Skip to main content
WLK $59.22 -0.79%
WLK logo
WLK · Westlake Corp
Track WLK — free
Market Cap
$7.63B
Shares
127.89M
Volume · Nov 19 211.64K Avg daily vol (3M) 878.03K
All webcasts

Conference · 2026-02-26

Westlake Corp (WLK) February 26, 2026 Conference Transcript

Concluded Feb 26, 2026 Audio replay
Feb 26, 2026 40:25 42 turns
Period
2026-02-26
Runtime
40:25
Sources
2 artifacts

Transcript & audio

40:25 Audio
Operator

Welcome. Welcome back. I'm sure people will keep filing in and out, but we keep the ball rolling here. And I'm very pleased to be joined by Steve Bender, the EVP and CFO of Westlake. Obviously, Steve, you know, recently announced his retirement pending, you know, the replacement and hiring process. so congratulations I know you've been at Westlake CFO as long as I've been in the industry which is an exceptionally long time but longer in and of itself than most CFO stints so congratulations on the career thank you very much I was remarking between like yourself and Vince and Al Mistich and it's like a lot of the CFOs who I kind of came up to the industry are now departing so it's a little bittersweet but it's been good you've always been like a an incredibly helpful resource for us over time, and so thank you for that.

I appreciate those kind of words. Of course.

Operator

So there's a few different things we can talk through, Steve, but I want to talk PVC maybe to start. It's a business that, like, historically has had a pretty small margin, right, as it relates to the overall chloralkali component of it. How do we change that? And what we've seen from a global trade flow perspective is maybe a little bit more difficulty with China becoming a little bit more of an export presence. But what are you seeing on the ground there that might cause or change any shifts? Because anti-end pollution is taking different terms and different VAT systems are changing. So can we give a little bit of sense on the market for PVC and where you think it goes?

Yeah, the market really is fundamentally changing, I think, with the – and when you have to kind of pull back a little bit and say China was really self-sufficient in PBC, they imported some, they exported some, but on balance, they were actually self-sufficient. With the slowdown in construction activities in China, naturally, everybody's aware they started exporting, but China sits very high on the cost curve. So their exports were generating actually cash losses. They were actually exporting below their own variable cost, not a very good business model. And so when you think about what they've started to do here with their anti-involution efforts and also the repeal of their duties, they're allowing, therefore, people to become more rationally oriented, which, and again, just kind of level set everybody here, on the revocation of their duties, what they were saying is you got that 13% duty drawback if you exported. effective April 1st, they're no longer going to provide that duty drawback to those exporters producing in China and exporting overseas. So what you've already seen well in advance of April 1st is export prices rising. And as a consequence, many of those producers, in fact all those producers, were losing money because, as I said, they're producing below their own variable cost. For many of those, that 13% duty drawback was the only profit they expected to see. And now that they're losing that, still producing below variable cost, their losses are going to continue to grow. So when you think about who's financing those losses, it's provincial and regional banks within China. You think back, going back to history here, going back to 2005, we saw similar behavior by the Chinese vinyl producers. At some point in time, those loans are going to have to be recapitalized by the banks because these loans are not going to get prepaid. So what happened in 2005 and 2006, the Central Bank of China, Bank of China, stepped in and had to recapitalize those provincial banks. So therefore, they cut off lending to those non-profitable operations. I fully expect to see that begin to materialize here because none of those loans being funding those unprofitable operations by those regional players in China are never going to get repaid. And so it's going to create not only a problem for the producers, but also for those regional and provincial banks in China. So I think the first step of this effort is that revocation of that duty. You've also seen anti-involution, which is shuttering some of those non-integrated PVC sites. China has a proliferation of inland-based, non-integrated PVC operations. And when you think about what's happened over the course of time, you've seen those operations be surrounded by residential construction. We have a plant that we just shut down last year. It was a non-integrated PVC site that had completely been surrounded by residential construction over the nearly 30 years that that plant had been operating. So when we shut that plant down, we are permitted by statute to run that plant in an idle mode for up to two years. Within two months, they walked in and revoked our air and water permits. Sure, we can reapply, but trying to get that air and water permit might be a real challenge. So what you see them doing is pulling back where they can on non-integrated operations and trying to then pull those operations to the coast and tying those production into refining another chemical operation on the coast. So I do expect to see a slow sunset of non-integrated PVC producers that are not on the coast and tying those back to operations that are integrated with refining and chemical operations. That'll take many years, but I think that effort is underway.

