MSG Knickerbockers Corp PRE 14A, filed Apr 7, 2025

MSG Knickerbockers Corp. (MSGK)

PRE 14A 2025-04-07 For: 2025-06-10

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Added on October 17, 2026

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			Page
Questions and Answers About the Proxy Materials and Our Special Meeting			1
Forward-Looking Statements			9
Proposal – Approval of the Redomestication of the Company to the State of Nevada by Conversion			10
Principal Terms of the Nevada Redomestication			10
Background of the Proposal			11
Recommendation of the Board of Directors			13
Reasons for the Nevada Redomestication			14
Certain Considerations Associated with the Nevada Redomestication			16
What Changes After the Nevada Redomestication?			18
What Does Not Change After the Nevada Redomestication?			41
Certain Federal Income Tax Consequences			42
Additional Information			43
Interest of Certain Persons			50
Vote Required			51
Recommendation of our Board of Directors			51
Stock Ownership Table			52
Other Matters			64
Stockholder Proposals for 2025 Annual Meeting			64
Appendix A – Resolutions of the Board pursuant to Section 266 of the Delaware General Corporation Law			A-1
Appendix B – Plan of Conversion			B-1
Appendix C – Nevada Articles of Incorporation			C-1
Appendix D – Nevada By-laws			D-1
Appendix E-1 – Delaware Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation			E-1-1
Appendix E-2 – Delaware Certificate of Amendment of Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation			E-2-1
Appendix F – Delaware Amended By-laws			F-1


Issue	Delaware	Nevada
Increasing or Decreasing Authorized Capital Stock	Delaware law does not have a provision permitting the board of directors of a corporation to increase or decrease the number of authorized shares in a class or series of the corporation’s shares and correspondingly effect a forward or reverse split of any class or series of the corporation’s shares (and change the par value thereof) without a vote of the stockholders.	The NRS allows the board of directors of a corporation, unless restricted by the articles of incorporation, to increase or decrease the number of authorized shares in a class or series of the corporation’s shares and correspondingly effect a forward or reverse split of any class or series of the corporation’s shares (and change the par value thereof) without a vote of the stockholders, so long as the action taken does not adversely change or alter any right or preference of the stockholders and does not include any provision or provisions pursuant to which only money will be paid or scrip issued to stockholders who hold 10% or more of the outstanding shares of the affected class and series, and who would otherwise be entitled to receive fractions of shares in exchange for the cancellation of all of their outstanding shares.
Classified Board of Directors	The DGCL permits a Delaware corporation to classify its board of directors into as many as three classes with staggered terms of office. If a board of directors is classified, the stockholders elect only one class each year and each class would have a term of office of up to three years.	The NRS permits a Nevada corporation to classify its board of directors into any number of classes with staggered terms of office, so long as at least one-fourth of the total number of directors is elected annually.
Removal of Directors	Under the DGCL, the holders of a majority of shares of each class entitled to vote in an election of directors may vote to remove any director or the entire board with or without cause unless (i) the board of directors is classified, in which case directors may be removed only for cause (unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise), or (ii) the corporation has cumulative voting, in which case, if less than the entire board is to be removed, no director may be removed without cause if the votes cast against his or her removal would be sufficient to elect him or her.	The NRS requires the vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the voting power of the issued and outstanding stock entitled to vote in an election of directors in order to remove a director or all of the directors. The articles of incorporation may provide for a voting threshold higher than two-thirds, but not lower. Furthermore, the NRS does not make a distinction between removal for cause and removal without cause.


Issue	Delaware	Nevada
Director Independence for Corporate Acts and Transactions	Under the recent amendments to the DGCL, a disinterested director is defined as a director who is not party to the act or transaction being considered and who does not have a material interest in that act or transaction or a material relationship with a person that has a material interest in the act or transaction. A material relationship is defined as a familial, financial, professional, employment or other relationship that would be reasonably expected to impair the objectivity of the director’s judgment when participating in the authorization or approval of the act or transaction at issue. In addition, under the DGCL, any director of a corporation that has a class of stock listed on a national securities exchange is presumed to be a disinterested director with respect to an act or transaction to which that director is not a party if the board of directors has determined that the director satisfies the relevant criteria for determining director independence from the corporation and, if applicable, the controlling stockholder or control group, under any rules promulgated by the applicable exchange. This presumption may only be rebutted by substantial and particularized facts that the director has a material interest in the act or transaction or has a material relationship with a person with a material interest in the act or transaction.	The NRS does not have counterparts to the disinterested director provisions under the DGCL. However, NRS 78.140 provides a statutory framework for the approval of a transaction between a corporation and a director or officer who has an interest in that transaction, as described in more detail under “—Standard of Judicial Review of Board Decisions” below.
Fiduciary Duties	Under Delaware law, the standards of conduct for directors and officers have mostly developed through Delaware court case law. Generally, directors and officers must exercise a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to the corporation and its stockholders. In addition, under Delaware law, controlling stockholders of a corporation may owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its minority stockholders in certain circumstances, including when the controlling stockholder is selling its shares or seeking to change the status quo using its voting power, although the recent amendments to the DGCL do provide that controlling stockholders and control groups, in their capacity as such, cannot be liable for monetary damages for breach of the duty of care. See “—Limitation on Personal Liability of Directors, Officers, Controlling Stockholders and Control Groups” below.	Fiduciary duties of directors and officers are codified in the NRS. Nevada law requires that directors and officers of Nevada corporations exercise their powers in good faith and with a view to the interests of the corporation. The NRS also provides as a matter of law that directors and officers are presumed to act in good faith, on an informed basis and with a view to the interests of the corporation in making business decisions. While the express provisions of the NRS do not specify the fiduciary duties of controlling stockholders, the Nevada Supreme Court has acknowledged, without clear delineation, that controlling stockholders do have limited fiduciary duties to minority stockholders, at least in the context of a merger transaction.


