Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to JPMorgan Chase's first quarter 2026 earnings call. This call is being recorded. Your line will be muted for the duration of the call. We will now go live to the presentation. The presentation is available on JPMorgan Chase's website. Please refer to the disclaimer in the back concerning forward-looking statements. Please stand by. At this time, I would like to turn the call over to JPMorgan Chase's Chairman and CEO, Jamie Diamond and Chief Financial Officer Jeremy Barnum. Mr. Barnum, please go ahead.

Thank you very much and good morning, everyone. This quarter, the firm reported net income of $16.5 billion and EPS of $5.94 with an ROTC of 23%. Revenue of $15.5 billion was up 10% year-on-year, primarily driven by higher markets revenue, higher asset management and investment banking fees and higher NII driven by the impact of balance sheet growth, predominantly offset by the impact of lower rates. Expenses of $26.9 billion were up 14% year-on-year, largely driven by higher compensation, including higher revenue-related compensation and growth in for office employees, as well as higher brokerage expense and distribution fees. The increase also reflects the absence of an FDIC special accrual release in the prior year. and credit costs of $2.5 billion with net charge-offs of $2.3 billion and a net reserve build of $191 million. And in terms of the balance sheet, we ended the quarter with a standardized CT1 ratio of 14.3% down 30 basis points versus the prior quarter as net income was more than offset by capital distributions and higher RWA. This quarter's standardized RWA is up $60 billion, primarily driven by the market's business, reflecting higher client activity, seasonal effects, and higher energy prices, which resulted in higher RWA across market risk and credit risk ex-lending. Now, let me spend a few minutes on the recently released Basel 3 endgame and G-SIB reproposals. I'll start by acknowledging that this has been a long journey and getting it done across multiple regulators and applied to the full set of U.S. banks is unquestionably a difficult task. With that said, we do have some concerns with elements of what's been put forward, primarily with the G-SIB proposal. On the left-hand side, we show you our preliminary estimate of the impact on JPMorgan Chase next to what the Fed has disclosed for the Category 1 and 2 banks in aggregate. Our results are worse in each category. Estimated RWA is higher, G-SIB is worse, and because our CCAR losses are below the floor, the Fed's reduction is not going to apply to us. The result is that under the proposed rules, our CET1 capital would increase around 4%, while the Fed's estimate for large banks is about a 5% reduction. Our longstanding position has been that the agencies should calculate each component of the capital requirements correctly without regard to what that may mean for any specific firm or for the broader industry. And to the extent regulators want to add conservatism, they should make that explicit rather than embedding it in methodological choices. Turning to GSIB on the right, the surcharge on the reproposed rule looks quite high when placed in the historical context, as the chart clearly illustrates. As many of you know, we have been on the record for the better part of this last decade advocating for averaging smaller buckets, GDP scaling, and reweighting short-term wholesale funding to 20%. And we were glad to see many of those concepts in the NPR. However, while we have every reason to believe that the Fed's published estimate of a 3.8% reduction in capital associated with the GSIB NPR is accurate when defined narrowly, it's important to understand that under the current rule, the surcharges for almost all of the GSIB banks are scheduled to increase meaningfully over the next two years, simply as a result of recent growth in the system, despite, in our view, no change in real-world systemic risk. In addition to that background increase, the proposed change in the short-term wholesale funding methodology adds about $22 billion of GSIB-specific capital principally to the money center banks, of which we represent about $13 billion, while in the process making the methodology less risk-sensitive and less consistent with the Fed's original rationale for including it. This could have been addressed by better adjusting for growth in the system, but it wasn't enough. The net result is that we need to plan for 5.2% in 2028, a 70 basis point increase from the current 4.5% requirement, which when combined with the RWA increase from the Basel III endgame NPR, results in a total increase of about $20 billion of GSEF capital based on our current balance sheet. This persistent miscalibration of the U.S. surcharge, is obviously bad for international competitiveness. But more importantly, domestically, this means that the cost of credit from JPMorgan Chase to U.S. households and businesses is likely higher than it is from other domestic non-GCIP banks. We recognize that we are larger and more systemically important than even large domestic peers. But in the end, the question is, how much more should the cost be? It is very hard to reconcile the principles articulated in the 2015 Fed G-SIB white paper with an outcome where JPMorgan Chase has $109 billion of G-SIB surcharge. Obviously, the rules aren't final yet, and this is what the comment process is for. As Jamie wrote in his chairman's letter, everyone wants to move on, so our comments will be very focused, but we feel strongly that the framework should be coherent, and the system would therefore be better off with these outstanding points addressed. Now, moving to our businesses, CCB reported net income of $5 billion. Revenue of $19.6 billion was up 7% year-on-year, predominantly driven by higher card NII, largely on higher revolving balances and higher operating lease income and auto. A few points to highlight. Notwithstanding the recent volatility in market and gas prices, based on our data, consumers and small businesses remain resilient, with consumer spend growth continuing above last year's pace. Average deposits were up 2% year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter, driven by account growth and moderating yield-seeking flows. Fine investment assets were up 18% year-on-year, driven by market performance and healthy net inflows. And in home lending, originations of $13.7 billion increased 46% year-on-year, predominantly driven by refi performance. Next, the CIV reported net income of $9 billion. Revenue of $23.4 billion was up 19% year-on-year, driven by higher revenues across the businesses. To give a bit more color, IB fees were up 28% year-on-year, driven by strong performance across M&A and equity underwriting, partially offset by lower debt underwriting. Looking ahead, line engagement and pipelines remain healthy, but, of course, developments in the Middle East could have an impact on deal execution and timing. In markets, fixed income was up 21% year-on-year with strong performance across the businesses, partially offset by lower revenue and rates. equities was up 17% from increased client activity. Turning to asset and wealth management, AWM reported net income of $1.8 billion with free tax margin of 35%. Revenue of $6.4 billion was up 11% year-on-year, predominantly driven by growth and management fees on strong net inflows and higher average market levels, as well as higher brokerage activity. Long-term net inflows were $54 billion with continued strength across fixed income, equity, and multi-asset. AUM of $4.8 trillion was up 16% year-on-year, and client assets of $7.1 trillion were up 18% year-on-year, driven by higher market levels and continued net influx. And before turning to the outlook, corporate reported net income of $699 million on revenue of $1.2 billion. In terms of the full-year 2026 outlook, we continue to expect NII X markets to be about $95 billion. We now expect total NII to be approximately $103 billion as a function of markets NII decreasing to about $8 billion, predominantly due to rates, which we expect will be primarily offset in NIR. The adjusted expense outlook continues to be about $105 billion and the card net charge off rate continues to be approximately 3.4%. With that, we're now happy to take your questions, so let's open the line for Q&A.