Operator

So as we look at your expectations or what we could expect to see as a result of the VAT removal, right? You have this April deadline. Is the view that we're actually seeing a lot more exports right now ahead of that? or has that kind of become a guidepost and people are starting to raise price now and then by April the price goes up more? How is the market responding itself to the deadline?

Yeah, the market responded very quickly when the authorities announced the removal of that drawback. So export prices have already started to rise and it's not going to be a surprise to I think many, certainly not in the industry, that we're going to see an inversion where export prices will maybe exceed domestic prices for residents, which is why you're seeing costs begin to rise, and you saw natural gas prices rise, ethane prices rise, and ethylene rise over the last several months. As we all know, it's been very cold in the Midwest and the Northeast. Gas prices shot up, and they've come back down, but you still see an elevated cost. So you've seen domestic producers raise prices and nominate prices not only in January, February, and some in March. But the export prices continue to rise, and as we see that continue to rise in advance of the April 1st date, I think you're going to see more rational production come into play because you already see in Europe a number of vinyl producers who have shuttered operations. You've got a handful of producers in Europe who are also in bankruptcy right now. So I think you see a number of actions, whether it is China becoming a little bit more financially rational, operations in Europe who are being shuttered. We ourselves shuttered a number of – we shuttered three core vinyl assets in December that were all export-oriented. So I think you see now the supply side beginning to react to the loss of profitability, which is beginning to balance that market. The vinyls market is much more balanced than we see from a supply-demand balance than the polyethylene markets. You've only got a small handful of players relatively in the vinyl space versus in the polyethylene space. So I think that market has a much likely chance to be balanced much sooner than the polyethylene space.

Operator

Well, and that gets back to my point a little bit, right? Because we don't see much global capacity adds for chloralkali chain, PVC, caustic chlorine in and of itself. And, you know, I know people like to think of Westlake as a U.S. housing play, and that's certainly relevant for the building products. But you sell PVC domestically. But in reality, PVC is kind of an international business. We can't raise U.S. PVC prices unilaterally for an extended period of time outside of what we might see as global price. So how far are we away from, you think, seeing a backdrop where operating rates could warrant a better backdrop for margins for the vinyl chain?

I think we're beginning to see some of those, what I would say, and we're cautiously optimistic in our outlook, but I'd say beginning to see some signs of improvement in that space. Rationalization of excess capacity, as I mentioned, is already happening both in the Americas. We're part of that. It's happening in Europe, and you're seeing some actions in Asia. So I think you're beginning to see some actions on the supply side. Demand has always been very predictable in the vinyl space. It's, as you mentioned, largely construction-related. And historically, for as long as I've been in this business nearly 50 years, I would say that we've seen it grow very predictably at about one times global GDP. So it's really a supply problem, not so much a demand problem. I wouldn't say that's the case in polyethylene quite now. You still have a lot of excess capacity being added. But I would say on the vinyl side, it's really an oversupply issue. As you see players begin to rationalize that excess capacity, you're going to see the market begin to recover sooner. So you're right. There's very little capacity being added in core aqua and in PVC. So I expect to see that market begin to kind of return to profitability much sooner than I would see it in some of the other chains.

Operator

And that other chains, including polyethylene, too. Well, polyethylene is profitable.

Polyethylene is profitable, but you still have very significant capacity being added in Asia. capacity being added in the Middle East and capacity being added even in North America so if you just look at some of the consultants that talk about capacity being added in Asia you probably have six to seven world scale plans being built between now and 2028 in Asia you have several being built in the Middle East and at least one being added here in North America so you ask yourself in the course of the next four years three and a half years do you have a need for seven to nine world scale polyethylene plants Probably not. So this is why the market and the consultants are saying the market's going to be oversupplied for a while. Now, to play in the polyethylene space as we are, we play in the more specialty end, not the commodity grades. So as you look at Westway's position in polyethylene, our space is really more in the specialty end. It's the low-density, high-pressure, high-clarity form of polyethylene, which has over 125 grades. In the more commoditized forms of high density and linear, you have roughly half a dozen grades or so each. And most of that production, both in North America and the Middle East, is destined for export. And if your export market is building its own capacity, where is that production going to go? Sure.

