Good afternoon, and welcome to the FitLife Brands Third Quarter 2025 Financial Results Conference Call. It is now my pleasure to turn the floor over to your host, Dan Judd, CEO of FitLife Brands. Dan, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Tom. I would like to welcome everyone to FitLife's Third Quarter 2025 Earnings Call. We appreciate you taking the time to join us this afternoon. Joining me on the call is FitLife's CFO, Jakob York; and FitLife's EVP, Ryan Hansen. As we typically do, I'll provide some opening commentary to get us started, and then we'll open the call up for Q&A. Before jumping into the numbers, let me begin by saying how excited we are about our previously announced acquisition of Irwin Naturals, which closed on August 8, 2025. FitLife's financial results for the third quarter of 2025 include Irwin's performance for the 53-day period from August 9 through September 30. In addition, beginning with this quarter, the results of MRC are now reported as part of Legacy FitLife. However, we will continue to provide more detailed disclosure about MRC when it makes sense to do so. For the company overall, for the third quarter of 2025, total revenue increased 47% year-over-year to $23.5 million. Revenue from Irwin accounted for $6.8 million of the $7.5 million revenue increase during the quarter. This means that our other brands collectively delivered $0.7 million of organic growth during the quarter. MRC declined, but Legacy FitLife, excluding MRC, delivered 8% organic growth during the quarter, and MusclePharm delivered 55% organic growth. On a year-to-date basis, MusclePharm and Legacy FitLife, excluding MRC, have delivered organic growth of 15% and 7%, respectively. However, total organic growth for the company on a year-to-date basis is slightly negative due to the previously discussed MRC headwinds. Wholesale revenue for the quarter was $13.2 million, an increase of 156% compared to the third quarter of 2024. Excluding the $6.5 million of wholesale revenue generated by Irwin, wholesale revenue for the company's other brands increased 30% year-over-year, with wholesale revenue for Legacy FitLife and MusclePharm increasing 4% and 112%, respectively. Online revenue was $10.3 million or 44% of total revenue, a decrease of 5% compared to the third quarter of 2024. MRC online revenue declined 16%, while Legacy FitLife online revenue, excluding MRC, increased 14% and MusclePharm online revenue declined 3%. Gross margin declined to 37.2% during the third quarter of 2025 compared to 43.8% during the same period in the prior year. Excluding the impact of the amortization of the inventory step-up in the Irwin business, which I'll explain in more detail a bit later, gross margin for the company overall was 38.9%. The decline is due to lower gross margin in the MusclePharm business as well as the addition of Irwin during the quarter, which has historically generated a lower gross margin than FitLife. I'll provide more detail on margins for both of these businesses a bit later in my commentary. Contribution, which we define as gross profit less advertising and marketing expense, increased 25%, driven primarily by the addition of Irwin, partially offset by lower contribution from MRC and MusclePharm. Net income for the third quarter of 2025 was $0.9 million compared to $2.1 million during the third quarter of 2024. The decline is primarily due to elevated merger and acquisition-related expense associated with the acquisition of Irwin Naturals, but also due to lower gross margin and higher income tax expense. Income tax expense was unusually high during the third quarter due to a true-up of the company's 2024 tax provision and the amount actually owed when the company filed its 2024 tax return. With regard to brand level performance, I'll start with Legacy FitLife. Total Legacy FitLife revenue for the third quarter of 2025 was $12.9 million, of which 68% was from online sales and 32% was from wholesale customers. This represents a 4% year-over-year increase in wholesale revenue and an 8% year-over-year decrease in online revenue, or a 5% decrease in total revenue. Excluding MRC, online revenue for the other Legacy FitLife brands was up 14%. Gross margin for Legacy FitLife declined very slightly from 45.3% to 45.0%. Contribution declined 9% to $4.7 million and contribution as a percentage of revenue decreased to 36.2% compared to 37.9% in the same quarter last year. Excluding MRC, both contribution and contribution as a percentage of revenue for Legacy FitLife increased during the quarter. Moving on now to MusclePharm. Total MusclePharm revenue increased 55% during the third quarter, with wholesale revenue increasing 112% and online revenue declining slightly at 3%. MusclePharm's gross margin declined to 19.8%, which is a function of two primary factors. First, gross margin from wholesale revenue is lower than from online revenue. And due to our strong wholesale growth, total gross margin for the MusclePharm brand was lower. And second, the cost of whey protein continues to climb, and MusclePharm's product portfolio is heavily weighted to protein. Thus far, the company has elected to absorb these cost increases rather than increase prices to its customers. We anticipate that the cost of whey protein will continue to increase during the fourth quarter and early in 2026. We have begun communicating the potential for price increase to many of our MusclePharm customers effective January 1. Now, I will provide our report on the performance of Irwin Naturals. The numbers we are reporting for the third quarter reflect about 7.5 weeks of operations for Irwin. Irwin's revenue during the period from August 9 through September 30 was $6.8 million. Of this amount, roughly 95% or $6.5 million was from wholesale customers and $0.3 million was from online sales. The company did not start selling Irwin products on Amazon until October, so there is no Amazon revenue included in Irwin's third quarter numbers. There are a couple of items worth calling out that impacted Irwin's revenue during the quarter. First, the previous owner pulled forward approximately $0.6 million of sales prior to the transaction closing. He did this by offering an aggressive discount to the customer along with extended payment terms. As a result, we didn't get the credit for the revenue, although we did get to collect the receivable. And second, as part of our strategy to grow online revenue, we