Thank you. Please stand by. If you would like to ask a question, please press star 1 to be entered into the queue. We kindly request that you ask one question and only one related follow-up. If you would like to ask an additional question, please press star 1 to be re-entered into the queue. Our first question comes from Stephen Chubuck with Wolf Research. Your line is open.

Hi, good morning, Jamie and Jeremy. Thanks for taking my questions. So maybe to start on the AI cache tool, which, Jamie, you commented on in your letter. There's been lots of focus on this particular at least launch. given that this is a tool which could potentially result in some consumer deposit pressure as well as drive some impact on increased competition as well as higher deposit betas. I was hoping you could just speak to how you see deposit competition unfolding as some more smart tools become more widespread.

So, you know, that's a great question. And obviously there's early stages for this particular product. So you have to look at it literally segment by segment, how people manage their money, how they want to manage their money. People are pretty astute at it, particularly the higher net worth. They have tons of choices. They often have money at many different places. And so the question for us is how can we make it easier for them to manage their money in a way they're comfortable? Most of you on this call, you have in your mind how much days in a checking account, and then you write a ticket to a money market fund or a deposit account, something like that. And that's all we're trying to do. And, you know, we provide great values to people. You know, if you're a customer of J.P. Morgan, I remind people you have, you know, if you have this product, you have ATMs, you've got branches, you've got advice, you have instant payment systems like Zelle. So we look at the whole basket, how we can do a better job for the client. And, yeah, it may squeeze some margin somewhere and create more competition somewhere. You know, that's life. Jeff Bezos always says your margin is my opportunity, and I kind of agree with that. We're trying to look at the world from the point of view of the customer. What more can we do with them? And this is really early stages. And as you know, there's tons of competition out there for money.

Yeah, exactly. And see, the only thing I was going to add to that, it's sort of understandable that it's gotten attention because it has sort of AI in it, and it's kind of interesting. But as Jamie says, like, and as you highlighted in your question, competition for deposits has always been very intense. It continues to be intense. And we have both external and internal competition from higher-yielding alternatives, and people sort of optimize that, and it's part of running the business. And as also Jamie just alluded to, this thing is kind of not even live yet, and it's sort of targeted at a very small subset of the client base, particularly clients with investments, where we think there's a larger share of the investment wallet as part of this. So it's understandable the amount of interest that it's gotten, but I think they're right.

No, that's helpful context. And maybe switching gears just to the Basel III capital proposal, certainly helpful in terms of how you frame some of the shortcomings, some potential areas for improvement, but maybe just focusing in on the RWA inflationary impacts, does the guidance that you've laid out contemplate any mitigating actions you might pursue? Is there any potential mitigation that you envisage? And do you have any preliminary views just on the magnitude of SEB relief that you could see from the removal of some of the double counting of markets or operational risk? I recognize that piece is a little bit more opaque.

I mean, those are interesting questions. I think, obviously, we are kind of well-practiced over the course of the last decade and a half on understanding the rules in detail and ensuring that we're using our financial resources efficiently to support the client franchise. So, and I think the hope is that the rules land in a stage where there is nothing in them which sort of takes an otherwise good and healthy business and makes it completely non-economic. I think we've alluded to a couple of areas where, you know, if you look at the presentation slide on the bottom right-hand side, we talked about targeted RWA clarifications needed. there's this issue with like high yield repo collateral and stuff about advised lines where you know the proposal is a little bit unclear about what the actual impact would be and in some versions of the results but broadly I don't think this is a story about optimization at this point I think this is converging to a place and then we need obviously we have said a lot about GSIB on this page you said but that is the one area where if a significant disincentive to it I think the point that we've often made publicly, that the depth and breadth of U.S. capital markets, key competitive regulatory capital rules that at the margin, just in our view, sort of not great.

Anything you could speak to just in terms of the removal of the double counting?

Oh, yeah. Sorry, I forgot about that part of your question. Yeah, so as you know, like we're currently below the floor, right? So obviously, if that is like the new normal, then if the double count is addressed by removing further things from stress testing, it wouldn't have any impact. If the double count is addressed by modifying the operational risk calculation in RWA, then it might have some impact. And obviously, it's far from guaranteed that we will be a bank that is permanently below the floor. But ISIS is more relevant for structurally to be above the floor. It's a little bit unclear for us as things settle down, whether we're going to bounce around above and below the fees structurally above the floor. We'll see. But I think removal of the double count is our number one priority at this point.

Can I also just mention on the global market shock, it's never been in the real world all these years, including during the COVID and then before, the great threat is nothing like what they have. And we already have $80 billion or $90 billion of capital for the trading books. So those numbers, they're completely out of whack with reality. And operational risk capital, I can't avoid saying it, is another crazy, obtuse, one-in-a-thousand-year thing. And then worse than that, in my opinion, they create risk-weighted assets. That's operational risk. And they artificially create risk-weighted assets which do not exist. And this locks up a lot of capital liquidity for eternity for no good reason. And I understand there's operational risk. I think there are real ways to measure it, by the way, which I point out, which is not this artificial, you know, over-architected academic exercise, but, you know, there's operational risk of margin loans that are late, you know, and using subprime collateral as opposed to prime collateral and, you know, how you process things. And that's what they should really be focusing, you know, reducing actual operational risk as opposed to these calculations, which you can't change. Like, if it all comes from the mortgage business and you got out of the mortgage business, it's still bad.

Well said. Well, thanks so much for taking my questions.

Thanks, Stephen.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Erica Najarian with UBS. You may proceed.