Operator

So I find myself often in the world where like CMA is increasingly the only like source for some of the stuff missing the days of Brian and Charlie. And Charlie probably shouldn't have said this when he did, but I'd ask Charlie where PVC would settle. He's like, I don't know. I haven't settled it yet. Right. Like he took PVC was his baby. But when we see – we track a lot of this data, and, like, it feels like the PVC market is going unsettled for, like, very long periods of time. And maybe that's not the case, and CMA is just off. Like, what's happening there?

Well, I think that, you know, as we think about it as producers, and you think about just the North American market, there are only four producers, really, in the North American market. And frankly, to make sure that we're staying certainly within the boundaries, we don't necessarily publicize our prices. When you've only got four producers, you're not going to get into publicizing prices. So you may have consultants who may say it hasn't been settled, but trust me, I'm billing and collecting on a much basis. And so when we talk about prices maybe not having been settled, in fact, they have been settled. It may not be transparent to necessarily all the parties that are not in that space, but prices have been settled. And so as we think about making sure that we stay within the boundaries of what is legally allowable, that we're not signaling to other producers where there may only be three others and ourselves, we want to be very careful about what we're doing to stay within the legal bounds. In the polyethylene space, since you have multiples of those four players globally operating in an environment that is not within the bounds of the United States, there's probably more transparency than I would say in the domestic market where you have only four domestic producers. The answer is we're still operating and operating and settling on a regular basis. It just may not be as transparent to an outside reporter.

Operator

No, that's helpful because it's not, but that's fine.

I wanted to talk about polyethylene, and by the way, we settled up a penny in January, and we've announced price increases in PVC for February and for March.

Operator

Just for how far ahead of the domestic market is the international market right now?

It's evolving. I'd say export prices are moving up, and because it is a largely spot-oriented market, I would expect that over the course of the first quarter, if in fact we continue to see the behavior continue to develop, we could see what I would call an inverted market where export prices are higher than domestic prices. It's not there yet. It's certainly possible because we continue to see a retraction of exports coming out of the Chinese market, and it's possible with that. that we could see further elevation of export price.

Operator

Yeah, so that's always been the indicator that I've looked for, for like the most durable price factor for PVC. On the polyethylene side, we just had Augustin from Leyendell here, and we were talking about polyethylene inventories. And, you know, we tracked the ACC data, pretty large reversion or, you know, cut basically made to the U.S. balance. And I think it helps, you know, certainly the argument for pricing in February and January, which we saw as being up.

Westlake has made comments about wanting to run your assets hard, I believe, right?

Operator

Like that's the view on the polyethylene side of the equation. Dow has made similar comments. what's the puts and takes of of running hard versus trying to balance things out because you know operating rates are high 80s for the u.s right now and we're balanced like inventories are tight but we can put inventories into oversupply domestically if we turn operating rates up as an industry so is this westlake you know taking your position maybe smaller than other peers and running full out and letting other Do people worry about balancing things or do you think this is a market that should, you know, everybody should be running full?

Well, this is a market that I think where product differentiation will really shine because when you think of the larger producers, be it CP Chem, Exxon, Chemical, Lyondale, Dow, and many others, the answer is the great majority of their production is the commodity-based polyethylene. It's high density and linear low density, and they're big exporters in the markets. You know, if you look at Westlake, the great, great majority of our production is in the specialty end. It's low-density, high-pressure polyethylene. So we're comparing apples to oranges when we talk about polyethylene more generally across those producers than across Westlake. So while we talk about operating rates and polyethylene generically, the reality is we're comparing two very different sets of properties of those products. So our properties are really going into largely consumer packaging and applications with high clarity. So think of the coating on packaging applications. These are cardboard, potato chip bags, bread bags, and such. So the applications you see many of our peers in and high density and linear through the trash can liner. It's the rigid, blown milk jug. It's that application. So we're competing in very different markets. So our product sets are quite different. So when we talk about operating rates and polyethylene generically, we're missing the big distinctions between these product categories. So in our case, we're not competing with them in that product set. Yeah, we make a very small portion of our product sets that compete with them, but the great majority of our products don't. So when we think about our operating rates relative to theirs, we're really not comparing apples to apples in that context.

