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Conference · 2026-01-07
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Thanks, everyone, for joining. We're going to get started here. This next session is going to be a treat. I've been looking forward to this. I want to welcome to the stage President and Chief Operating Officer of Cameco, Grant Isaac. I've got a lot to talk about in terms of the nuclear ecosystem, especially in the A lot of optimism, anticipation, maybe capital to talk about in terms of the implications for the sector. But maybe just big picture, I wanted to start, Grant, with 2025 was clearly eventful for both Cameco as well as the overall nuclear industry. So what would you say stood out as some of the most needle-moving events, whether at the macro and policy level, and then also clearly the company-specific milestones? What are you most proud of?
Yeah, it's a great place to start. Thank you, and thanks to everybody for giving us some time today. 2025 was a big year in the nuclear industry, and it was just actually a continuation of several big years, and I would just summarize it by actually echoing some of Brian's lines in the past. Nuclear went from being part of, well, first of all, being in the wilderness post-Fukushima. Then it became part of the climate security solution, and then Russia invaded Ukraine, and people realized it actually is a key part of the energy security solution. And then it fully emerged as part of a national security solution. So it's that triumvirate of security issues that nuclear is just incredibly well-placed with its attributes, 24-hour baseload, carbon-free, resilient, robust power, and then just found its way into discussions over and over again. One of the notable things in 2025 was... The announcement that it is time to start building in the United States. We announced a deal with the U.S. government to invest $80 billion into kick-starting new builds of AP-1000 reactors, an incredible technology, the world-leading gigawatt-scale technology that other nations are pursuing, and it was time to start building in the United States. So that announcement was big. On the fuel side, it's absolutely linked to the optimism around where nuclear power is going. And another notable thing about 2025 is the world is waking up to the fact that markets actually work. After years of unacceptably low prices across fabrication, enrichment, conversion, and uranium, there was a lack of investment in the nuclear fuel cycle, and that lack of investment has meant that fuel is short. Thank you. The only way to solve that is higher prices, and so we're looking at a really neat situation where our business model allows us to participate in reactor new builds, build our own demand for every reactor that then becomes core for 80 to 100 years for Westinghouse and Cameco, and we're delivering on that plan, and we're just excited about where it's at.
So this is a January conference, everyone. Any guidance, but following on the heels of some of the...
When I look ahead, and I'm going to kind of start downstream at the reactor side, and then I want to work back up from the fuel cycle or to the fuel cycle, I think 2026 is going to be a big year because I think we are going to see FID on some AP1000s. Maybe not in the United States because we're still pretty nascent in this $80 billion program, but I think we are going to see FID in Poland. And Bulgaria, two nations that have chosen the AP1000. Poland wants to build six of them. The first three have been site-selected. Bulgaria wants to build two. They are very quickly moving through the front-end engineering and design process as they accelerate towards FID. I think that's a pretty strong signal. For that next wave of U.S. gigawatt-scale technology, we have a partnership now with the Koreans. They're no longer a competitor. They're now a collaborator. I expect them to continue to advance their new-build projects, which benefits Westinghouse quite significantly. As that rolls out, I think 2026 is going to start to see higher levels of contracting across the fuel cycle. I think those are pretty strong signals when you see new builds happening that it really is time to get serious about long-term uranium contracting, and that is an absolutely essential We keep reminding utilities around the world that are interested in nuclear or have nuclear That fuel is one of the long-lead items they need to be spending time on. Yes, it's your reactor pressure vessel. It's your coolant pumps. Yes, it's your steam generator. But your fuel and your fuel components and contracting for them are also a long-lead item. We expect 2026 to see stronger demand for that reason and are prepared for it. In fact, as you have noted in some of your research, 2025 ended quite strong, including a leaked negotiation we were having with the Indians. And I think it woke up the market a little bit that there is big sovereign demand back in the uranium market. And that has always been a leading indicator of a really robust contracting cycle about to begin. So, 2026 is feeling... The supply-demand dynamics, as we look out, are actually in a situation right now where we would conclude that the demand forecast that most have out there, like the World Nuclear Association's Fuel Market Report or UX or Trade