Yes, thank you. Good morning. Jeremy, my first question is for you. So you modified the market's NII outlook given the change in rates between end of February and today. I'm wondering, as we think about the X market's NII number of $95 billion, you know, you retain that. What are sort of the offsets to, you know, higher rates and the asset sensitivity, you know, if we don't have cuts for the rest of the year?

Yeah, sure. So it's a good question because I think we have said that we're asset sensitive. and rates are a little bit higher as a removal of the cuts in the back half of the year. And so you might have otherwise expected us to revise the NIAX markets up a little bit. But just to do a little mental math, the EAR that we've just disclosed is $1.8 billion. As a result of the fact that the cuts were pretty backdated, the impact on the full-year average is only about 20 basis points. So the amount of upward revision that you might have otherwise expected is really quite small when you do that math. And there were some other bits of up and down noise, some rounding effects, so that is essentially the reason the numbers aren't changed. I don't think there's too much to read into it.

Got it. Perfectly clear. And my second question is for Jamie. Of course, we were all unpacking your chairman's letter from a few weeks ago, and one of the topics that you wrote about and you've spoken about at length in the past is on private credit. And I think we fully appreciate what J.P. Morgan's view here is, but given all of the headlines that this topic has garnered, I guess the question here for you and your team is, you know, if we do have a recession and higher defaults and higher severity and cumulative losses in leveraged lending, what is the ultimate loss back to the banks? because, as we understand, the banks are fairly well protected in terms of structure. And while you address this in your letter, for those that maybe hadn't had time to read it and that are listening to this call, do you think that if we do have a default cycle in private credit that it will be systemic?

No, I mean, I was quite clear. I don't think so, and I gave them big numbers. Private credit leveraged lending is like $1.7 trillion. High-yield bonds are something like $1.7 trillion. Bank syndicated leveraged loans are like $1.7 trillion. investment-grade debts, $13 trillion, mortgage debts, like, $13 trillion, and there's a lot of other stuff out there. And I pointed out that, yeah, I think there's been some weakening and underwriting, and not just by private credit, elsewhere. And there will be a credit cycle one day, and I think when there's a credit cycle, losses will be worse than people expect relative to the scenario. I don't think it's systemic. It almost can't be systemic at that size relative to anything else. But, you know, when recessions happen and values go down and people have reified higher rates, there will be stress and strain in the system. And, you know, are people prepared for that? I can't speak for other banks, but these are – most of these things are, you know, are there on top of – you have to have very large losses in private credit before at least it looks like banks are going to get hit or something like that. So it doesn't mean you won't feel some stress and strain and you might have to do something about it. But I'm not particularly worried about it. i would i'm i'd be more worried about when there's a credit cycle how's that going to filter through the whole system that that to me is a bigger issue but i also pointed out corporations in general the debt's not too high consumers in general the debt's not too high most of the excess debt is in you know government debt at this point and so there are positives and negatives you look at what's going to happen if there's a cycle and of course we always worry about what happens in their cycle And like I said, I think it will be worse than people expect. And you can go look at what happens in other cycles to various credit and industries, et cetera. The other thing which almost always happens is that there's an industry which surprises people. If you go back to the year 2000, people are surprised. There was utilities and telecom, you know, grandma stocks that got hit. Things changed. And going to 08, it was media companies and newspapers, warm Buffett stocks. Things changed. This time, you know, you have all the tools you're talking about software, which we'll see. You know, it might be software, it might not. But something that always happens that people don't expect in credit.

Thank you both.

Thanks, Erica.

Thank you. Our next question comes from John McDonald with Truist Securities. Your line is open.

Hi, good morning. I wanted to ask you a question about reserves. Can you talk about scenario weighting and how your evolving views on the macro risks out there factor into your reserves? setting process and how that played out this quarter?

Yeah, John, good question, because I think at a high level, if you look at the allowance, it's, like, quite small, and you might wonder, like, what's going on there given, you know,

everything that's happening in the Middle East, especially given our historical sense

about wanting to be conservative and concerns about the geopolitical dynamics. So a couple things in there. One, as you know, we start the reserve, the allowance calculation process with a sort model-based approach that's based on economic forecasts. And actually, just to make it easier to track, let me start with a little bit the punchline, which is we actually did not change the weights this quarter. And so with that said, on sort of unchanged weights flowing through the economic outlook actually lowered the weighted average unemployment rate and the allowance buildup from 5.8 to 5.6. So that created some tailwinds across the numbers you know primarily in consumer but also a little bit in wholesale um and we also had a little bit of a lease consumer in home lending i think it was about 150 million which was an hpi uh under the covers there are some builds in the place that you would expect level we did sort of have a very conscious debate should we inclusion was a conservative bias developed and they don't but core global economic outlook, then that would actually flow.

Okay, thanks, Jeremy. And then separately, was wondering about any changes to your outlook for loan and deposit growth. Your balance sheet growth was very strong this quarter. A lot of it seeming to be in the markets business. So just looking for more color on, you know, the drivers of growth this quarter and how it affects your outlook for loan and deposit growth this year.

Sure. So I would say that this quarter's growth, yes, you said, primarily markets, is primarily low density stuff that's not contributing a lot to rwa secured financing of various sorts and a lot of that's seasonal so there is a sort of background trend of growth in the size of the market's business and in the size of the market's balance sheet but i don't think that anything happened this quarter that was sort of particularly off trend in that respect in terms of the firm-wide overall outlook i think arguably the single most significant number is what we said about card loan growth expectations, a company update, which is that we said we expected 6% or maybe a little bit more, and that hasn't really changed. That's still kind of our core expectation. In the rest of the franchise, it's really pretty modest growth overall. We actually have some headwinds in home lending as a result of some First Republic portfolio roll-off and stuff like that. But, you know, to a significant degree, some of that's going to get driven by acquisition financing, that we hold on balance sheet for a while, that some of that's a little bit of a driver this quarter as well. And, of course, you know, if things deteriorate, which we very much hope they don't, that tends to produce lower loan demand. So we'll see what happens there, but we're going to be there for our clients for whatever they need. And then the final building block of this is markets, which, as you know, has been actually, interestingly enough, the primary driver of wholesale loan growth recently. But there, it's going to be very opportunistic. You know, a lot of it is kind of the data center lending type stuff and related things where we're going to participate when the terms make sense, but we're going to do what it looks like and how we feel.