Operator

Okay, fair enough. I don't typically think of Westlake making missteps on the acquisition front, but Hexion feels like one that probably felt great at the time, considering the multiple. And even then, I think you knew it was past peak. One, can you walk me through the decision to close the Purnace? And then two, what do you learn from that Westlake, or for the Hexion deal? probably need to talk to the intelligence agencies a little bit closer than we do.

We didn't see the invasion by Russia into Ukraine. And so we didn't see the termination of gas supply coming out of Russia into the European markets, nor did we see the fact that when China would come out of COVID lockdown, that most of their GDP would be tied to non-durables versus durables. And so as we thought about this acquisition, we closed just about a month before the invasion occurred. And so from a timing perspective, our timing was frankly very poor. And so what happened in our operations in Pernice, Rotterdam, was the fact that we saw a real spike. And even though prices have come down, they stay very elevated in terms of feedstocks, power cost. So what has happened here with our operations in the Netherlands is a much higher cost of operations than we would have expected. Plus, with China coming out a lockdown out of COVID. The production of epoxy that we saw being built was largely designed to be consumed domestically, but because of the non-durable demand that they have largely in their economies, they're exporting that product because they don't have the domestic demand for that product today, though I feel sure they will. And so that product is being flooded into markets, again, into Europe. It's not really coming much into this market, but we are seeing product coming out of Korea into this market. So I would say that what we missed was really the spike in cost of energy and feedstocks. We also did not see that the economies in China would be as, from a durable markets perspective, as weak as they have been and remain so. The growth in China's GDP is largely non-durable. And that's really where most of this epoxy would have been consumed. And until that migration of product goes from non-durable to durable, it won't pull back that epoxy out of the Western markets back into Asia. So you're right. It was a call on both a business that we thought is long-term viable, but unfortunately that asset specifically in the Netherlands isn't. So we shuttered that asset in 2025, and I would say having now shuttered that asset, our epoxy business is profitable. It was just the lack of profitability of that operation in the Netherlands that was shielding the profitability of the rest of our epoxy business. So today, as I look forward with our epoxy business, it has been profitable since the shuttering of that Pernis asset and remains profitable to this day. And I expect it to continue to be profitable. It's just that the lack of profitability in that Pernas operation in Rotterdam overwhelmed the profitability in the rest of the business.

Operator

And Europe is an interesting case study because it's like a half measure, right? We saw these anti-dumping duties on epoxy from China, but not South Korea, right? And so China maybe exited the European market and South Korea just moved directionally there. And so as you think about how Europe is taking steps to defend domestic industry, like in your efforts, are you lobbying for this? Like has the conversation moved to a broader import anti-dumping stance? Is there frustration around how ineffective some of these decisions can be? I don't know. It's a hard question. It's not really a great question to ask you. But I do wonder because it's as a region facing deindustrialization is more or less a dumping ground for a lot of commodities. So as Europe tries to come to some form of policy on industrial defense, like how are you seeing these steps form there?

I'd say Europe differs in terms of which state you may be discussing. And I'd say that the operations that we have in Germany, the operations we have in the Netherlands, the operations we have in France is different in terms of the dialogue. They don't all speak with the same common voice. And so when you think about the conversations we had with the Dutch authorities as we approached thinking about shuttering that plant in Rotterdam, that Pernice facility in the Netherlands, when you approached them and said between your environmental policies, which required us to invest truly hundreds of millions of dollars in the next few years in a business that was losing money, and said, could we not think about some grace in terms of deferring those investments, at least until this business can afford making those capital investments, and thinking about your trade policies that at least allow us to be playing on an even level playing field with those imports coming out of Asia that are being sold in the market below their own cost of production. And I would say the authorities in some countries, such as the Netherlands, basically said we don't care. But I would say in Germany you get a very different answer. So I would say in Germany where we have operations as well, I would say there's probably a more favorable error. So as a recent example, some of the carbon credits that we see coming out of the EU for operations, the Germans have heavily influenced decisions by the EU, and Germany is providing to industrial players free carbon credits, whereas I'd say some countries lobbied against that. And so I would say that you get different voices depending on the footprint that you may have across Europe. It varies much state by state by state. And so I would say that as an industrial player in some of these markets, you just have to be cognizant of how might you be competitive. And there is no no doubt that we continue to be very engaged in dialogues with these countries and with the provincial and local authorities as well, of course. But you just have to be thoughtful about capital investments that you're going to be making now and in the future. And the policies can change on the fly. So you just have to be very thoughtful about that. Okay.