ceased wholesale sales of our products to the third party who has been the primary seller of Irwin products on Amazon. Pre-transaction, wholesale revenue from this customer was roughly $0.5 million per quarter, or approximately a $0.3 million impact for the 7.5 weeks we owned Irwin during the third quarter. So this is a situation where we are choosing to give up wholesale revenue in the short term in order to generate higher and more profitable online revenue in future quarters. Regarding margin, Irwin's gross margin was 32.2% during the third quarter, including the effects of $0.4 million of inventory step-up amortization. Under GAAP, when you acquire a company, the inventory has to be stepped up to its net realizable value. The effect of that is a lower reported gross margin, which, although in accordance with GAAP, does not reflect the economic reality or the cash flow profile of the sale of the underlying inventory. Excluding the effect of the amortization of the inventory step-up, gross margin for Irwin during the quarter would have been 37.9%. We are actually pleased with that number for a couple of reasons. First, the gross margin in the mid- to high 30s is very typical for a wholesale-oriented supplement company. If you go back in time and look at FitLife's margins before we began focusing on online sales, you'll see a similar margin profile. And second, Irwin's historical margins have been much lower. We filed abbreviated financial statements for Irwin with the SEC on October 20. And from those, you can see that Irwin's gross margin in 2023 was 24.7%. In 2024, it was 32.3%. And for the first half of 2025, it was 35.7%. We expect Irwin's gross margin to continue to slowly increase over time as we optimize supply chain and fulfillment and as our percentage of revenue from online sales increases. Regarding online sales trends, as previously mentioned, following the consummation of the acquisition, we ceased wholesale sales to the customer who has been the primary seller of Irwin products on Amazon. As that customer sells through their remaining inventory, we expect to replace them as the primary seller of Irwin products on Amazon. Our first sales on Amazon were on October 11, and sales have grown steadily since then. We are currently generating approximately $10,000 of revenue daily from Amazon or approximately $3.6 million on an annualized basis. We are now actively selling on only 116 of our 242 product listings, so we expect online sales to continue to grow. Now let me provide a few additional high-level comments and some forward-looking remarks, and then we can move into Q&A. We continue to work on generating revenue from the Dr. Tobias brand off Amazon as well as driving increased traffic to the brand's listings on Amazon. We have made some progress, but there's still a lot of work to do. We began to experience the Amazon revenue declines for Dr. Tobias during February of 2025. So we are nearing the point in time when the year-over-year comparisons will be easier, and we are hopeful that we can achieve greater revenue stability for that brand in the near future. In terms of balance sheet, we did not pay down any debt during the third quarter, instead using our cash flow to pay expenses associated with the Irwin acquisition. For example, we had accrued a very substantial legal bill over the several months leading up to the transaction. Much of this was paid during the third quarter and the remainder was paid early during the fourth quarter. Going forward, we expect to incur additional nonrecurring expense related to the transaction, but certainly not at the scale you saw during the third quarter. Our term loan balance begins amortizing at the end of December, so you will start to see debt reduction in the fourth quarter and beyond. Last, we referenced in the earnings press release a couple of exogenous factors we are seeing in the business. The first was the cost of whey protein, which I mentioned earlier in my remarks. If you have additional questions about this, I would be happy to answer them during the Q&A. And second, late in the third quarter, we began to see evidence of across-the-board general consumer weakness. For example, beginning in September, our subscriber counts on Amazon started to decline. Excluding the MRC brands, this is something that hasn't happened as long as we have been selling on Amazon. For pretty much seven years, every week, the chart of our Amazon subscriber count only went up and to the right. In fact, our first reaction when it happened was to let Amazon know that there was something wrong with their data. But in our discussions with our account executives at Amazon, who also support other supplement sellers, they indicated that other accounts are seeing the same trend. We are also seeing a reduced pace of replenishment orders from our wholesale customers, which is corroborated by the reduced traffic counts many of them are experiencing in their brick-and-mortar locations. It is not unusual to see performance fluctuations within a specific brand as each brand can have its ups and downs driven by a number of considerations. But what we are seeing now is across all brands and all channels, and we have heard similar commentary from other consumer-driven companies when they have reported their performance. We also note that consumer confidence, as measured by the widely accepted University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, is close to the lowest level it has ever been since they started tracking the data in 1951. The government shutdown in the U.S. certainly contributed to the consumer sentiment and weakness. So hopefully, the fact that the bill was passed and signed yesterday will help. To be clear, the sky is not falling, but in the spirit of transparency and good disclosure, we just wanted to communicate what we are seeing in the business. The subscriber count declines are very small, but when you're used to seeing them only going up, it catches your attention. Total revenue for October came in a bit softer than we would have otherwise expected. Bottom line, we started to see cracks in September and October was a bit soft. But if things pick up from here, it will be largely immaterial in the grand scheme of things. But of course, there's always the risk that the consumer weakness persists or accelerates. So that concludes my opening commentary. And operator, you can go ahead and poll for questions.