Okay. Thank you. Thanks, John.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Manan Gosalio from Morgan Stanley. Your line is open.

Hi. Good morning. Jeremy, Jeremy, you have one of the best views on the U.S. consumer. You mentioned that the economy is resilient, the consumer is healthy. Could you give us some more color on what you're seeing there? How resilient is consumer spend and credit if energy prices remain high? And are there any signs of cracks that you're seeing at all?

Yeah, so, you know, it's a good question. It's the right question. it's a question we get a lot and I sort of struggle to say something new and interesting every quarter there really is not anything new or interesting to say this quarter we've looked at it through every angle you know early roll rates delinquency rates, cash buffer spend, discretionary spend, non-discretionary spend, it all looks consistent with prior trends and you know fundamentally healthy so let me add maybe just a little bit of nuance in the context of energy prices and what's going on this quarter. So I think, you know, gas or energy cost is something like 3% of the typical consumer's expenditure, at least in our portfolio. So it's not nothing, but it's not overwhelming. We've looked to see if there's kind of evidence in there of people, you know, trading, decreasing other discretionary spending to adjust for higher gas prices, but it's just kind of not enough yet to be visible. I would caution, though, I think it remains fundamentally the case that the biggest single reason that the consumer credit performance is healthy is that the labor market is strong. And, you know, if you get, you know, bad outcomes in the Middle East, much higher energy prices or other problems that sort of do eventually crack what has been, I think, from many people's perspective, a surprisingly resilient American economy and a very resilient U.S. consumer, and that winds up having knockout effects on the labor market, then you will see that come through clearly. But right now, in the end, the story remains the same, which is resilient consumer that's doing fine despite higher gas prices.

Yeah, and I would just say we're really getting too fine-tuned here, but it's being helped right now by higher tax refunds, too.

Exactly.

That's really helpful. Thank you. And then a separate follow-up, just on the trading business, you know, one is, are you seeing any signs of bad volatility here, or are things, you know, were things in March still pretty good? And then if we look at trading assets that were up pretty significantly quarter on quarter, was there anything specific in the environment that drove that? Was that business as usual? Or is this some of the deployment, the ongoing deployment of excess capital, Jeremy, that you've been talking about?

Okay. So, sorry, I think there are several embedded questions in your follow-up questions. So let me try to do this efficiently. So, in short, no, we haven't really seen any so-called bad volatility. I mean, I'm sure there are pockets of that in some markets. But broadly at a high level, I think what we mean by that is the types of extremely gappy, discontinuous markets with low liquidity that keep clients on the sidelines. And as I say, I'm sure there have been pockets of that in certain subsegments of certain asset classes. But in general, that has not been a characteristic of this quarter, which is, I think, part of the reason that the performance has been very good. On trading assets, as I said a second ago, I think that was mostly PAU growth, mostly seasonal, low risk density, and not particularly a function of capital deployment one way or the other. I think to the extent that that plays out, that'll be a longer-term phenomenon. And just to refer you back to my comments at Company Update, I think to really get that right, you need both to free up capital but also to free up liquidity to allow banks to the real economy, not just kind of high risk.

I appreciate that. Thanks for taking my questions. Thanks.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Mike Mayo with Wells Fargo Securities. Your line is open.

Hi. Jamie, in your CEO letter, as was mentioned, you talked about private credit, and you mentioned the $1.7 trillion private credit market, which didn't really exist two decades ago, as you know. How much of that $1.7 trillion would you say is a substitution effect from banks to private credit, and how much of that might be types of credit you never would have originated in the first place? And with the regulatory changes and what's happening in the market, do you think you can recapture some of that share? And more generally, what are you doing with regard to the collateral? There are new headlines this past quarter that you're becoming more conservative with that. And lastly, what kind of spreads are you getting? Are there spreads improving on this or staying the same?

So, you know, those are all really good questions. So the trillion-send that actually was there before. There's always this, and, you know, banks did it. In some ways, it was arbitrage because banks were, you know, were really discouraged from doing leverage lending over a certain amount of leverage. And then, of course, you know, the competitive world finds new ways to do things, which we're not against, you know, how they do it. There's a little bit of raise arbitrage and all these various things. But I do think, I mean, it's really hard to say that half of it probably was arbitrage, that, you know, banks can pick up some of that. You know, banks also look at relationships differently. When a bank does a loan, and middle market leveraged lending, that's what this is. We've been doing this for a long period of time, but we look at the relationship extensively, not just the loan, but the rest of the relationship, payments, custody, asset management type of services, et cetera. So maybe some will come back. I'm not particularly concerned about it. And the spreads, you can just track how spreads move around. Every bank does it differently, and every bank charges differently and stuff like that. But, you know, depending on how concerned they are, are they going to raise the spreads and what they're charging for private credit? Private credit spreads themselves, and what they charge their clients have gone up and down. And you've actually seen loans go back and forth every now and then from the private credit market to the bank syndicated loan market. So we'll see. And we always had what we call marking rights, you know, to look at the underlying collateral. And that's just a right that protects you and gives you certain rights, things like that. You know, obviously, if you ever see credit getting worse, and it's gotten not terribly worse, the actual credit, which a lot of these private equity, private credit guys have pointed out, the actual credit hasn't gotten that much worse. There are pockets where it has. And, you know, and credit spreads themselves haven't gotten much worse in general, but there are pockets where it has. So we'll be watching it closely. We think, you know, we're okay on all that. You know, it remains to be seen. I think the big point to me, Mike, is I don't think it's systemic, but I do think with the credit cycle, and I'm not referring to private credit here, because of underlying and leverage and picks and competition, and we've had a cycle for a long time, a lot of people are late to this game. I just don't expect every player is going to be the same. I think some will be – it won't be a bell curve. It'll be something different than that, and people may be surprised that some of the players aren't particularly good at it, and that business will probably come back to banks.