Operator

I appreciate that. Thank you. So to move from Pernice to the Aberdeen Lake Charles closures, Ultimately, you know, what's driving the decision there? Because, you know, if we think simplistically about America and lower end of the cost curve with cheaper U.S. gas, it is interesting to see the rationalization happening domestically here as well.

Yeah, and so all the operations, and I should roll the clock back a little bit. In 2025, we shuttered six chemical plants in 2025. We shuttered Purness, this operation in Rotterdam. We shuttered a non-integrated facility in China, a PVC operation, and shuttered four operations in the United States, three core alchemy, core vinyls plants, and a styrene plant. all six of those facilities were destined for export markets. And so therefore, it was clear to us that we needed to take those actions because all six of those plants were not generating positive value. So as we thought about those operations in Aberdeen or in Lake Charles where we shuttered those core vinyl plants, it was clear to us that while we have a low-cost production, they're not physically integrated. We were having a lot of rail cost and shipment cost of products between site and site, all destined for a low-priced market. And so while we have a low cost of inputs, we're also selling those low cost of inputs into an even lower-priced market. And as I mentioned earlier, we have many of the Chinese producers that are selling below their own variable cost. And if they're selling below their own variable cost, you're competing with a party that seemingly has no end in terms of how long they'll fund that. So we recognize that while these are low cost on a global basis, they were our higher cost sites. So we felt we could go ahead and shutter these assets permanently, remove that production out of the market, pull that out of the export markets, still remain low cost for the remaining footprint we have, run those existing assets we have at even higher operating rates, which spreads that fixed cost of production over more production. So from our perspective, it allowed us to extract ourselves from a low priced negative margin business, allow our domestic operations to actually raise their operating rates and become even more profitable.

Operator

So from like a net exit basis, right? Because those assets probably weren't running at 100%, but maybe they were closer to 70, 75 if they were in an unprofitable situation. And your domestic base was already running pretty well, but you could take it up. What's like the net loss through your network if you were to look at like tons pre and post those decisions.

So we are then elevating operating rates because we are able to then service some of that market domestically with the higher operating rates of our domestic plants. So we're still in the export market. We didn't fully exit the export market in vinyl, but we exited a significant portion of our business in the export market. The industry is exporting just under 40% of its PVC out of North America. Because we have our hip building products business that takes a very significant portion of our PVC resin, we were substantially below that 40% number the industry was exporting. And by pulling back on our PVC exports, now we're very significantly less than half of that export percentage today. So it allows us therefore to run those domestic assets at higher operating rates to meet market demands.

Operator

I wanted to talk about the balance sheet a little bit. So, you know, one of the effects of the cycle that we've seen pressure is cash flow and cash flow can at least not particularly robust right now. So what do you have as levers here? I mean, the balance sheet is not in a bad position by any means. You've always been very conservative with how you run the business. But what are the priorities for cash over the next two years? Are there any real capital calls? What should we expect from company-specific actions to improve the cash flow dynamics?