And your first question today is coming from Ryan Meyers from Lake Street Capital Markets.

First one for me, Dayton, I just want to kind of piggyback off of what you just had commented on as far as the consumer softness and the impact on the subscription side of the business. Can you remind us what percentage of the business came from some of these recurring subscriptions? And then just so I understand it correctly, was it less new subscriber adds that you saw? Or was it also customers just turning off their subscription? Just want to make sure I understand all that correctly.

Before we acquired Irwin, about 20% to 25% of our online revenue came from subscribers. Prior to the acquisition, online revenue represented two-thirds of our total revenue, with 20% to 25% derived from subscriptions. After the acquisition, the situation has changed significantly since Irwin generates very little online revenue and almost no subscriptions. Consequently, subscription revenue now constitutes a smaller percentage of our overall revenue. Regarding your second question, we do not provide visibility into Amazon's subscriber metrics. While we do offer insights for our website subscribers, we only see a net figure for Amazon, so we cannot specify whether sign-ups are slowing or cancellations are increasing. The changes we're observing, which include small declines around 1%, are not concerning at this time. I wanted to address this during our call to keep everyone informed about business developments. It's important to note that we are not experiencing a significant drop in subscribers, but when a consistent growth trend over seven years suddenly halts, it becomes noticeable, and I felt it was necessary to highlight it.