And then separately, Jeremy, you mentioned no change in the core NII, despite being asset sensitive. And in terms of the deposit growth, you had some really amazing deposit growth and then kind of hit an air pocket for a little while. In this quarter, consumer deposits were up 2%. I guess taxes probably helped that out. Is this the start to getting back on that higher deposit growth path or not yet?

Well, I think air pocket is a little bit of a strong word, but fair enough. I recognize the dynamic that you're describing. And I think it's a little bit too early to sort of say, like, yay, like we're back with, like, super robust consumer deposit growth, partially because of your point, actually, about tax. I think you're right. That probably is contributing a little bit right now. But, you know, at a high level, we talked about a company update, consumer deposit growth expectations being low to mid-single digits, and I think that is still the belief, and I think we'll be a little bit more confident in that. as maybe we'll know a little bit more next quarter. But I will say that, you know, through the lens of, like, net new checking accounts, where I think we said in the EPR that we did over 415, it just becomes a question of, at the margin, how yield-seeking flows develop. And something we're watching a little bit early, but, you know, unchanged expectations and some signs, as you point out, that the trend might be improving slightly. And then just to complete the picture, the sales side is an optionally strong year for wholesale deposit growth. So our expectations for this year were actually the year starting out pretty well. Some of the typical increases to the extent that we would have expected, the core view is for significantly less robust growth than last year. All right. Thank you.

Thanks, Mike.

Thank you. Thank you. Next, we will go to the line of Gerard Cassidy with RPC Capital Markets. Your line is open.

Hi, Jeremy. Hi, Jamie. Jeremy, obviously the first quarter of the expense levels were a little elevated relative to the full year guide, you know, if you annualize it out, of course. Can you give us some color that, you know, how are you going to bring down the following three quarters to be able to hit the year-end guide that you gave us at about $105 billion?

Yeah, so I would somewhat discourage you from, like, annualizing quarterly expense run rates because there's a lot of seasonality in the volume and revenue-related component of that as a function of the seasonality of the market's revenue in particular. But I think, and I think, you know, in reality, as you well know, Gerard, that's kind of, like, not how we manage the company, meaning I don't think you meant this, obviously, but the implication of your question is that, like, oh, the numbers were a bit high in the first quarter. Let's, like, run around and find some expenses to cut in order to meet our guidance, and that's kind of, like, not how we do things. Like, we just manage the expenses holistically kind of every day of the week. But at a high level, I think you're actually getting at something important, which is that when you consider the exceptionally strong performance of the markets and banking business this quarter, you actually might have otherwise expected us to revise up the full-year expense guidance because, realistically, I think no one could have – it's implausible to imagine that we would have budgeted the level of performance that we saw this quarter in markets and banking. No, I'm almost done. I'm almost done.

No, but I'd say some of us expected it to be quite good. And I hope every quarter is this good and that our expense target would be love to spend more money because we did so well.

Okay, but I still want to make my point, which is that, Gerard, I would discourage you from drawing the conclusion that for the purposes of the whole year, we are going to see the amount of implied internal offset between volume and revenue-related and other expenses that is implied. And the failure to revise the guidance this quarter, it's just a little early in the year. So let's see how things play out, certainly.

If volumes and if every quarter was as good as this quarter, we will spend more than $105,000 for a very good reason. Yeah, no question about that. The $105,000 is not a promise. It's an outcome of business results.

Which you've said in the past, Jamie, good expense growth. We all completely understand. As a follow-up question, on digital assets, stablecoin, on the continuum that we're on for, you know, adopting these types of new technologies, can you guys give us an update where you see this moving in terms of deposit impact possibly, but more importantly, payments? Obviously, you're a very large payments company, and how are you guys assessing it?

Sure. I mean, there's, like, so much to say on the stablecoin front. Obviously, there's a lot of legislative and regulatory stuff going on. I think, Gerard, your question is a little bit more about sort of long-term impact on the payments ecosystem. So I guess through that lens, I would actually start with the wholesale business and talk about all of the innovation that we've done in sort of modernizing payments through Connexus and the way that some of that is starting to play out and giving a lot of our customers kind of exciting new features like programmable money and different hours and the associated, you know, tokenized deposits and all that type of stuff. So we're super excited to embrace this type of innovation and be part of it. You know, and the question a little bit is how does that relate to our existing franchise? And in the context of wholesale payments, I think it's just part of an overall product offering. I think sometimes people think that you're going to have some stablecoin thing that's going to, like, radically disrupt the existing wholesale payments paradigm, and I think that's not quite the right way to look at it, only because wholesale payments is already an incredibly efficient, extremely low-margin business with very sophisticated clients. And so it's not as if, you know, a little bit to Jamie's earlier comment, it's not like there's one of these, like, your margin is my opportunity type situation in wholesale payments. It's already a very modern, very technologically sophisticated, pretty low-margin business where we're constantly delivering innovation, including with some of these sort of new technologies. On the consumer side, you know, people talk about, like, what is the consumer use case for stablecoin? And, you know, one version of it is, like, digital cash, and there's all the obvious, like, KYC implications of that. And I think maybe that's where, you know, you get a little bit into the legislative and regulatory front where, you know, there's some new developments on that whole thing associated with this notion of, like, you know, to what extent is the payment of rewards or proxy for interest, and that sort of turns it into, instead of stablecoin being an interesting form of innovation, it's just regulatory arbitrage so that you can run a bank without being subject to the important regulatory protections, both prudentially and for consumers in terms of KYC and stuff like that. So we're eager to compete. We're eager to innovate. We're innovating all over the place. We definitely support the certainty that comes from this legislation, But as we get close to some form of finalization there, it's very important that the same product be regulated, same risk be regulated in the same way. And it doesn't become the case that, you know, you just create a giant arbitrage backdoor for the prohibition on the payment of interest for stable funds. So we'll see how that plays out.

Gentlemen, as always, thank you.

Thank you, Gerard.

Thank you. So our next question comes from David Ciaverini with RBC Capital Markets. Your line is open.

Hi, thanks, actually, with Jeffries. But thanks for taking the question. So I wanted to follow up on –

Welcome to the call.