Yeah, and so there are three specific discrete actions that we've been very clear in terms of what we're taking. We call it our three-pillared strategy. The great majority of this is really on the PIM or the chemical side of the house. And so the first piece of that pillar is a cost reduction initiative, which is a $200 million structural change to our cost structure. Remembering we achieved $170 million of cost reductions in 2025. So this $200 million sits on top of the $170 million we achieved in 2025. It's a very significant piece of self-help. The second piece of that pillar really is this footprint optimization we just talked about, where we've shuttered not only six chemical plants, but we've actually repositioned three other HIPAA plants over the course of 2025. That itself ought to also generate a $200 million savings itself. And then the third pillar really is running the plants on a more reliable, excuse me, on a more reliable basis. In 25 and in late 24, we had a very unusual level of planned turnarounds. We had moved a lot of these planned turnarounds out to 24 and 25 because during COVID, we didn't want to have all that kind of maintenance performed in 21 and 22. So we pushed these out several years, 24, 25. As we undertook those planned outages, as we brought the plants up, we found putting some of that equipment under stress, temperature, and heat caused some of these plants to stumble and go down again in an unplanned manner before they came back up. So 26 ought to be a more normalized turnaround year. So while everybody will have unplanned outages, we expect that our unplanned outage number should be greatly, greatly reduced because the number of planned outages is greatly, greatly reduced. So we think that third pillar is also about a $200 million savings. So when we think about the savings that we have that are just pure self-help, putting markets aside, that's $600 million of value we see being delivered to EBITDA in 2026. So just with setting the market aside, just the actions that we're taking, we think we'll achieve that. So two of those pillars, I would say, are deeply underway. So the first pillar of cost reductions, we actually negotiated all those last year, talking about logistics, procurement activities, and manufacturing. So we've already negotiated the rate. It's just a matter of run rate over the course of the year. So I fully expect that to be in pocket. in terms of those plants that were losing money last year, but we were all shuttered. So I don't expect those losses to reoccur. So that's really in pocket. So the third pillar is plant reliability. We have to earn that every day. So we'll watch as we go forward over the course of 26 to see is our reliability significantly a step up from 2025's reliability. As I say, I have to earn that every year, every day. But we'll see how that plays through. But I'd say of those three pillars, two of those are really well in hand at this stage.

Operator

So I like to play a game sometimes called talk to me like I'm a fourth grader. I was looking at 4Q earnings, right? And we got walked down a bit because you had these assets that were idled and there was the unabsorbed fixed cost. And then earnings comes in much stronger. And you still have the gap costs on this. And I asked on the earnings call a little bit about this. Sorry, I apologize for asking again, but I'll give you the same answer. Yeah, I'm ready for that. I just don't know how you found $80 million in like three weeks, right? And so for me, it feels like, and this is fine if this is what it is, like creative accounting around adjustments or things like that. And it's not. You said it's not. So the game of explain it to me like a four. So because that's the question we got and the pushback we got as well around that. And as it relates then to next year, because you have these pillars, right? And you've talked about them, and they're all very tangible, we understand. And a lot of it is just the absence of cost, which lends a lot of credibility to them. But if we've got this earnings now in 4Q, is that theoretically less growth for next year?

And you seem to say no. So the gap, and it depends on whether I'm trying to bridge to your estimate or the street estimates, but what I would say is that in the last few weeks of the year, we monetized, annuitized a number of pension obligations that we had, and I had, frankly, a very pleasant surprise. It was about a $27 million pleasant surprise by further annuitizing some pension obligations that came that we didn't know where that was going to land until we got literally to the end of the year. Then on top of that, I had a number of – a large number of kind of one-timers. So when you add those small bits and pieces to that $27 million annuitization, that's $30, $35 million of one-time items that were in the fourth quarter, late in the fourth quarter. And then I would say that some of that additional bridge was frankly the fact that we weren't selling product in the last two weeks of the year that we're losing money. These plants that we had shuttered that we announced on the 15th of December, I obviously couldn't tell the employees we were going to permanently shut these plants. We brought the plants down. We weren't selling product. We told the employees we're going to undertake an action on these plants, and they assumed it was a maintenance action. In fact, it's the shutdown action. So we had fixed costs but no sales, and those sales, as I mentioned, were being sold at or in some cases below variable margin. So the additional loss that you incur by selling additional products was not incurred as well. So part of the bridge is really the annuitization of some pension obligations, some smaller items as well, as well as the lack of losses related to those facilities that we showed in December.

Operator

And I apologize for taking me this long to get to building products. It's comfortably consistent. And so I've been trying to spend time on things that aren't. But it's been a very good, stable anchor for the business, right? You're seeing some trends as it relates to trading down that's impacting your mix. But overall, the business remains pretty healthy. So what's the future of Westlake building products as we move through this downtrend cycle and your cash flow gets better? Westlake's always been an acquiring company. So should we expect more to be done in building products over time?