Okay. Got it. No, that's good to know. And then just kind of looking at the MusclePharm business, first off, congrats on kind of getting that business to where you guys were able to during the quarter. Just as we understand sort of the wholesale part of that business, how much of that growth was new versus existing customers? It sounds like you saw positive signs from both those avenues. But is there any way to kind of unpack how much was new versus existing?

I don't have the specific numbers available, but I'd estimate that growth is primarily from existing customers, possibly in an 80-20 ratio. When engaging new customers, we usually start from scratch, with small initial orders rather than significant replenishments. However, we are seeing new sell-in, mainly from regional chains and grocers, and we've had good traction with our ready-to-drink protein products. We've successfully launched three flavors: chocolate, vanilla, and salted caramel, with vanilla and salted caramel selling out completely while we await more production. We're still managing to keep some chocolate available, but we are working hard to meet demand.

Okay. Got it. And then the last question for me, and I don't think I saw this in the press release, but the Irwin business during the quarter, can you give us a sense of what the year-over-year business looked like for Irwin? Was it flat? Did it grow? Was it a decline? Just so we can get a sense of maybe how that business trended at least during the third quarter?

Yes, I don't have that information. I can tell you it will be a decline, but I can't provide an apples-to-apples comparison at this moment. Perhaps we can address that in a future call. The reason for the decline has been mentioned in earlier press releases and discussions. Irwin used to have significant sales through Costco. Before entering bankruptcy, Costco stopped selling one of their items, and during the bankruptcy process, they discontinued another. Therefore, any year-over-year comparison I could provide now would indicate a decline due to the loss of the Costco business. I haven't examined the timeframe when we owned it compared to the same period last year when we didn't, excluding Costco from the analysis. When we did that calculation at the time of acquisition, the declines were down to low single digits. I would expect we're still in a similar range, somewhere between stable and low single digits down.

Your next question is coming from Sean McGowan from ROTH Capital Partners.

A couple of questions, if I can. First, have you worked through all or substantially all of the stepped up inventory? And if not, what kind of an impact would you expect to see in the fourth quarter on that?

No, we have not worked through all of it. We currently have about four months' worth of inventory and have managed to work through approximately 40% of that. The total step-up in inventory was $1,045,000, and around $390,000 was accounted for during the third quarter. The remaining balance is about $650,000, which will be reflected in the fourth quarter. Essentially, we will have one more quarter with this step-up and its amortization. After that, the numbers will be clear.

Okay. And you'll call that out, right? So…

Yes, we will mention that. We include it in the add-back in the EBITDA table. It's noncash, right? It's simply an accounting convention under GAAP.

How much more pressure should we anticipate on MusclePharm's gross margin in the fourth quarter due to the whey issue or any other factors? Is this the level we can expect, or could it potentially worsen?

I think the situation may deteriorate slightly. The reason is that protein costs have continued to rise, and the numbers we are reporting are for July, August, and September. During this time, protein costs were increasing in the background. Thus, the inventory we are currently selling is at a somewhat higher cost, and the inventory we will sell in early 2026 will be at an even higher cost. Although I do not have the specific numbers right now, we generally consider whey protein acceptable between $3 and $4 per pound, but it has been below $3 per pound. To give you an idea of the current market, whey protein is unavailable in the spot market right now, and it is also not available for delivery in the first quarter; it has all been bought. Our recent purchases indicate we secured our supply, allowing us to cover our needs for the first quarter. However, with prices rising to $6.30 per pound, we are working on securing supply for the second quarter of 2026, with initial pricing starting around $7. It's a quite unusual situation that we haven't encountered before. If there are any questions, I am happy to discuss this further. Overall, there's a significant protein trend occurring in the U.S. People are adding protein to various products, whether it be coffee, chips, or desserts. As a result, food companies are buying a lot of this, leading to higher demand without a corresponding increase in supply. To address your question, Sean, I would not be surprised to see margins decrease, rather than increase. However, we have already started notifying about a price increase effective January 1, particularly for large accounts, and we hope to lessen the impact moving forward. We could have addressed this previously; it was not an unexpected issue for us. This was a deliberate decision made with the understanding that we want to grow the brand, as you all have observed since the fourth quarter of last year and into the first quarter of this year, including our efforts in promotions and advertising. We are attempting to expand the brand. The positive aspect is we are seeing success, and now we are striving to balance growth with fiscal responsibility.

