ materially from UBS’s expectations. In particular, the global economy may suffer significant
adverse effects from increasing political tensions between world powers, changes to international trade policies, including those related to tariffs and trade
barriers, and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, as well as the continuing Russia–Ukraine war. UBS’s acquisition of the Credit Suisse Group has materially
changed its outlook and strategic direction and introduced new operational challenges. The integration of the Credit Suisse entities into the UBS structure is
expected to continue through 2026 and presents significant operational and execution risk, including the risks that UBS may be unable to achieve the cost
reductions and business benefits contemplated by the transaction, that it may incur higher costs to execute the integration of Credit Suisse and that the acquired
business may have greater risks or liabilities than expected. Following the failure of Credit Suisse, Switzerland is considering significant changes to its capital,
resolution and regulatory regime, which, if proposed and adopted, may significantly increase our capital requirements or impose other costs on UBS. These
factors create greater uncertainty about forward-looking statements. Other factors that may affect UBS’s performance and ability to achieve its plans, outlook
and other objectives also include, but are not limited to: (i) the degree to which UBS is successful in the execution of its strategic plans, including its cost reduction
and efficiency initiatives and its ability to manage its levels of risk-weighted assets (RWA) and leverage ratio denominator (LRD), liquidity coverage ratio and other
financial resources, including changes in RWA assets and liabilities arising from higher market volatility and the size of the combined Group; (ii) the degree to
which UBS is successful in implementing changes to its businesses to meet changing market, regulatory and other conditions; (iii) inflation and interest rate
volatility in major markets; (iv) developments in the macroeconomic climate and in the markets in which UBS operates or to which it is exposed, including
movements in securities prices or liquidity, credit spreads, currency exchange rates, residential and commercial real estate markets, general economic conditions,
and changes to national trade policies on the financial position or creditworthiness of UBS’s clients and counterparties, as well as on client sentiment and levels
of activity; (v) changes in the availability of capital and funding, including any adverse changes in UBS’s credit spreads and credit ratings of UBS, as well as
availability and cost of funding to meet requirements for debt eligible for total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC); (vi) changes in central bank policies or the
implementation of financial legislation and regulation in Switzerland, the US, the UK, the EU and other financial centers that have imposed, or resulted in, or
may do so in the future, more stringent or entity-specific capital, TLAC, leverage ratio, net stable funding ratio, liquidity and funding requirements, heightened
operational resilience requirements, incremental tax requirements, additional levies, limitations on permitted activities, constraints on remuneration, constraints
on transfers of capital and liquidity and sharing of operational costs across the Group or other measures, and the effect these will or would have on UBS’s
business activities; (vii) UBS’s ability to successfully implement resolvability and related regulatory requirements and the potential need to make further changes
to the legal structure or booking model of UBS in response to legal and regulatory requirements and any additional requirements due to its acquisition of the
Credit Suisse Group, or other developments; (viii) UBS’s ability to maintain and improve its systems and controls for complying with sanctions in a timely manner
and for the detection and prevention of money laundering to meet evolving regulatory requirements and expectations, in particular in the current geopolitical
turmoil; (ix) the uncertainty arising from domestic stresses in certain major economies; (x) changes in UBS’s competitive position, including whether differences
in regulatory capital and other requirements among the major financial centers adversely affect UBS’s ability to compete in certain lines of business; (xi) changes
in the standards of conduct applicable to its businesses that may result from new regulations or new enforcement of existing standards, including measures to
impose new and enhanced duties when interacting with customers and in the execution and handling of customer transactions; (xii) the liability to which UBS
may be exposed, or possible constraints or sanctions that regulatory authorities might impose on UBS, due to litigation, contractual claims and regulatory
investigations, including the potential for disqualification from certain businesses, potentially large fines or monetary penalties, or the loss of licenses or privileges
as a result of regulatory or other governmental sanctions, as well as the effect that litigation, regulatory and similar matters have on the operational risk
component of its RWA; (xiii) UBS’s ability to retain and attract the employees necessary to generate revenues and to manage, support and control its businesses,