Of course, the answer is we closed on an acquisition just last month in our compounds business, and I expect that we'll do more of that over time and fill out the portfolio. When you think of our HIP business, the housing and infrastructure products business, that HIP business really is a very nice business. It is not capital intensive like the chemical business is. It is more stable and has a predictable organic growth rate that we've signaled is 5% to 67% a year just organically. The acquisitions that we undertook in 21 and 22 have continued to add to that portfolio and give us a coast-to-coast footprint to be able to service the big nationwide homebuilders, the Dior Hortons-Pulte, LENR homebuilders, KB Homes, and many others. And we have a geographical footprint that services both Canadian and the U.S. market from coast to coast. But nevertheless, there are some gaps in our portfolio that we'd like to fill out, and product innovation at the same time to meet those customers' needs. So I do think that we'll look for opportunities to fill those gaps. You just have to recognize that sometimes those values on a multiple basis are higher than the chemical trading multiple we see oftentimes attributed to Westlake. Which means I have to find compelling synergies to be able to buy down those, that elevated multiple. And that will sometimes cause us to lose some of these opportunities because I won't pay that elevated price. Westlake is incredibly focused on value add and EVA, economic value add. So I'm not going to stretch to pay an outsized multiple if I can't see a path to making that truly a product a productive and profitable business. That doesn't mean we're ignoring the chemical side of the house.

Operator

Yes.

So we'll look at opportunities that are value added on both sides of the house and say how can I improve the profitability both on the hip side and on the PIM side and Now, there are opportunities to fill out the portfolio geographically or by product set within HIP. Likewise, on the PEM side, there are opportunities to improve the overall portfolio to further integrate that business because profit does move back and forth across the chain. You mentioned earlier in your comments that PVC tends to have a low margin. I agree with you. Historically, it has. But to be a producer of PVC, you have to produce ethylene, chlorine, caustic, ECM, EDC, and then PVC. So profit moves back and forth those chains on a regular basis. So if you don't occupy that entire space, you'll miss that. So we don't look at just the PVC space to be able to say where's the profitability. You look across the integrated chain. So as we think about being able to fully integrate that chain, we'll continue to look for ways in which to do that, be it in this market or some of our overseas markets.

Operator

Look, we only have a few minutes left, right? But that kind of brings me to this nagging question that I've had. It's not your problem anymore, so that's fine because you're going to be gone.

I'm still a shareholder.

Operator

Okay. Look, for the next five years, if I see what's in the pipe, we're going to see net tightening to the ethylene market. To this point of integration, Westlake remains net short on its ethylene position. um clearly we have favorable dynamics in the u.s as it relates to ethane but also it's expensive to build a plant and not everybody wants to just sell an ethylene plant so if projects come back right like uh linedelflex 2 right which is the uh metathesis unit they were looking at they could drive further spot ethylene reductions how where is this on the list of concerns for Westlake as well as like opportunity sets.

So with the shuttering of these plants in North America that we shuttered in December, I've cut my ethylene, my short position by 50 percent. Today, before those actions were taken, we were buying 1.2 to 1.3 billion pounds of ethylene. Today, I'm between 6 and 700 million. When you think about the joint venture cracker we have with our partner in Lake Charles, Louisiana, the Loti JV. That cracker is a 2 billion pound cracker. We own 50% of that, and we actually operate the cracker. That has potential de-bottlenecking of 40 to 50%. So our share de-bottleneck 40 to 50% would be 400 to 500 million pounds. So when you think about the ability to de-bottleneck and quickly fill 400 to 500 million pounds, it pretty much balances this. It's just a matter of how do you decide and when do you decide to do that? The issue is we know what the shortfall position is. The question is what's the capital cost to de-bottleneck and what's the margin? And the answer is when you think about the margin today, the cash margin for Ethleen is five cents, four cents. Not a wild margin. You want to spend how much capital do you want to spend to get four to five cents margin? Probably not a lot today. So the reality is you want to take a look at the forward margin and say, what is that margin likely to be? What's the capital cost to spend to get that margin? So it really is asking ourselves, what's the dollar you want to spend to get the margin you could achieve? So it really is just doing that math and making that investment, that investment decision at some point in time. So we'll wait until we see the margins likely to widen out. Having done some of the engineering work, we know where the bottlenecks are. It's It's just a matter of choosing to then pull the trigger to make the investment to be able to balance ourselves.

Operator

That's helpful context, Steve. Thank you. I'll end it there. We're out of time. So I appreciate the opportunity to be speaking with you.

Thank you very much for your interest.

Full-screen source Call document