Yes. We talked about this earlier in the year and maybe just the prices wind up or costs wind up being higher. So it's a little bit more of an impact. That doesn't mean you would have gone and raised prices if you had known exactly where the cost would be because you'd make the same strategic decision, right?

Yes, we are aware of our costs months in advance. As I mentioned, we have secured our protein for the first quarter, so we know exactly what the price will be for the MusclePharm products we are producing and have ordered for delivery in that period. This gives us good visibility into our costs. The ongoing decision we face is when to consider increasing our prices, which is a topic we discuss regularly.

Okay. A couple more questions. Can you remind us what the issue ongoing is with Dr. Tobias?

The main issue is that, for reasons we cannot explain, traffic to our Dr. Tobias listings on Amazon has dramatically declined. We are unsure why this is happening. Our instinct suggests it may be something within Amazon's systems, as changes in their algorithm can impact our visibility positively or negatively. While we see strong online growth with Legacy FitLife, excluding MRC, and some of our products have increased by 50% year-over-year consistently, the challenge lies with Amazon. There is a considerable element of unpredictability regarding the outcomes. Something has led to a decline in traffic to the Dr. Tobias listings. While we can analyze the data and see that conversion rates remain high once customers reach our listings, the problem is attracting visitors in the first place. We haven't changed our approach, yet this issue has emerged. Although we often attribute it to Amazon's complexities, it remains our key concern. We have tried increasing our advertising expenditure, especially for Dr. Tobias on Amazon, but we cannot simply spend our way out of this situation. We are also focusing on growing our presence outside of Amazon. For instance, by directing customers to Amazon from our website or through ads on platforms like Meta or Google, we aim to leverage Amazon's algorithms which may favor our listings if they detect new traffic. These are strategies we are exploring. Unfortunately, I can't identify a specific action we've taken or something Amazon has done, but this situation has been ongoing for nearly a year and has affected us significantly.

Okay. Last question, a little knit and did here on taxes. So is the reason that the effective tax rate is so much higher that some of these expenses are not tax deductible?

The reason for the higher effective tax rate is that, over the course of the year, you estimate and calculate a provision for income taxes. We don’t handle this internally; we rely on a reputable firm, Grant Thornton. When you finalize your tax return at the end of the year, you determine the actual amount owed, and if there are discrepancies between what was recorded in the profit and loss statement and the actual tax owed, adjustments need to be made. We filed our tax return for 2024 in the third quarter of 2023, and it turned out that our provision did not account for enough income tax. Thus, we are catching up on that in Q3, but this is not a recurring issue.

Okay. So the rate we see then through the 9 months is not indicative of what you expect the full year rate to be. It's just a true-up in the quarter that makes the quarter look weird and the 9 months look weird.

Yes, it might be higher for the full year than, say, a typical 24%-25% rate again because some of it is really attributed or because of 2024. But yes, on a long-term steady-state basis, we would expect something closer to 24%, 25%.

Your next question is coming from Samir Patel from Askeladden Capital.