Issue	Delaware	Nevada
Reliance	Members of the board of directors or any committee designated by the board of directors are entitled to rely in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports and statements presented to the corporation by corporate officers, employees, committees of the board of directors or other persons as to matters such member reasonably believes are within such other person’s professional or expert competence, provided that such other person has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.	In performing their duties, directors and officers may exercise their business judgment through reliance on information, opinions, reports, financial statements and other financial data prepared or presented by corporate directors, officers or employees who are reasonably believed to be reliable and competent. Reliance may also be extended to legal counsel, public accountants, advisers, bankers or other persons reasonably believed to be competent, and to the work of a committee (on which the particular director or officer does not serve) if the committee was established and empowered by the corporation’s board of directors, and if the committee’s work was within its designated authority and was about matters on which the committee was reasonably believed to merit confidence. However, directors and officers may not rely on such information, opinions, reports, books of account or similar statements if they have knowledge concerning the matter in question that would make such reliance unwarranted. Nevada law extends the statutory protection for reliance on such persons to corporate officers.


Issue	Delaware	Nevada
Standard of Judicial Review of Board Decisions	So long as directors properly discharge their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty when managing a corporation, under Delaware case law, their decisions will generally be protected by the presumption of the business judgment rule, under which a court will not second guess an unconflicted business decision made by the board of directors unless such decision cannot be attributed to “any rational business purpose.” However, in certain circumstances, Delaware courts may instead apply different heightened levels of scrutiny, including in the case of: (i) conflicted transactions, which include transactions involving a controlling stockholder or other related party; (ii) adoption of defensive measures; (iii) actions infringing on the stockholder franchise (i.e., stockholder voting); and (iv) change of control transactions. In those cases, a court will scrutinize not only the board of directors’ decision-making process but also the substance of the decision. Section 144 of the DGCL provides that a transaction between a corporation and a director or officer who has an interest in that transaction (but that is not a controlling stockholder transaction) is entitled to statutory safe harbor protection if (a) the transaction is approved in good faith and without gross negligence by a majority of disinterested directors on the board or a committee of the board and the material facts regarding the director’s or officer’s relationship with or interest in transaction have been disclosed to the board or board committee approving the transaction or (b) the transaction is approved or ratified by an informed, uncoerced, affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders. Under the recent amendments to Section 144 of the DGCL, a controlling stockholder transaction that does not constitute a “going private transaction” is entitled to statutory safe harbor protection if it is (a) approved in good faith by a committee consisting of a majority of disinterested directors or (b) approved or ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders and the material facts regarding the transaction have been disclosed to the committee approving, or the disinterested stockholders voting on, the transaction. The “entire fairness” standard of judicial review under Delaware law applies to transactions involving a controlling stockholder for which the safe harbors under amended Section 144 of the DGCL are not available. The entire fairness standard places the burden on the board of directors to demonstrate both fair dealing (i.e., process) and fair price.	NRS 78.138 provides for a statutory business judgment rule, which presumes that directors and officers acted in good faith and on an informed basis and allows for director or officer liability only when the plaintiff affirmatively rebuts the business judgment rule presumption and proves (i) a breach of fiduciary duty and (ii) that the fiduciary breach involved intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law. The statutory business judgment rule is generally the sole standard for any analysis involving fiduciary duty claims against corporate directors and officers in Nevada, regardless of the circumstances or the parties involved in the transactions (including the presence of a controlling stockholder). However, in the narrow circumstances of an action to resist a change or potential change in control that impedes the rights of stockholders to vote for or remove directors, directors will only be given the benefit of the presumption of the business judgment rule if the directors have reasonable grounds to believe a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness exists and the action taken that impedes the exercise of the stockholders’ rights is reasonable in relation to such threat. The NRS also expressly provides that this precondition to the application of the business judgment rule does not apply to poison pills or actions that only affect the time of the exercise of stockholders’ voting rights. Neither the NRS nor Nevada case law has precisely delineated the scope or extent of the fiduciary duties of controlling stockholders. NRS 78.140 provides a statutory framework for the approval of a transaction between a corporation and a director or officer who has an interest in that transaction. Under the framework, an interested transaction will not be void or voidable if: (a) the interest is disclosed to the board of directors or a committee thereof, and the disinterested directors or committee members approve the transaction in good faith; (b) the interest is disclosed to the stockholders of the corporation, and the stockholders holding a majority of the voting power approve or ratify the transaction in good faith; (c) the interest is not known to the interested director or officer at the time the transaction is brought before the board of directors for action; or (d) the transaction is fair to the corporation at the time it is authorized or approved.