which may be affected by competitive factors; (xiv) changes in accounting or tax standards or policies, and determinations or interpretations affecting the
recognition of gain or loss, the valuation of goodwill, the recognition of deferred tax assets and other matters; (xv) UBS’s ability to implement new technologies
and business methods, including digital services, artificial intelligence and other technologies, and ability to successfully compete with both existing and new
financial service providers, some of which may not be regulated to the same extent; (xvi) limitations on the effectiveness of UBS’s internal processes for risk
management, risk control, measurement and modeling, and of financial models generally; (xvii) the occurrence of operational failures, such as fraud, misconduct,
unauthorized trading, financial crime, cyberattacks, data leakage and systems failures, the risk of which is increased with persistently high levels of cyberattack
threats; (xviii) restrictions on the ability of UBS Group AG, UBS AG and regulated subsidiaries of UBS AG to make payments or distributions, including due to
restrictions on the ability of its subsidiaries to make loans or distributions, directly or indirectly, or, in the case of financial difficulties, due to the exercise by FINMA
or the regulators of UBS’s operations in other countries of their broad statutory powers in relation to protective measures, restructuring and liquidation
proceedings; (xix) the degree to which changes in regulation, capital or legal structure, financial results or other factors may affect UBS’s ability to maintain its
stated capital return objective; (xx) uncertainty over the scope of actions that may be required by UBS, governments and others for UBS to achieve goals relating
to climate, environmental and social matters, as well as the evolving nature of underlying science and industry and the possibility of conflict between different
governmental standards and regulatory regimes; (xxi) the ability of UBS to access capital markets; (xxii) the ability of UBS to successfully recover from a disaster
or other business continuity problem due to a hurricane, flood, earthquake, terrorist attack, war, conflict, pandemic, security breach, cyberattack, power loss,
telecommunications failure or other natural or man-made event; and (xxiii) the effect that these or other factors or unanticipated events, including media reports
and speculations, may have on its reputation and the additional consequences that this may have on its business and performance. The sequence in which the
factors above are presented is not indicative of their likelihood of occurrence or the potential magnitude of their consequences. UBS’s business and financial
performance could be affected by other factors identified in its past and future filings and reports, including those filed with the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC). More detailed information about those factors is set forth in documents furnished by UBS and filings made by UBS with the SEC, including
the UBS Group AG and UBS AG Annual Reports on Form 20-F for the year ended 31 December 2024. UBS is not under any obligation to (and expressly disclaims
any obligation to) update or alter its forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise.
Disclaimer:
This document and the information contained herein are provided solely for information purposes, and are not to be construed as a solicitation of
an offer to buy or sell any securities or other financial instruments in Switzerland, the United States or any other jurisdiction. No investment decision relating to
securities of or relating to UBS Group AG, UBS AG, or their affiliates should be made on the basis of this document. No representation or warranty is made or
implied concerning, and UBS assumes no responsibility for, the accuracy, completeness, reliability or comparability of the information contained herein relating
to third parties, which is based solely on publicly available information. UBS undertakes no obligation to update the information contained herein.
Alternative Performance Measures:
measures that may qualify as Alternative Performance Measures as defined in the SIX Exchange Directive on Alternative Performance Measures, under the
guidelines published by the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA), or defined as Non-GAAP financial measures in regulations promulgated by the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Please refer to “Alternative Performance Measures” in the appendix of UBS’s Quarterly Report for the second quarter
of 2025 for a list of all measures UBS uses that may qualify as APMs. Underlying results are non-GAAP financial measures as defined by SEC regulations and as
APMs in Switzerland and the EU.
© UBS 2025. The key symbol and UBS are among the registered and unregistered trademarks of UBS. All rights reserved.
SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrants have duly
caused this report to be signed on their behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.
UBS Group AG
By: /s/ David Kelly
_
Name: David Kelly
Title: Managing Director
By: /s/ Ella Copetti-Campi
_
Name: Ella Copetti-Campi
Title: Executive Director
UBS AG
By: /s/ David Kelly
_
Name: David Kelly
Title: Managing Director
By: /s/ Ella Copetti-Campi
_
Name: Ella Copetti-Campi
Title: Executive Director
Date: October 1, 2025