The first one, I'll start with Irwin, and congrats on the momentum there with the online sales. So you mentioned the $3.6 million and I think about half of SKUs, and you also mentioned that you're still competing with inventory overhang from other sellers. As you roll out those remaining listings and you become the primary seller, do you have some sort of vision for where you think the revenue might get to? Like, for example, I'm not sure if you did the high-volume SKUs first, so if we can kind of extrapolate based on that figure of it being half. And then you also can kind of quantify how much inventory might still be out there in the channel that you'd sold wholesale previously. So any thoughts there would be helpful.

Yes. I can provide some extra details. In response to your question about whether we started with the highest volume SKUs, the answer is no. The company we partnered with was previously the exclusive seller of MusclePharm products on Amazon when we acquired the brand, so we have an established working relationship with them. While they may not be thrilled that we take some of their business, they do cooperate with us by sharing inventory information. We know which SKUs they are likely to run out of first, and we've prioritized our inventory and shipping accordingly. It's not a case of simply selecting the highest volume SKUs; our approach involves a mix of higher and lower volume items, driven by our desire to ensure customers can purchase our products on Amazon without interruptions. Regarding potential revenue, while I don't have the exact figures on hand, we have tools that help us estimate total sales volume for listings on Amazon. Combined across the Irwin portfolio, we estimate this to be in the range of $7 million to $8 million, though I could be slightly off by about $1 million. Additionally, the value of inventory being sold by third parties exceeds $30 million, and there are numerous smaller sellers also distributing our products. If we were to take over from them, we might reach high single-digit millions in sales. Furthermore, there’s potential to grow faster by launching new products and increasing subscriber revenue. However, I expect we'll see growth ramp up to high single-digit millions first, and then we’ll evaluate further growth from that point.

Okay. That's super helpful. And that's actually better than I was expecting. There's a couple of areas I want to walk through. So one is just very, very simply, other than the $0.5 million quarterly, $2 million annualized that you talked about from getting rid of the wholesale partner. I mean, is there any other trade-off to those online sales? I mean, obviously, indirectly, like if someone walks into a health store and they've already bought it online. I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about just like, if you're just trying to model where the business was and where it's going to be, is it reasonable to kind of take that, add 7 and then subtract 2? Or am I missing a piece of the math there?

No, I think that's very reasonable. We are assuming that these changes do not impact our direct-to-consumer business, which accounted for about $300,000 during the 7.5 weeks we've owned it. This business has existed alongside other sellers on Amazon for years, so we believe that will not change either. Therefore, the key point is the difference between the $7 million, $8 million, $9 million and the $2 million we are sacrificing in wholesale sales.

Okay. That's really impressive, actually. Can you go a little bit more in depth? Did I hear correctly that there are people buying this product in a store and then reselling it on Amazon?

No, no, not buying it in the store. So we sell these products through like tens of thousands of doors in the U.S. So like Walmart, every single Walgreens, every single CVS. But in addition to that, it's in hundreds and hundreds of independent health food stores. So there may be a business owner. They may have one health food store, they may have ten, right? But they are able to buy the product through our fulfillment partners, through our distributors that sell to these smaller health food stores. They're buying the product. They're putting it on the shelf in their store, right? Some of them are kind of opportunistic and say, well, I'm just going to box some up and send it into Amazon and also sell on Amazon. So really, what we see is one really big third-party seller, which is the one I talked about, the $2 million. And then a lot of these are a handful of these smaller, let's just say, independent health food retailers, some of them may be dedicated online retailers, some of them may have physical stores who are buying primarily through distribution and then in addition to selling in their stores, they're selling online. So that's a dimension of sellers that we didn't have. For example, when we bought MusclePharm, it really was just this one big third party. But with Irwin, we do have a handful of smaller sellers that are also out there.

Okay. Okay. And then the final question on Irwin is, you talked about expecting those margins to go up over time. I mean, you've outlined numerous times kind of the contribution margin delta for the GNC business between someone buying that product online and buying it through the wholesale channel. I mean, do you have math that you want to share around if you sell one unit of an Irwin product through the wholesale channel versus through Amazon, what the kind of margin delta is? And then as a related issue, kind of both margin and operational, any progress on the glass issue that I know you're dealing with Amazon?