Tech, two of the... We believe they're actually understating demand when they build up their profile because really that demand story is typically only built on the current reactor base. And then you add to it some reactors that are restarting, Duane Arnold, Crane Clean Energy Center, Diablo Canyon, Life Extension, you add that in there, subsequent license renewals for other reactors. And then there's new build but only of reactors that are under FID. Actually, the demand case doesn't include the $80 billion project we just talked about. It doesn't include Bulgaria and Poland yet because they're not at FID. It doesn't include Ontario's plan to build 14 gigawatt-scale reactors because none of those are at FID yet. By the way, the demand story doesn't yet anticipate nuclear being used for generative AI. We see that our sector trades quite closely with where the data centers are at. That is all upside to the demand story. That's actually not currently baked in to the demand story for nuclear. So it astonishes me a little bit how we trade off when the data story trades off a little bit, because that's not even built into the forward demand story of nuclear yet. And then on the supply side, we see a dynamic where we tend to overstate the supply that's going to come to the market, Because our industry tends to... They're really bad at disentangling on the uranium side a preliminary economic assessment on a potential uranium resource from a technical report on a material operating property, and they treat the two as equivalent, and so they see a preliminary economic assessment that says production's going to start in four years from now, and it's going to be 20, 25 million pounds of production, and there's no license, there's no permit, there's no infrastructure. There's no workforce. There's no contractors. And so when we back out our experience of how long it actually takes to bring in supply, we actually see the gap is bigger. And that gap, in relative terms, of the amount of material that utilities have not yet bought to run the known reactor base has never been bigger. And that feels like a really exciting time to be an incumbent producer in uranium, but we're a disciplined producer. We still have 30% of our production shut in or curtailed because we are waiting for the fuel buying community to get serious about the prices required to create that next wave of supply. We never reward our investors by front-running demand with supply. In fact, we create the maximum reward for our owners. We're at or slightly late the market because when we're at or slightly late the market with our production, that's when fuel buyers trip over each other to buy material. That's when demand starts to hit replacement rate and beyond. That's when you start to discover strong pricing that we can lock into multi-year contracts. We're still in supply discipline because we see a very, very robust contracting cycle coming.
I guess in terms of numbers, you mentioned the replacement rate. Contracting for 2025, based on the latest numbers, I think was like 80 million pounds, a little less than 60% of replacement rate, which does seem unsustainable. Is there that much secondary supply or inventory out there? It just seems like something will come to a head. So can you kind of speak to the call?
We've always used this as a rule of thumb in our industry. If you want to kind of assess the health, and I'm talking about the uranium segment in particular, if you want to assess the health of where the uranium segment is at, you simply look and you say, collectively, are utilities entering new forward contracts that are replacing the material they're burning on old contracts? And if they are, that's called replacement rate. If they're above... They're not just at replacement rate, but they're also building inventory by definition. And if they're below, they're chewing through secondary supply and inventory. Utilities have not been at replacement rate collectively since 2012. So the world has chewed through that historic shock absorber. So those who have been around the story for a long time will often say, but Grant, it's never about primary production in uranium because there's all that secondary supply. There was all that secondary supply, but the situation has been since 2012, utilities largely went on a buyer's strike, and they stopped contracting at replacement rate, but the gap needs to be filled with something, and that something has been a continual drawdown of government inventories, utility inventories, and secondary supply such that we're at a moment where the mobile inventory position in the uranium segment has never been lower. And we're not even at replacement rate. We're at an $86 long-term price of uranium in U.S. dollars, and we're not even at replacement rate. We've been at an $86 long-term price before, but never on the front end of a contracting cycle. We've been after there's been a big supply disruption or a demand shock, and we have a lot of above-replacement rate contracting in the market, but we've never been at $86 on the front end of a cycle before. This is setting up really nicely. Replacement rate has to be achieved. We have to go beyond replacement rate to start building inventories again. That's a very constructive setup for an incumbent uranium producer.