Sincerely yours,

James L. Dolan Executive Chairman and Chief Executive Officer


			By order of the Board of Directors,

			Mark C. Cresitello Secretary


Provision	Delaware	Nevada
Charter Regarding Preferred Stock	The Delaware Charter provides that holders of shares of any preferred stock will not have any voting rights, except as provided in an applicable certificate of designations or as otherwise required by the laws of the State of Delaware.	The Nevada Charter provides that holders of shares of any preferred stock will not have any voting rights, except as provided in an applicable certificate of designation. Except as otherwise stated in an applicable certificate of designation, any right of holders of preferred stock to vote pursuant to NRS 78.2055(3), 78.207(3) or 78.390(2) (which relate to reverse stock splits or charter amendments having an adverse effect on a particular series of preferred stock) is specifically denied.
Charter Regarding Limitation of Liability	The Delaware Charter provides that no director of the Company will be personally liable to the Company or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, except (a) for any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the Company or its stockholders; (b) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (c) for the payment of unlawful dividends, stock repurchases or redemptions; or (d) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.	The Nevada Charter provides that the liability of both directors and officers of the Company will be eliminated or limited to the fullest extent permitted by the NRS. Under the NRS, this does not exclude exculpation for breaches of duty of loyalty.
Charter Regarding Dividends and Distributions	There is no corresponding provision in the Delaware Charter or Delaware Bylaws.	The Nevada Charter provides that the Company is allowed to make any distribution that otherwise would be prohibited by NRS 78.288(2)(b) (the Company may make a distribution even if its total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus the amount that would be needed, if the Company were to be dissolved immediately after the time of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon such dissolution of holders of shares of any class or series of the capital stock of the Company having preferential rights superior to those receiving the distribution).


Name and Address	Title of Stock Class(1)	Beneficial Ownership	Percent of Class	Combined Voting Power of All Classes of Stock Beneficially Owned(1)(2)
Dolan Family Group (3) 340 Crossways Park Drive Woodbury, NY 11797	Class A Common Stock	507,873	2.6%	70.7%
	Class B Common Stock	4,529,517	100.0%
James L. Dolan (3)(4)(6)(17)(22) P.O. Box 420 Oyster Bay, NY 11771	Class A Common Stock	212,022	1.1%	22.6%
	Class B Common Stock	1,443,004	31.9%
Thomas C. Dolan (3)(5)(7)(18)(23) 340 Crossways Park Drive Woodbury, NY 11797	Class A Common Stock	37,478	*	11.5%
	Class B Common Stock	739,546	16.3%
Brian G. Sweeney (3)(5)(8)(11)(20)(25) P.O. Box 509 Oyster Bay, NY 11771	Class A Common Stock	44,686	*	10.5%
	Class B Common Stock	676,888	14.9%
Paul J. Dolan (3)(5)(9)(16)(17)(21) 340 Crossways Park Drive Woodbury, NY 11797	Class A Common Stock	75,683	*	17.6%
	Class B Common Stock	1,135,085	25.1%
Marianne E. Dolan Weber (3)(5)(10)(19)(24) MLC Ventures LLC P.O. Box 1014 Yorktown Heights, NY 10598	Class A Common Stock	60,981	*	11.3%
	Class B Common Stock	723,494	16.0%
Charles P. Dolan (5)	Class A Common Stock	6,094	*	*
	Class B Common Stock	—	—
Quentin F. Dolan (4)(5)	Class A Common Stock	326	*	*
	Class B Common Stock	—	—
Ryan T. Dolan (5)	Class A Common Stock	576	*	*
	Class B Common Stock	—	—
Joseph M. Cohen (5)	Class A Common Stock	609	*	*
	Class B Common Stock	—	—
Stephen C. Mills (5)	Class A Common Stock	832	*	*
	Class B Common Stock	—	—
Nelson Peltz (5)	Class A Common Stock	506	*	*
	Class B Common Stock	—	—
Alan D. Schwartz (5)	Class A Common Stock	6,163	*	*
	Class B Common Stock	—	—


Resolutions of the Board of Directors of Madison Square Garden Sports Corp. Approving the Nevada Redomestication



THE MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY

By:						/s/ Mark C. Cresitello
Name:						Mark C. Cresitello
Title:						Senior Vice President, Associate General Counsel and Secretary