Thank you. Thank you so much. I wanted to follow up on the consumer deposits. So interest-bearing deposit costs were down nicely in the quarter. Could you talk about the opportunity going forward in light of the changes in the forward curve?

That's an interesting formulation. I sort of don't actually know the number you're quoting, but I suspect it's just a function of the rate curve and the thoughts that came through last year.

Go ahead, Jamie. I would just keep it simple. The margin would be about what it is today, give or take, a couple of basic points up or down. There are a lot of factors in there, like what kind of accounts you're opening, tax refunds, all that kind of stuff, but roughly the same for now.

Yeah, I mean, I was going to pivot to the broader question, I guess, which you talk about in terms of opportunity. And I think that, you know, there's the, as Jamie says, there's just the yield curve flowing through the high beta portions of the deposit franchise, and then there's the low beta portion of the franchise where I wouldn't say there's quote-unquote a lot of opportunity to price down because I think as is well known, the price there is already quite low, but it's in the context of an overall service bundle.

Thanks for that. And then shifting over to a follow-up on private credit. So there's still a lot of attention on this in the banks. I think the banks are well-protected. But can you remind us of the structure of these loans in terms of typical advance rates and embedded credit enhancement that protects your position?

I think I was asking for too much information. There are loans on top of leveraged loans, so you're senior to the actual loans themselves. And each one is different. But, you know, the loan-to-value, the triggers on loan-to-value and all the things like that. But you can probably figure those out if you look at the disclosures on the BTCs, et cetera.

Yeah, I do think it's reasonable to sort of remind, I guess, the market of some things that we've said before about this space, right? So, yes, you know, each client, each relationship is a slightly different structure. But at a high level, as Jamie points out, it's a senior position. The portfolios are well diversified. There are a number of protections that we have, conservative advance rates, good underwriting, sector concentration caps, cash flow trapping mechanisms, et cetera, et cetera. So as we often say, nothing that we do is riskless, but this is a space that we're quite comfortable with as a function of very close scrutiny on the way that we do the business and ensuring that the underwriting is high quality and that we've got a bunch of structural protection in place.

And the BDCs have statutory rules that they can't exceed in terms of loans at the parent, which is sometimes one and sometimes a little bit more than that.

Very helpful. Thank you.

Thanks, David. Welcome to the call again.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Ibrahim Poonawala with Bank of America. Your line is open.

Hey, good morning. I guess just one question on AI, one on the risk side, one on the opportunity side. On the risks, maybe, Jamie or Jeremy, if you can just give us a sense of it's very hard for investors and for us from the outside to handicap cyber risk. We saw the headlines last week around LLM-enabled cyber risks being discussed in D.C. Like, is this a different level of risks, and how would you characterize the preparedness of the banking system to handle this if something were to happen, and we see headlines. I'm just wondering what would be the implications of that as we think about just systemic risks, et cetera.

So cyber, you know, we've been talking about cyber risk for a long time. In fact, I think I said in the chairman's letter, it's our largest risk. So I think every industry is different. So in context, I think JPMOR is very well protected. We spend a lot of money. We've got top experts. We're in constant contact with the government. We're constantly updating things. But AI has made it worse. It's made it harder. Of course, we read about Mithos, which we're testing now and looking at, and it does create, you know, additional vulnerabilities. And maybe down the road, you know, better ways to strengthen yourself, too. But the cyber risk isn't isolated to banks. You know, it's like you can look at almost any industry. And also banks, of course, are attached to exchanges and all these other things that create other layers of risk, which, you know, we work with a lot of people to protect themselves. So it is a complex one. It's a full-time job, and we're doing it all the time. And while we're trying to get the benefits of AI, we're also very cognizant of the risks of cyber. I think the government's aware of it, too. And remember, you have cyber criminals, you have cyber states, you have cyber everywhere, and that's why you have to be quite careful. So I'd say the banks in total are rather well protected. That doesn't mean everything that banks rely on is that well protected.

Yeah, and I think there's one just minor extension of what Jamie said that is worth pointing out, which is obviously he's specifically been talking about the importance of being prepared for cyber risk for many, many, many years. But I think even more recently, even before this sort of latest set of headlines around the latest anthropic models, there's been a clear understanding that AI and generative AI in particular brings both risks and opportunities from the cyber risk management perspective. So it's not like this is the first time that anyone's thought about the way in which these more recent generative AI tools can both make it easier to find vulnerabilities, but then also potentially be deployed by bad actors in attack mode. So obviously now you've got an even higher level of attention as a result of the apparently much greater capabilities of the latest models, but that is still happening on a continuum that we've been engaged with for really quite a long time.

Yeah, and that's very good on the phone. I think it's also important to look at a lot of it is hygiene. You know, is your new software being tested before it goes in place? If you ask them to do certain things to protect their company, how do you protect your data? How do you protect your networks, your routers, your hardware, changing your passcodes? I mean, a lot of it is just doing all those things right, you know, combatively reduce the risk. And you've seen a lot of banks, they haven't had some of those risks, like ransomware and things like that, at least not that I know of.

That was helpful, thank you because I think it's something that investors struggle with on the opportunity side I think what it feels like the productivity boost which for us translates into what the long term efficiency ratio could be, could be meaningful from AI deployment just given the speed at which the technology is evolving maybe talk to that and also does it create new business opportunities where maybe it's extending the perimeter of JP Morgan's business into new things that were harder to do and are now easier to sort of put together and grow as a business given AI-driven technologies?

So on the first question, I think it's a bad idea to think you're going to deploy AI and improve your efficiency ratio because in the competitive world, I'm going to do it, everyone else is going to do it, and the benefits will be passed on to the marketplace. It's not like you're entitled to have your ROE go to 50% and that'll stay there because you do it better than everybody else. You may get a head start, you want a head start, but I just don't, I think that's just not a rational thing that somehow that will be the ultimate outcome. But the second question, absolutely it creates opportunities because, you know, if you look at, and you just take our consumer business, it's true in all businesses, but just take the consumer business with the data you have, and now we call it, you know, connected commerce, we can do travel and offers and all of these various things that people want. So you can use your relates with the client, the data you have, to make the client happier. We do a lot to reduce risk and fraud and scam by using AI. We do a lot better job of prospecting. We offer AI services to clients, et cetera. So it will enhance a lot of things you can do directly, and it will create more adjacencies, in my opinion, if you can use it quickly and wisely.