So the $86 a pound, I think that's a $7. I know you're not in the business.
Well, I am. I'm just not in the business of saying it's up.
I'm advertising it, I suppose. But you do set floors and ceilings, and you have a contract mechanism that you have articulated in Telegraph. As well as, you know. You kind of give us a sense.
When we think about the term market, it's important to understand we exclusively sell into the term market. We do not sell any spot material at all. In fact, as a strategy, we are over-contracted. We deliberately sell more than we can produce so that we have demand to deploy in the spot market to buy at our discretion because, quite frankly, some idiot is always going to try to sell into the spot market. And that can be deleterious to forward negotiations. So we always want to be in a position to pick up that material to the advantage of our owners. So when you think about the term market, it's important to understand there's two ends of the spectrum. The first are base-escalated type contracts. And the way those work, Brian, is if you came to me and said, look, I'm looking for 100,000 pounds of uranium 2028 to 2035, but it's got to be base-escalated. We basically would turn to today's long-term price of $86, and that's kind of the starting point of our negotiation, and then we fight over how it escalates. We fight how it escalates to first deliveries. And we fight over how it escalates through those deliveries. And I'll be arguing for things like mining cost indicators and regulatory cost indicators, and you'll be saying, no, it's just CPI, and I want you to discount CPI because others are willing to do that. So we'll fight over the escalation. We historically do not like base escalated prices at this point in the cycle. Escalation is nice, and $86 is nice, but we think the market's going higher. What we have a preference for is market-related contracts. The way those work, same 100,000 pounds, 2028 to 2035, Brian comes to me. Now, we're not trying to price it today. We're just trying to agree the pricing indicator at time of delivery out in the future. He might say to me, I want it to be the spot price because we're normally in contango. Or he might say, sometimes we're in backwardation, so I want it to be the term price. I never want to take same-day spot exposure, so I might want a rolling average of the spot price, or I might want a blend of the spot and term price at time of delivery, but that's what we're fighting over. And then at some point, he's likely going to go, oh, but I want a ceiling. And I'll say, okay, well, if you want a ceiling, I want a floor. And now we're fighting over the callers around a market-related contract. So priced out into the future, but subject to callers that escalate. This is our preference today. This is where we want to be. Seventy percent of the contracting in the market in 2025 was market-related. Only 30 percent was base-escalated. Of that 70 percent, it's really important to understand that price reporters do not account for that 70 percent at all. Price reporting, that $86, is only based upon base-escalated pricing. So what the market is missing right now... Seventy percent of the information that is basically suggesting uranium is already at three-digit pricing. And what I mean there is we sign contracts today, market-related. We've had market-related contracts with floors, escalated floors in the mid-70s. We've had ceilings as high as $150 escalated. The midpoint... Between those floors and the ceilings are already $100 uranium, $115 uranium. So there are utilities out there willing to sign market-related contracts. They're running a value-at-risk analysis between the floors and the ceilings, and the midpoint is already three-digit uranium. But the market only prices the long-term on the 30% that are base-escalated. So what we have to do as Cameco is, even though we have a preference for market-related, We have to occasionally agree to a small portion of a contract that's base escalated just so we can say to the price reporters, it's not $86 today. We can get $88, and then the next turn we can get $90. So we have to deliberately walk up that long-term price because the market is ignoring 70% of the information out there. And when I look at the 70% of the information, it's already telling me we're at three-digit uranium, which is an exciting place to be. So nuclear demand.
Inflecting higher, inventory is dwindling, prices are already starting to creep higher. So what is the trigger or triggers for the utilities to actually... Does it need a supply shock, or what kind of...