Yes. Sorry, did you say glass bottle? Is that what you said?

Yes. Them wanting the bottles bubble wrapped in your 3PL and all that.

Thank you for bringing that up. Regarding your first question, I don't have the specific numbers available at the moment. Many of us have discussed the economics of selling the brands exclusive to GNC on Amazon, which is quite financially appealing. However, most other parts of our business do not share the same level of appeal due to a significant trade-off between selling a unit in-store versus online. This situation arises because we do not spend any money on advertising those brands. They are retail brands that we simply place online at a higher price than what they are sold for in stores, and whatever revenue we earn is an added benefit. The economics are attractive mainly because there is no advertising cost and the products are priced at a premium. In contrast, brands like Irwin, iSatori, or Mimi’s Rock require advertising expenditure to reach customers. We have seen this scenario play out multiple times, which is why we employ this strategy. Selling online leads to higher revenue; for instance, selling a unit for $20 or $25 at retail instead of $10 wholesale increases our overall revenue and improves margins. I don't have exact unit-to-unit comparisons at this moment, but it's clear that some GNC items are more compelling. Regarding your second question, there are complexities with Irwin's packaging that pose challenges for selling on Amazon. Specifically, Amazon prohibits the sale of glass bottles unless they are bubble-wrapped. Our products mostly come in glass bottles, so to sell on Amazon, we must have a third party open each box, wrap each unit, label them, repack everything, and then ship it to Amazon. This process incurs significant costs. Right now, we are managing this situation, and it's the same for other sellers on Amazon. It might be sensible over time to consider producing some of our higher-volume SKUs in plastic bottles to reduce these packaging costs. Currently, we are not taking action on this front, as we are focusing on priority items during this transition period. Nonetheless, we believe there is substantial opportunity to optimize various aspects of this business, from supply chain and packaging to fulfillment and increased sales on Amazon. There is a lot to look forward to.

Perfect. I have a couple of questions regarding MusclePharm, and then I'll let others ask. The first question is about whey protein. I looked at some data sources this morning and found a USDA index for 34% whey protein. However, based on the numbers you quoted per pound, it seems you're using a different index. Is there a reliable public data source or benchmark we can refer to for tracking? The second question is about pricing. I understand what you're doing to grow the brand, but I'd like to know how you see other competitors handling this issue. Are they implementing price increases as well?

So first of all, regarding protein, I can't point you to a specific data source at the moment. However, I will check with our operations team since they have gathered data and created charts that we've reviewed and shared with the Board. It's clear that there are many types of protein, including whey, milk, casein, and gelatin. Specifically, within whey, there's WPC 80, which is whey protein concentrate that contains at least 80% protein. This is what we typically monitor because it’s the protein we use. Our top-selling product is a five-pound chocolate 100% whey, which uses WPC 80. I might be looking at a different protein than you are, but there are resources available; I just can't recall what we specifically use or if we source it from manufacturers or direct suppliers. As for your second question about what competitors are doing, we gained market share in the third quarter because we did not increase prices. This was a significant factor for us. Most of our gain came from capturing market share rather than pulling in new customers, and we attribute this growth to our decision to hold prices steady while others have chosen to raise theirs. It's important to note that the protein segment is the least profitable and most competitive in the supplement industry. Everyone seems to have a protein product, and they are costly and cumbersome to ship. Achieving a 30% gross margin in this area is considered successful. Overall, we believe our share gains were largely due to maintaining our prices.

Thank you. That concludes our Q&A session. I will now hand the conference back to management for closing remarks. Please go ahead.

Thank you all very much for participating in the call. If you have other questions, feel free to reach out to us. Otherwise, we will speak to you all again towards the end of March. Thank you.

Thank you. Everyone, this concludes today's event. You may disconnect at this time, and have a wonderful day. Thank you for your participation.