Thank you.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Matt O'Connor with Deutsche Bank.

your line is open. Hi, I want to start with a big picture question on trading. It's been amazingly strong this quarter of the last few years. Really, no matter whether markets are good or bad, we've had shocks in commodities this quarter, rates, credit, equities. And it's not just you and others kind of managing well, but it does seem like the client base is also managing it very well and just wondering if you have any thoughts on that on why it's been so consistently strong across a variety of environments yeah so you know just to put it in the big picture

but our folks do an excellent job you know and if you meet with them you'd be very impressed with their knowledge their brain power and you know and we buy and sell you know almost four trillion dollars a day and you make a little bit each time you buy and sell and then you have to manage the exposure to the risk so they do a great job in that every now and then you're on the wrong side of something a credit or commodity or rate rate side or something like that and and you see that but to me that's that's kind of the cost of doing business that's like a retailer having inventory that they can't sell the real question is do you serve your clients every day you know with great products and great services great execution uh you know and the answer is yes and that's where the real business is, and what you see today is much more volume and volatility, which generally helps because it makes spreads a little bit wider, all things being equal. There will be times where you're going to be sitting here and we're going to say that volatility killed us if you were on the wrong side of something. But in general, you're serving huge investors around the world who have $350 trillion with so much products and services. That's the business of trading. And I remind people it's not that different, you know, when you go to Home Depot. They have inventory. They put it in, they put it out, they mark it up, they mark it down. They don't call it trading, but there's that element of risk management there. But, you know, fabulous people, you know, doing a great job for clients, you know, very conscious of the risk they take. Sometimes we take a risk that we, you know, we were wrong, and we're okay with that. We never panic over that. You've never seen us say, my God, we were on the wrong side of this trade. No, because we're there serving clients. And very often, you're on the wrong side of the trade if the client wants to sell, and you're not really dying to buy if you do it anyway to serve a client. And so it's a business. It's a very good business.

And just one minor extension of that that I think supports the larger point is the thing we've said a couple times now, which is, yeah, the revenues have been great and the performance is very good. We're deploying a ton of capital in this business, actually, and a lot more over the last few years. And I think the returns that we're getting are good there. They're actually below the 17% for the company as a whole. That's fine, and we're serving clients, and it's much better than alternative uses of capital. But I think the important thing to understand is that it's not as if you're getting giant amounts of revenue growth with the same capital base in ways that you might think are unsustainable. Part of what's going on here is that we're deploying more capital and getting healthy returns.

That's helpful. Well, and then I guess a good segue into kind of a broader capital management question. Obviously, a lot of comments on the re-proposals. But as we think about kind of capital management going forward, any updated thoughts on, you still have a big buffer, obviously, on today's required levels three years from now or two years from now, you generate a ton of capital, obviously very solid buybacks this quarter. You know, you grew organically, as you mentioned. But just any updated thoughts on how to think about capital allocation going forward?

Yeah, so obviously we have a lot of excess capital. Today we measure around $40 billion. Obviously that can change depending on ultimate rules and regulations. And we prefer to deploy the capital serving clients. And the way you see us serving clients, we have more bankers, innovation economy, more global banking, doing commercial banking overseas, opening countries, opening payment systems, opening branches, that is ultimately what deploys capital over time, building the client base. It doesn't happen overnight. The outcome isn't deploy capital. I mean, the goal isn't deploy capital, build, you know, wonderful businesses that use capital intelligence over time, developing, you know, with a client, mainly with a client focus on it. And I think when I look at the world today, if you look at the world that is so big and so complex, and the capital needs, you know, when you look at the small, you know, we're one of the biggest small business bankers out there, but look at the capital needs of countries today, you know, the remilitarization of the world, the infrastructure that people need. I think there will be huge capital needs of companies, huge mergers. I mean, some of these companies, when I look at themselves, we're not big enough to serve them anymore. And so we think there will be more opportunity to serve, you know, large clients in the ways that they need it over time, And that could be M&A, it could be countries, it could be, you know, helping them build the infrastructure they need. And that will happen over time. We're not in a rush. You know, our preferred way of using capital is not buying back stock today. We're doing it, you know, fair market value and all that. But I'd rather buy back stock when we think it's a real discount. And the ongoing shield, it gets the benefit of buying it cheap.

Okay, thank you very much.

In fact, I want to remove that little thing that says cash returned to investors, which is dividends and stock buyback. I don't particularly like that because I think it puts you in an artificial position thinking that's always a good thing when it's not.

All right. Well, that's the list. Next question.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Glenn Shore with Evercore ISI. Your line is open.

Hi. Thanks very much. That last comment leads into my question. I'll just merge my question and follow it together because it's easier. So those things that you just mentioned, Jamie, on the big capital needs, some of those are very long duration. I'm curious on how much you think of that plays into a long-duration private markets balance sheet, or can big public banks finance that? And so you mentioned in your letter the market might be a little too relaxed about higher for longer rates. And I'm curious how you see that playing into all these direct lending, double B and single B credits that need to get refinanced. And while we're at it, the follow-up is, can you size your private credit exposure? So sorry to smush that all together, but I'll end it on that.

So, Jamie, sorry, if you don't mind, let me just answer Glenn's second question first, because I think it would be useful for the market to have the size number out there. So I'll do that quickly, and then if you want to take the first part of the question. So, Glenn, let me just frame this in context because I think the question of private market exposure and the definition of that, it means, as you know, a lot of different things, a lot of different people. So let me just quickly run through. You'll remember last quarter we did a walk in the context of NBFI from the 330 and the call report to the 160 that we consider core NBFI exposure, which we defined in that context. I won't go through that again. So inside of that 160, there's about 50 that we would call private credit, and it's essentially the portion of that 160 of NBFI, which involves leveraged loan investors. So that's some of the stuff that we've been talking about on this call in terms of back leverage and BDC lending that has all these characteristics in terms of underwriting, diversification, cash flow trapping, et cetera, which is why we're broadly comfortable with it. So I just thought it would be worth sizing that in that context. There are obviously other pieces of that, like direct lending or subscription lines that are variously in or out of various different measures and that you could consider, like, in a broader definition. But our sense is that the thing that people are interested in is this kind of, like, leverage loan, back leverage type stuff, and that's about $50 billion for us. So with that, I'll hand it back to Jeremy for the first time.