It's a market where sometimes people... The fact that we're not at replacement rate and haven't been for Fukushima, they'll say things like fuel buyers are asleep at the switch or they don't know what they're doing. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our typical fuel buyer is a master's or PhD trained nuclear scientist. These are some of the smartest people you'll ever have the pleasure of spending time with. You just have to, like in any industry, follow the incentives. Fuel buyers do not have an incentive to try to call the bottom of the uranium price. They have this wonderful averaging effect, first of all. Like, there is no fuel buyer, with the exception of maybe the Ukraine right now, because of their security of supply contract. They're not getting all of their uranium this year under one delivery. They have multiple contracts, so they pay an average price of uranium, and it reflects contracts signed many years ago, contracts that are in midlife and brand-new contracts, but they pay an average price. They're not paying today's price, right? They pay an average price. The interesting thing is, they take their uranium, they put it into a bespoke fuel bundle, and then they capitalize it for the time the fuel bundle is in the reactor. So they get these two amazing averaging effects. They average down today, and they average over time, which means they're kind of insulated from price spikes, which means they don't really worry about them in the way that others do. So if the price has been low and it stays low... And when the price starts to go up, well, then they start to contract. That's their incentive structure. And then security of supply kicks in. So they don't spend all their time going, oh, boy, you know, if I contract today, I can save $2 a pound. They're not rewarded that way. They're just rewarded for security of supply. That means generally our industry needs to be shocked into action. It doesn't sort of march up rationally to a production economic pricing. It usually requires a supply event, like the flooding of the Cigar Lake event in 2006-2007. Cigar Lake Development Project flooded. The market panicked. Fuel buyers all went through the door at the same time. Uranium went to $136 a pound, $200 in today's terms. Then came off as Kazak production was incented and came up. Or in 2010, there was a demand event. Chinese stepped into the term market for the first time in the summer of 2010 and bought 152 million pounds of uranium in one month. And the rest of the fuel buyers felt like they were going to get left out on future supply, so they all tried to go through the door at the same time. But generally, our market needs to be shocked into action. I don't know where that shock is coming from. It could be... The failed promises of restarts of mines, it could be when greenfield projects don't go as well as people think they're going to go, could be a demand shock. I talked about the leaking of the Indian contract that we were negotiating. That's a lot of demand that people didn't realize was in the market. I'm not exactly sure what the next shock is going to be, but because this market doesn't have the inventory position it used to have, this This market has never been more vulnerable to a shop. Than it is today. That historic shock absorber, government inventories, like DOE inventories, or the megatons to megawatts project, for those old enough to remember that in the industry. 400 million pounds of uranium material flowing into the commercial market under the HEU agreement. Gone. None of that exists today. So this market will hit a shock, and when it hits a shock, it has no shock absorbers anymore. And that sounds like a pretty constructive thing for an incumbent producer.
I want to spend some time on... We need baseload power. You mentioned at the start the $80 billion partnership between the U.S. government, Cameco, Brookfield, and Westinghouse. Maybe just for starters, For people, how this partnership came to fruition, sort of what is the signal here in the next 12 months, and then maybe for the next, you know, probably decade plus.