Yeah, so the way I look at it, so banks aren't going to warehouse very long data stuff in their balance sheet. But, you know, when you have investment grade or even large non-investment grade, you know, private markets and public markets are going to come together. People have to make markets on those things, do research on those things. I think it would be harder for private credit to do, not all of them, you know, but to do large investment grade stuff, though they've done it, you know. But like I said, they have to compete with us on that, and we're willing to do it, too. We always take the customer view. They want to do a large direct lending investment-grade deal. We will present that side-by-side with a bank-syndicated loan or something different. But I do think you're going to see a lot of creative capital, a lot of creative financing. A lot of institutions out there need long-dated assets. Think of pension plans and Social Security plans, all these various things like that. So our job is to intermediate, to come up with ideas, to turn it over, sometimes put it on the balance sheet. The stuff in the balance should be short of dated, but it's all opportunity. And I think the requirements of the world are going up fairly dramatically in the infrastructure at large. Almost everything is infrastructure today, you know, utilities and roads and bridges and data centers and GPUs. And so it's all there, but we're going to do a great job serving clients, and so we're not worried about that. But I do think you'll see, in certain categories, private markets and public markets come a lot closer in how they look at values and trading and secondary markets, et cetera.

Does that conclude your question, Glenn?

Yeah, I just want to choke in there, the higher for longer part, and if that has an impact on all some of that single B, double B paper that's coming due for refinancing.

yeah no you know that's like a basic risk management where you know when you look at the world you got to look at you know what's going to happen in recession and i'm not talking about i'm not forecasting anything i'm simply saying for jp morgan we have to be prepared for a recession and that you know you can have stagflation you know you see people mention that we have to be prepared for stagflation you know obviously if you have stagflation and higher rates for longer and credit spreads gap out that will put a lot of stress and strain on leveraged companies as they refinance. And those get fixed. Sometimes people put in more capital credit. Sometimes they reduce their CAPEX plans. It's not an immediate disaster overnight, but it would put a lot more stress and strain in people. And I pointed out that if there's a credit cycle, I do expect it will be worse than people think relative to the scenario. It's not a disaster. We're used to credit cycles. We'll be big boys about it. But asset prices will go down. Credit spreads will go down. People may get a little nervous about some of those things. We don't think it's systemic. That's more, I would put it in the category of traditional recessionary

behavior. All right. Thanks for all that. Appreciate it. Thank you. Our next question

comes from Jim Mitchell with Seaport Global Securities. Your line is open.

Good morning. Just maybe a quick question on investment banking. It seems like activity held up pretty well in March, but just wanted to get your thoughts on that. Has there been any pushing out of any pause on activity levels and pushing out of the pipeline? Just any thoughts on the pipeline and how you're looking in the near to intermediate

I mean, I think it's true that activity held up well. The other thing that I think is worth noting is that, you know, some of the robust result this quarter is the result of actually accelerated timing on M&A deal closure, and some of that was as a result of faster than expected regulatory approval. So that's obviously all to the good, but I think it's sort of unrelated one way or the other to, like, overall sentiment. On the question of overall sentiment on the pipeline, I would describe it as resilient, maybe surprisingly resilient, given everything that's going on. But I also think, you know, the timelines in the Middle East are kind of quite short. There are deadlines or negotiations. I think it's reasonable for people to kind of proceed with their plans in the hope or maybe expectation that we get relatively quick resolutions. But if things start getting derailed, I would be surprised if you didn't see some impact on sentiment. But for right now, it seems quite resilient.

Okay, and just to follow up on the balance sheet growth in markets, it has been strong, I think up over 20% year over year. What you're saying when you think about the impact of the G-Sub surcharge on JP Morgan specifically, does that start to impinge your ability to grow that as much as you want? How is that factoring into your capital decision in the markets business?

I think the short answer is yes, and that's a big part of the reason that we spent the time that we spent today talking about the problems with the surcharge. You know, it disproportionately accrues to the markets business. it disproportionately accrues to the relatively low risk density type of stuff that the client base really needs and wants these days. And that's why we think it's important that regulators think very carefully about what they're actually trying to achieve here.

One other thing. We will obviously use our brain power to do something I don't like doing, which is trying to find a lot of ways to serve our clients properly and reduce the G-SIP charge, which is usually called arbitrage. So I'm not sure the outcome is great for the system, but we will find ways to do it.

Okay, great. Thanks.

Thank you. Our last question comes from Kuangpeng Ma with China Securities. Your line is open.

Thank you. Good morning. Thank you for taking my time. This is Kuangpeng of China Securities. I have a quick follow-up on private credit. I totally agree with Jamie that there is no systematic risk at this moment, as long as we assume that every type of capital expenditures continue with good yield outlook. So it comes down to company-specific questions, like how does JP Morgan ensure its capability of selecting the top-tier projects? How do you ensure you stay with those good guys and stay away from those fat guys. Thank you.

Yeah, so we are quite disciplined on credit. You know, there's certain things we turn down. We don't like the covenants, the underwriting, or the ability to move assets out of the secured, you know, company or something like that. And we're perfectly willing to have our balance sheet go down. You know, if, in fact, we think credit is getting stressed, you will see us not make loans. Actually, we don't want to. We're just not willing to meet those terms. And so that's how we do it. We underwrite, you know, when it comes to most clients, including private credit. We want to write the company, the loans, the covenants, all those various things. And, you know, credit's a discipline. You know, like I said, loans, all of them, are an outcome of doing good business. Sometimes if the loan book drops 10% next year, we would be completely fine if we thought the loans

that we were walking away from were irresponsible.

Does that conclude your question?

Thank you, Jim. Thank you. Thanks very much. Thanks, everyone. Thank you, everybody.

Thank you all for participating in today's conference. You may disconnect at this time and have a great rest of your day.