The genesis, or if we think about the origin story for this deal, it really was born out of a little bit of frustration. You know, we were dealing with a U.S. administration that was going, I'm building gigawatt-scale reactors. The U.K., hell, the province of Ontario is building 14 gigawatt-scale reactors. How can all of these much, much smaller economies find the launch conditions to build gigawatt-scale reactors, and we can't launch in the United States? What's going on here? And so it's a matter of, well, the U.S. system was set up to be a race for the bronze medal. It wasn't set up to be a race for the gold medal. The order book for Units 5, 6, and beyond was actually quite big, but nobody wanted to be 1 and 2, following Vogel. Nobody wanted to be 3 and 4. There was nobody wanting the gold and nobody wanting the silver. And so the U.S. government took the position that maybe it's the role of government to prime the pump here. Stimulate the supply chain to reduce what are often cited as the main risks that are keeping utilities from making this decision. Standing up the supply chain for the first time, engaging a constructor and letting them go down the learning curve and making sure they're delivering good unit costs, bringing in the skilled labor and training it up so that it's ready to be deployed. The U.S. government just looked at it and said, well, maybe that's our role to play here, and besides, we need the electrons anyway. So it sounds like a good project to be engaged in. So as we look ahead... You know, one of the main themes is the executive order from May 23rd that spoke to large nuclear power plants said 10 need to be under construction by 2030. In order to achieve that, you need to separate ordering long lead items for gigawatt scale reactors from, you know, figuring out the sites they're going to be built at and figuring out the model they're going to be built under. So the first project is... What does the order for long lead items look like? The kit for eight to ten nuclear reactors, you know, how are we going to finance that? How are we going to put that package together? That is a Westinghouse conversation. The next project is trying to figure out, well, where are they going to be located? What is the model they're going to be built under? I think if there's four or five two-packs, there's going to be four or five different models of how they're built under. There might be a build, own, and operate by the U.S. government to meet national security needs, electrons for generative AI for national security, for example. On the other end of the spectrum, we might simply take advantage of the utilities that already produce nuclear power, that already have a construction and operating license that are already NRC-regulated and are ready to go but just need a financing package in place. And in between, there might be... Some build-owned transfer models, where you have government taking the lead, but then transferring to a consortium of utilities or transferring to long-term PPA with a group of hyperscalers, all to solve this problem of 24-hour baseload electrons. So I think there's going to be a number of different innovative, creative models around how we're going to deploy and where they're going to be. And that's just going to take time. We're peripheral to that conversation. We're not really involved in it. And then, of course, it's going to be financed by Foreign and Direct Investment Pledge to the United States from Japan and Korea. And so there's a third work stream, which is to pitch to the investment committees that were set up as part of those mechanisms. to secure the funding for long lead items and then the new build. So, 2026 should be a really interesting year because if we're going to hit that executive order of 10 under construction by 2030, long lead items will have to be ordered in 2026, and we're going to have to identify sites and start moving sometime in 2026 as well in order to hit that order.
How much of this is already on the board? Is this all just fresh, new build? This is D.C. Summer. This is Fermi in Texas. Like, maybe give us a contextualization of the volume opportunity and maybe what's sort of on the board already.
Yeah, at the moment, the project of $80 billion minimum spend for 8 to 10 reactors, and, of course, that's a range because that's dependent on how fast you come down the next-of-a-kind to end-of-a-kind cost curve. If the DOE is right and it's the fifth unit that hits end-of-a-kind, then we can build 10 reactors. For $80 billion. If it takes a bit longer, it's probably going to be eight reactors. That's a contained project. It has nothing to do with VC Summer. It has nothing to do with the Fermi project. Those are all in addition. So you can start to do the math and say, well, are we actually potentially talking about 10 reactors plus VC Summer? That's another two plus Fermi. Are we talking about 16 reactors in the United States plus two in Bulgaria? Plus six in polling. It goes parabolic really quickly when you start looking at the order book. So those are in addition to this project, and those are playing for the LPO funding, now called the Energy Dominance Financing Department, former LPO. It's going to be hard for me to change over on that one. They have $250 billion already appropriated. for nuclear new build, for energy new build, but we'll allocate it to nuclear. So there is another pot of money that exists for those types of projects. They are distinct from this.
Maybe moving on to international.
Well, the CANDU reactors have served Canada extraordinarily well for a very long time, and as Cameco, we're fully integrated in CANDU reactors. We provide fuel to Bruce Power. That's what we sell, a fabricated fuel bundle. We sell all the Calandria tubes. We sell reactor components to all the CANDU reactors. We are fully integrated, but Canada has a choice to make. And it's a pretty stark choice. If it wants to build gigawatt-scale reactors and wants to begin to deploy them right now, it has to go with the AP-1000, because there is no Generation 3 can-do reactor. There isn't one designed. Canada might be tempted to say, well, we're going to build Generation 1 1970 Darlington Can-Do reactors, and they've just refurbished all of those reactors and refurbished them very successfully, so that could be a good strategy for Canada and would be a good strategy for Cameco. It would build out that part of our business, but then it's not an export strategy. Because no markets in the world want to build a Gen 1 reactor. In fact, most markets that are looking to build new nuclear have regulations that would prevent them from building a Gen 1 reactor, because when Fukushima happened, everybody upgraded their regulatory and safety standards. So if you're going to have an export program, it has to be a Gen 3 reactor or a Gen 3 plus reactor like an AP1000, and that doesn't exist today. There is no Gen 3. Heavy water can-do reactors. So if Canada wanted to wait to develop one, it would probably take 10 years to design it. It would probably take 10 years to build the first one. So you're 20 years out from new nuclear, or they could start to deploy an AP-1000 today. Because as Eric Chassard, the president and CEO of Bruce Power, would say, being one of the only CEOs who's actually built nuclear reactors in the world. He would say that there are five main risks that you have to manage when you make the decision to build nuclear. The first is design technology risk. The second is fuel risk. Do we actually have a commercial fuel supply for the type of reactor that we're looking to build? Number three is first-time licensing risk. It takes a long time to get a brand-new design licensed. Number four is regulatory risk, distinct from licensing. Like once you have a technology and you have fuel and you have a license, you still have to locate it somewhere. So you have first-time regulatory risk to place it as a product. And then you just have good old-fashioned big product risk and big project risk. And the AP1000 is the only reactor that Canada could choose that takes four or five risks off the table on day one. So we're optimistic. That Canada will remain a very powerful nuclear country. That Canada will make the right technology decision. And quite frankly, they've already chosen light water reactor technology. The Darlington SMR project is a GE BWRX300. That's not a Canadian technology. That's not a pressurized heavy water reactor. It's a light water, boiling water reactor. the pivot into light water reactor technology anyway.
It crossed that Rubicon, so to speak. In the last few minutes we have here, I mean, we talked a lot about the demand side. Clearly, there is a lot of focus on power demand and nuclear being a part of that equation. How about on the supply side? Can we build?
60 months. By the fifth year, we could have 20 in flight. Capitalize more of the supply chain to go beyond that, but that works. With today's order book, with today's plans, with where folks want to go, that is enough to get going because it is just absolutely critically important that we do the three S's, and we do them right this time in nuclear. First one is standardized. The U.S. built out 104 reactors through the 60s and 70s, 55 different models. Across 104 reactors. We cannot do that again. So by standardized, I simply mean it's Vogel 4 over and over again, right down to the color of the paint in the bathroom. Nothing changes. It's got to be Vogel 4 over and over again. By sequence, I mean, we have to understand that, you know, we don't start a golf tournament by everybody tees off on the first hole at the same time. So we have to sequence these things such that the big civil project starts on the first two-pack, and then it moves to the next one as the construction team is stood up. And then as the construction team moves on, the nuclear island. Gets assembled. And then as it moves on, the turbine island comes in. We've got to learn the lessons of the United Arab Emirates, the Baraka plant. We've got to learn the lessons of what the Koreans do when they build or the Chinese. We've got to learn the lessons of the major component replacement in Ontario. We have to standardize. We have to sequence. And then we have to make a commitment to simplifying. And I don't mean the design. I don't mean going back and changing the reactor. I mean... We've got to do a way better job of passing the learnings on from program to program to program. The U.S. was kind of built out in small islands. We ended up with 55 different models because there wasn't a lot of crosstalk between utilities about what was working and what wasn't working. We have to do better on that. We standardize, we sequence, we simplify. This is a deliverable program.
That's great. We are right up on time. We'll wrap it here. Great. Thank you. Thank you.